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THE IMPACT OF LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS ON 
U.S., U.K., AND CANADIAN BANK STOCKS
ABSTRACT
The 1980s have been a decade of crisis for banks engaged 
in international lending. This dissertation examines the 
impact of twelve events related to the Latin American debt 
crisis on the market value of the U.S, U.K, and Canadian bank 
stocks. The existing literature is extended in several 
directions. First, different types of events and several 
events of the same type are analyzed to enhance the generality 
of the conclusions. Second, a general theoretical framework 
involving two testable hypotheses is utilized to interpret the 
economic significance of the events. Third, the capital 
regulation hypothesis is tested extensively and it helped to 
clarify some of the ambiguities presented by earlier 
literature on the Mexican moratorium event. Fourth, the 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH) model is used to address some of the problems 
associated with the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) market model. 
These include nonnormalities, nonlinearities, and 
heteroscedasticity, and Cornell and Shapiro's criticism 
against use of event study methods for studying the impact of 
the debt crisis. Finally, the international dimension of the 
Latin American problem is recognized by extending the analysis 
to the British and the Canadian banks.
ix
Most of the events produced significant event-day excess 
returns for the U.S. banks with Latin American loans. The 
market distinguished high-, medium-, and zero- exposure groups 
among banks. The four moratoria (Mexican, Argentinean, 
Bolivian, and Brazilian) as a class, produced strong and 
consistent results, although the underlying dynamics of the 
moratoria differed. This study provides perspective on the 
economic impact of capital regulation and demonstrates a link 
between external exogenous events and bank value.
The analysis suggests that the GARCH model does not make 
a significant difference to event study results. The results 
for the British and the Canadian banks differ somewhat from 
those for the U.S. banks. Differences in capital regulation 
in the three countries may explain the differential reaction 
of the three markets for the same set of events related to the 
Latin American debt crisis.
x
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
In August 1982, Mexico declared a moratorium on servicing 
its external debt, thus triggering a major international debt 
crisis. Since the Mexican moratorium, other Latin American 
countries (e.g., Chile, Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia) negotiated 
debt-rescheduling accords with their bank creditors. In 
February 1987, Brazil, the world's largest debtor country, 
unilaterally suspended interest payments on its foreign debt. 
Throughout the 1980s the Latin American debt crisis has been 
a major problem demanding the attention of international 
bankers, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World 
Bank, the United States government, and academicians.
Several major banks of the industrial countries such as 
the U.S., U.K., Japan, and Canada have been big lenders to 
Latin America.1 The possibility of an outright default by 
Latin American debtors has serious implications for these 
banks. The debt crisis heightened public concern about the 
structural soundness and solvency of international banking 
system. Since the Mexican moratorium, considerable progress 
has been made toward resolving the debt crisis. The major 
debtor countries have adopted strong measures for structural
•The exposure of these banks to Latin American debt 
exceeds 100% of their shareholders' eguity.
adjustment in their economies. Banks have significantly 
boosted their reserves against losses on loans to developing 
countries and strengthened their capital base. As a result, 
the threat to the world financial system has receded. 
However, the debt crisis is far from being resolved.
The international banking industry is poised for 
significant changes in the 1990s and the market's assessment 
of bank stocks is going to be one of the important factors in 
shaping these developments. One of these changes is 
nationwide interstate banking becoming effective in the U.S. 
in 1991. Consequently, intense merger activity is expected 
in the banking industry in the 1990s. Another development is 
the new capital guidelines approved by bank regulators of ten 
major industrialized countries. Banks deemed to be 
inadequately capitalized under these guidelines may lose 
market share to strongly capitalized banks that will have the 
flexibility to expand. Thus, analysis of market reaction to 
several events related to the Latin American debt crisis may 
shed some light on how the market will assess the changes and 
events which will shape the banking industry in the '90s. In 
other words, the analysis will have a bearing on issues of 
capital adequacy and access to capital markets for major 
international banks.
Several studies have examined the impact of the Mexican 
debt moratorium announcement on the market value of the U.S.
bank shares.2 These studies arrived at conflicting findings. 
Schoder and Vankudre (1986) and Cornell and Shapiro (1986) 
find little effect on the event day, suggesting that the 
announcement had little informational content. Lamy, Marr, 
and Thompson (1986) find a negative impact on the event day 
and a negative effect for debt exposure on excess returns. 
Bruner and Simms (1987) find a significant negative effect on 
the event day and note that this effect was invariant to the 
level of bank debt exposure. Only for a time span beginning 
several days after the announcement do Bruner and Simms find 
evidence that bank returns are correlated with debt exposure 
ratios. Thus, there is a need to reconcile these conflicting 
results.
Other studies examined events such as the Brazilian 
moratorium, legislative actions and the announcement of debt 
reschedulings.3 Several hypotheses (e.g., new information 
hypothesis, rational pricing hypothesis) have been proposed to 
explain the results of the Mexican moratorium and other events 
related to the Latin American debt crisis. But, the 
regulatory aspect of the banking industry, especially capital 
regulation, is generally ignored in these theories.
2The major studies are Schoder and Vankudre (1986), 
Cornell and Shapiro (1986), Lamy, Marr, and Thompson (1986), 
Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) and Bruner and Simms (1987).
3These studies include Cornell, Landsman, and Shapiro
(1986), Glascock, Karafiath, and Strand (1986), Billingsley 
and Lamy (1988), Viswanathan and Philippatos (1989), Ozler 
(1989), and Musumeci and Sinkey (1990 a,b).
There are several special features of the Latin American 
debt problem. First, events of similar nature took place over 
a period of time. Thus, there are four moratoria at different 
points in time, namely, Mexican in August 1982, Argentinean in 
September 1982, Bolivian in May 1984, and Brazilian in 
February 1987. This provides an opportunity to analyze these 
four similar events and compare investor response to the four 
events.
Second, different types of events (e.g. , borrower-induced 
events such as moratoria on debt payments, lender-induced 
events such as the increase in Citicorp's loan-loss-provision, 
and events exogenous to the borrower-lender relationship such 
as the Falkland War, Baker plan, and the slump in oil prices) 
affected the same sample of bank stocks. There is no 
empirical study exploiting this aspect of the problem.
Third, the Latin American problem has an international 
dimension in that it affected the major banks of the 
industrial world. For example, the U.S., British, and 
Canadian banks held about 36%, 12%, and 9%, respectively, of 
the total Latin American debt in 1984.4 Thus, this problem 
offers an opportunity to study the market reaction to the same 
events across different markets and to extend the generality 
of the proposed theoretical models.
This dissertation attempts to exploit these interesting
4Source: World Financial Markets, July 1985, Morgan
Guarantee Trust Co.
features of the Latin American problem by analyzing a series 
of events during the period 1982-1987. For each event, the 
risk and return characteristics of the U.S., U.K., and
Canadian bank stocks are examined.
Most of the empirical studies on the Latin American debt 
crisis have employed event study method. Excess returns 
during the event period are measured from the market model 
using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation method. 
However, numerous econometric problems exist with this 
procedure. Empirical studies (e.g., Brown and Warner 1985, 
Lee 1976 a,b; McDonald 1983) show that the daily excess 
returns from the market model exhibit nonnormalities and 
nonlinearities resulting in a higher Type I error. A number 
of studies (e.g., Bey and Pinches 1980, Giaccotto and Ali 
1982, McDonald and Morris 1983) document the presence of 
heteroscedasticity in the market model. Studies by Beaver 
(1968), Patell and Wolfson (1979), Kalay and Lowenstein 
(1983), Christie (1983), and Ohlson and Penman (1985) document 
significant increases in variance during the event period. 
The change in variance results in misspecification of 
hypotheses tests for the significance of excess returns during 
the event period. Although the problem of heteroscedasticity 
is well recognized in the literature, the approach to 
correcting it is rather ad hoc. Cornell and Shapiro (1986) 
point out that the standard event study method is not suitable 
for analyzing the Latin American debt problem since it cannot
handle the leakage of information prior to the event. This 
dissertation attempts to address these empirical issues by 
employing the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model.
The structure of the dissertation is as follows. In 
Chapter 2, two streams of literature, namely, various 
theories/hypotheses proposed to explain the events related to 
the Latin American debt crisis, and the empirical studies on 
different events, are reviewed. In Chapter 3, twelve events 
are identified for detailed analysis. A brief description of 
each event and its hypothesized impact on bank stock prices 
are provided. The chapter also contains a description of the 
institutional background and data for the U.S., U.K., and the 
Canadian banks. In Chapter 4, two hypotheses, the new 
information hypothesis and the capital regulation hypothesis, 
are proposed to explain the significance of various events and 
also to reconcile the conflicting results of earlier studies 
on the Mexican moratorium event. The deficiencies in the OLS 
market model are addressed by using the GARCH model. In 
Chapter 5, the results of measuring excess returns using the 
OLS and the GARCH models are compared. The events for which 
the event day excess returns are found to be significant are 
analyzed further in Chapter 6 to test the two hypotheses. In 
Chapter 7, the analysis of events is extended to the U.K. and 
the Canadian banks. Chapter 8 contains a summary of the 
dissertation and suggestions for future research.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Latin American debt problem generated considerable 
interest in economics and finance literature due to its 
potential threat to the viability of the international 
financial and banking system. Finance literature has 
traditionally employed event study methodology to analyze the 
impact of specific events like the Mexican Moratorium on the 
value of major U.S banks involved in the Latin American debt 
crisis.
Analysts have offered various theories/hypotheses to 
explain the impact of Latin American debt crisis on U.S. bank 
shares. These are reviewed in the next section. Review of 
the empirical studies examining the excess returns during the 
event period constitutes the subject of Section B of this 
chapter. The last section summarizes the discussion.
A. Theoretical Explanations
The diversity of arguments put forward in the literature 
concerning the debt crisis points to the complexity of the 
Latin American problem. Although treated as competing 
explanations, they all capture important dimensions of the 
crisis. Table 2.1 summarizes extant theoretical explanations 
in the literature. A detailed review follows.
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1. New Information Hypothesis
The new information hypothesis is based on the efficiency 
of capital markets.1 From this theoretical underpinnings 
various authors have argued that stock prices should provide 
a quick and unbiased reflection of all new information 
available in the market. In the context of the Latin American 
debt problem, the new information hypothesis argues that new 
information provided by an event about the quality of Latin 
American loans should be immediately incorporated in the stock 
prices of the affected banks.2
2. "Dribs and Drabs” Hypothesis
The information-leakage hypothesis or the "dribs and 
drabs" hypothesis argues that information about the quality of 
Latin American loans leaked into the market over a long time 
(Cornell and Shapiro 1986).3 According to this hypothesis, 
bank stock prices reflected the information even prior to the 
Mexican announcement of moratorium due to the arrival of
•Beighley (1977), Pettway (1980), and Pettway and Sinkey 
(1980) report evidence that the market for the shares of 
large commercial banks is semi-strong form efficient.
2This hypothesis was proposed by Schoder and Vankudre
(1986), Smirlock and Kaufold (1987), Bruner and Simms (1987), 
Viswanathan and Philippatos (1989), and Musumeci and Sinkey 
(1990 a,b).
3The "dribs and drabs" hypothesis is a modified version 
of the partially anticipated events model of Malatesta and 
Thompson (1985). The latter researchers argue that the 
effect of any event consists of two components: the economic 
effect and the announcement effect. If an event is partially 
anticipated, the observed announcement effect will be 
attenuated compared to an equivalent unanticipated event.
information at the market in dribs and drabs. The leakage of 
information into the market over a period of time suggests 
that no single event by itself exerts a significant influence 
on stock prices but the cumulative effect of all the events 
combined may be significant. Thus, Cornell and Shapiro
propose that an announcement such as the Mexican moratorium 
may not have any effect on bank stock prices, although the 
Latin debt crisis as a whole could have an impact on annual
and biannual returns of bank stocks.
The above two hypotheses are concerned with the swiftness 
of market reaction to an event. The next two hypotheses, the 
rational pricing hypothesis and the contagion hypothesis, deal 
with the size of investor response.
3• Rational Pricing Hypothesis
Schoder and Vankudre (1986), Smirlock and Kaufold
(1987) , and Bruner and Simms (1987) argue that the impact of
the Mexican moratorium event on bank stock prices should be
correlated with their exposure levels. The implication is 
that banks with high exposure should experience a larger price 
change than banks with low exposure.
4. Contagion Hypotheses
An alternative to the rational pricing hypothesis is the 
investor contagion hypothesis, which argues that any negative 
signal about a bank or a group of banks spills over to other
10
banks not directly connected with the signal.4 In the context 
of the events related to the Latin American debt crisis, the 
hypothesis implies that the extent of the share price response 
is not related to the level of Latin American exposure of each 
bank. The market penalizes all banks irrespective of their 
degree of exposure because the event (e.g., Mexican 
moratorium) is treated as a "common type of bad signal".5
Bruner and Simms (1987) investigate the contagion 
hypothesis in the context of Mexican moratorium while 
Glascock, Karafiath, and Strand (1986) examine five major 
international defaults and reschedulings in 1982. Musumeci 
and Sinkey (1990a) propose two different types of contagion 
while analyzing the Brazilian moratorium event. In addition 
to the investor contagion effect, they propose country 
contagion effect, which implies penalizing all banks depending 
on their non-Brazilian exposure. They argue that country 
contagion might be rational if investors' expectations of non- 
Brazilian debt repayment changed.
Although a contagion effect offers an explanation for the 
excess returns of banks with little exposure, it does not rule 
out the importance of other confounding variables. One such 
factor proposed in the literature is the role of the
4Lamy, Marr, and Thompson (1986) refer to the investor 
contagion hypothesis as the irrelevance of exposure
hypothesis.
5For a detailed treatment of contagion effect, see 
Aharony and Swary (1983).
11
International Monetary Fund (IMF) in providing protection to 
the major banks involved.
5. IMF Bailout Theory
Lamy, Marr, and Thompson (1986) propose the IMF- 
Commercial Bank Bailout Theory in the context of the Mexican 
moratorium event.6 According to this theory, investors assume 
that the IMF shields commercial banks from the risk of losses 
from international lending to prevent collapse of the 
international financial system. According to this view, IMF 
is a lender of last resort. Hence, the Mexican moratorium 
event should have no impact on stock prices of the lender 
banks.
Billingsley and Lamy (1988) apply the IMF Bailout theory 
to study the impact of the proposed legislation in 1983 to 
increase the U.S. quota to the IMF. They argue that the 
additional U.S. financial support for the IMF implies a 
greater IMF 'safety-net' against foreign loan losses for the 
banks and thus should enhance bank value.
6. Federal Bailout Theory
Glascock, Karafiath, and Strand (1986) argue that the 
informal federal guarantees enjoyed by the eleven 
multinational banks can be explained within the framework of 
the Federal Bailout Theory. They cite the example of the 
bailout of Continental Illinois bank and the statement of the
6Lamy, Marr, and Thompson (1986) also refer to this as 
regulatory protection hypothesis.
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Comptroller of the Currency that the eleven banks were too 
large to be allowed to fail. They argue that if investors 
believed that full federal guarantees are extended to the 
largest eleven banks, then share prices of those banks should 
not decline as a result of international debt crisis.
7. Market Learning Theory
Viswanathan and Philippatos (1989) compare the impact of 
the 1982 Mexican moratorium with that of the 1987 Brazilian 
moratorium. Since several Latin American countries (e.g., 
Peru, Argentina, Chile) arranged for debt reschedulings 
subsequent to the Mexican moratorium, they argue that the 
market should have learned from these events. This learning 
should result in more accurate assessment of the probability 
of other Latin American defaults. This hypothesis implies 
that negative excess returns observed for the Brazilian 
moratorium event should be attenuated compared to Mexican 
moratorium event, even though it can be argued that the event 
could still produce economic impact. This theory in its 
present form, does not investigate whether learning can be 
manifested in other variables such as the variance of excess 
returns and the risk of the portfolio of affected stocks.
8. Bargaining Position Model
Ozler (1989) studies the impact of developing country 
reschedulings on U.S. bank stocks during the period 1978-1983 
and argues that the significance of excess returns is directly 
related to the relative bargaining positions of the Latin
American countries versus the exposed banks. The proposed 
model assumes that banks initially operate in a competitive 
market. When outstanding loans become due, the borrower has 
the option to default and enter into negotiations for debt- 
rescheduling. If lenders form a cartel, a bilateral monopoly 
develops between the lenders and the borrowers. The gain or 
loss from this confrontation depends on the relative 
bargaining position of the banks. During 1978-80 the 
borrowers were illiquid while the banks had a strong 
bargaining position. The result was positive returns in 
response to reschedulings during 1978-80. However, during 
1981-83, the serious threat of debt repudiation weakened the 
bargaining position of the banks, resulting in negative 
returns in response to debt rescheduling announcements.
In summary, each theoretical explanation provided for the 
specific events related to the Latin American debt crisis 
focuses on a specific aspect of the debt problem rather than 
providing a general framework to explain the debt crisis. 
Another drawback of the studies reviewed is that the 
regulatory aspect of the banking industry which is 
traditionally a central aspect of the economics of banking is 
generally neglected.
B. Empirical Studies on the Latin American Debt Crisis
Although the seriousness of the Latin American debt 
problem is well recognized both in academic literature and
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popular press, there have been relatively few empirical 
studies on the problem. Empirical studies can be divided into 
two broad categories: studies on the Mexican moratorium event, 
and studies on other related events.
1. Studies on the Mexican Moratorium Event
The Mexican debt moratorium is the most extensively 
studied event related to the Latin American debt crisis. Four 
studies (Schoder and Vankudre 1986, Lamy, Marr, and Thompson 
1986, Smirlock and Kaufold 1987, and Bruner and Simms 1987) 
employ event study analysis to investigate the stock market 
reaction to the announcement of the Mexican debt moratorium.7 
The analysis consists of two parts:
The first part entails measurement of excess returns of 
bank stocks around the event day to examine how rapidly the 
market reacted to new information. This is also a test of the 
new information hypothesis. Excess returns are calculated 
using the market model described by Fama et al. (1969).
The second part of the analysis tests two alternate 
hypotheses: the rational pricing hypothesis and the investor- 
contagion hypothesis. This is done by regressing cross 
sectional excess returns against the degree of exposure of 
each bank. It should be noted that bank exposure levels were 
not publicly known at the time of the Mexican moratorium 
announcement. Hence, these tests constitute test of strong-
7See Chapter 4 for a description of event study 
methodology.
15
form market efficiency.
Schoder and Vankudre (1986) study hour-by-hour reaction 
of bank stock prices to the Mexican announcement during August 
18-20, 1982. They find that money-center/Texas-based banks 
experienced higher negative excess returns than other exposed 
banks. They estimate a regression between excess returns and 
exposure levels and conclude that "stock prices did not 
correctly reflect the cross-border exposure of individual 
banks to Mexico." This conclusion suggests either
informational inefficiency (strong-form) or a contagion 
effect. The conclusion of contagion effect is controversial 
in the light of findings by Aharony and Swary (1983).8
One criticism of Schoder and Vankudre's study is that it 
uses the sum of loan exposure and the foreign exchange 
exposure to measure the exposure of banks. However, the 
effect of the moratorium on the two exposures may be 
different, which would result in specification error and thus 
biased coefficients.
Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) examine the effectiveness of 
the mandatory disclosure laws passed in the wake of the
8Aharony and Swary (1983) examine the contagion effect in 
the wake of three bank failures in the 1970s and find that the 
contagion effect was small and short-lived.
Mexican moratorium.9 They divide the sample of banks into 
those exposed to Mexico and those that are not exposed. They 
measure exposure as Mexican loans divided by the book value of 
equity. The sample consists of listed firms whose shares are 
traded continuously (every week) during the estimation period. 
The continuous trading criterion minimizes the bias in 
estimating betas that can arise from infrequent trading 
(Dimson 1979, Scholes and Williams 1977). They argue that 
since all of the sample firms come from the same industry and 
are affected by the same event, there may be cross-sectional 
correlation among the security returns. Hence, they employ 
the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique to estimate 
the market model. The results indicate a significant decline 
in bank stock prices that was proportional to the degree of 
Mexican exposure. Stock price response was absent for the 
non-exposed group. They conclude that despite the absence of 
mandatory disclosure laws, investors were able to distinguish 
among banks according to their exposure levels. One 
limitation of this study is that the findings reflect investor 
knowledge of relative exposure to Mexico and not the 
assessment of absolute exposure levels.
9After the announcement of the Mexican moratorium the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and bank regulators 
required banks to report details of country exposure if loans 
to a specific country exceed 0.75% of total assets or 15% of 
primary capital, whichever is less.
Lamy, Marr, and Thompson (1986) test the IMF-Commercial 
Bank Bailout Theory for the Mexican moratorium event. They 
divide the sample into exposed and non-exposed banks and 
measure exposure as the Mexican loans deflated by book value 
of owners' equity plus loan loss reserve. They obtain the 
excess returns from the excess returns tape provided by the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The results 
indicate that the exposed group had significant negative 
excess returns and the non-exposed group had significant 
positive excess returns on the event day. They report 
significant positive returns prior to the Mexican moratorium 
announcement and argue that this may be an indication of 
investor expectation of a lending agreement between Mexico, 
the IMF, and the Federal Reserve. The subsequent failure to 
arrive at an agreement may have been viewed as 'bad news'. 
They contend that the results are consistent with the bailout 
theory.
Lamy, Marr, and Thompson (1986) also report a significant 
negative relationship between excess returns and the size of 
each bank's exposure to Mexico on the event day. They 
interpret this result as evidence of the market's knowledge of 
each bank's loan exposure even in the absence of disclosure 
requirements, implying that the market for U.S. bank shares is 
strong form efficient. The sample utilized in the regression 
between excess returns and exposure levels includes both 
exposed and non-exposed banks. Thus, the regression may be
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differentiating between the two groups of banks and not 
reflecting the marginal effect of increased exposure within 
the exposed bank group. Other studies (Schoder and Vankudre 
1986, and Bruner and Simms 1987) use only the sample of 
exposed banks in the regression and find no significant 
relation between exposure and excess returns. Thus,
pooling of data among the two groups casts doubt on the 
validity of conclusions drawn by Lamy, Marr, and Thompson.
Bruner and Simms (1987) attempt to reconcile the 
conflicting results of the studies by Schoder and Vankudre
(1986), Cornell and Shapiro (1986), and Smirlock and Kaufold
(1987). They measure exposure as loans to Mexico deflated by 
the market value of equity and report significant negative 
returns for both high and low exposure groups on the 
announcement day. A cross-sectional regression between 
cumulative excess returns and the Mexican exposure shows a 
positive, but not significant association on the event day and 
the next four days. The relationship becomes significantly 
negative from day +6 to day +9. They attribute the positive 
association to a temporary investor contagion and argue that, 
in the absence of publicly available information, investors 
apparently took longer to discover the Mexican debt exposure 
levels of individual banks. However, six days is a long time 
for an effect to be capitalized in an efficient market.
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2. Other Studies
Although empirical studies related to the Latin debt 
problem have focused on the Mexican moratorium, several 
studies have considered other events such as legislative 
actions and the announcement of debt reschedulings. A review 
of these studies follows.
Cornell and Shapiro (1986) estimate cross-sectional 
regressions of the effect of Latin American exposure on daily, 
monthly, annual, and biannual returns over the two-year 
period, 1982-1983. They measure exposure as total Latin 
American loans divided by total assets. They find that Latin 
American loan exposure was a significant determinant of annual 
and biannual returns, but insignificant for monthly and daily 
returns, including the Mexican moratorium day. They conclude 
that the results provide support for their "dribs and drabs" 
hypothesis since the market incorporated the effect of Latin 
American exposure into the bank stock prices prior to the 
Mexican announcement. Nevertheless, information arriving on 
August 18-20 had no material significance.
The time frame adapted by researchers to study the market 
reaction to specific events is a crucial element of event 
study analysis. Cornell and Shapiro (1986) argue that an 
event day cannot be pinpointed in the case of Latin American 
debt problem and conclude that the standard event study 
methodology may not be appropriate in this case. Several 
researchers (e.g., Bruner and Simms 1987) discount this
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argument by claiming that the event date effects can be 
demonstrated. Obviously, observed announcement effect will be 
attenuated compared to the economic effect of an event in the 
case of partially anticipated events. But, this does not 
preclude the possibility of significant event day effects 
(Malatesta and Thompson 1985).
Glascock, Karafiath, and Strand (1986) examine the impact 
of five major international defaults and reschedulings 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela) in 1982 on 
the U.S. bank stocks. They divide the sample of banks into 
three groups: multinational banks, regional wholesale banks, 
and regional consumer banks. They test three hypotheses: 
rational pricing hypothesis, pure contagion hypothesis, and 
federal bailout hypothesis. This study employs the 
intervention analysis of Box and Tiao (1975). A number of 
dummy variables are used to capture the effect of the Falkland 
war and the announcement of defaults and reschedulings. The 
results indicate that multinational banks and regional 
wholesale banks show significant negative excess returns on 
the default day and regional consumer banks show no abnormal 
performance. The authors conclude that the market was 
efficient in assimilating the information content of loan 
defaults and that the results provide strong evidence against 
the pure contagion hypothesis.
Ozler (1989) studies the impact of announcements of 
developing country reschedulings on bank stock prices during
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the period 1978-1983 employing event study method. The study 
includes other developing countries besides Latin American 
countries (e.g., Yugoslavia, Sudan, Nigeria, Poland). It 
employs a multi-beta asset pricing model to capture the 
effects of returns to the overall market and industry-specific 
effects. The results indicate that debt reschedulings had a 
positive effect on bank returns during 1978-80 and a negative 
effect during 1981-83. As noted earlier, a bargaining model 
was proposed as an explanation for these findings.
Two other related studies by Cornell, Landsman and 
Shapiro (1986), and Billingsley and Lamy (1988) examine the 
reaction of bank stock prices to legislative actions that took 
place in 1983. The Mexican crisis resulted in enactment of 
the International Lending Supervision Act (ILSA) that enhanced 
U.S. quota to the IMF. The former study examines the dates 
this legislation was passed while the later study extends the 
analysis to include the dates that the legislation was 
introduced in the U.S. Senate and the House. Cornell, 
Landsman, and Shapiro (1986) and Malatesta and Thompson (1985) 
argue that the nature of the legislative process is such that 
it is difficult to isolate and measure the economic impact of 
a legislative event on stock returns. Hence, Billingsley and 
Lamy include the dates of various stages (introduction, 
approval and signing) of the proposed legislation since at 
each stage investors' uncertainty concerning the impact of the 
proposed change is progressively lessened. Both utilize an
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event study approach and measure excess returns with the 
market model. Cornell, Landsman and Shapiro conclude that the 
joint effect of the ILSA and an increased quota for the IMF 
led to negative returns to bank stocks whereas Billingsley and 
Lamy arrive at the opposite conclusion. Billingsley and Lamy 
report that the mean systematic risk of the sample of banks 
did not change, but there is a significant decrease in 
unsystematic risk. They conclude that this reduction in 
unsystematic risk was due to the perception that the IMF would 
provide a 'safety-net' against foreign loan losses.
Viswanathan and Philippatos (1989) compare the impact of 
the Mexican and the Brazilian moratoria on bank stock prices. 
They report significant negative excess returns for Mexican 
moratorium, but no excess returns for Brazilian moratorium. 
In the case of Mexican moratorium, the market took six days to 
price the shares of exposed and non-exposed banks. For the 
Brazilian moratorium, the high exposure group had positive 
(but not statistically significant) returns on the event day 
and negative returns for three days afterwards. They argue 
that the Brazilian announcement did not convey any new 
information about the quality of Latin American assets held by 
the banks probably because it was well anticipated.
Musumeci and Sinkey (1990a) analyze the Brazilian 
moratorium event and test hypotheses similar to those of 
Bruner and Simms (1987). Since country exposure figures were 
publicly available at the time of the Brazilian moratorium,
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the event study analysis is a test of semi-strong form 
efficiency. The results indicate significant negative excess 
returns for banks with Brazilian debt and a negative relation 
between exposure and excess returns.
Musumeci and Sinkey (1990a) also test a financial 
strength hypothesis. They hypothesize that the stronger a 
bank's capital position, the more resistant it should be to 
bad news. To test this proposition, they regress cross- 
sectional excess returns against each bank's ratio of market 
value of common equity to total assets. Results indicate that 
the capital variable is positive and significant for event day 
excess returns. However, when the book value of total equity 
(which includes preferred stock) is used in the regression, 
the capital variable is not statistically significant.
They also compare changes in bank equity values with 
changes in the market prices of the Brazilian debt. They 
conclude that changes in bank equity values are positively 
related to the change in the value of Brazil's traded debt.
Musumeci and Sinkey (1990b) examine security returns for 
U.S. banks around Citicorp's announcement of loan-loss-reserve 
enhancement in May 1987. Using event study method, they 
report positive and significant abnormal returns for Citicorp 
and other banks. They test four alternative forms of new 
information hypotheses: loan quality, tax savings, capital
structure, and corporate restructuring hypotheses. They argue 
that although loan-loss-reserve provisions are accounting
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adjustments, they affect stock prices because they signal 
economic value-enhancing corporate restructurings.
C. Chapter Summary 
This chapter reviews the literature on various hypotheses 
and empirical studies proposed to explain the impact of Latin 
American debt problem on the U.S. bank share prices. The 
empirical studies on Mexican moratorium event arrive at 
diverse conclusions. However, there is no general theoretical 
framework in the existing literature to reconcile these 
conflicting results. The regulatory aspect, especially 
capital regulation of the banking industry, is generally 
ignored in the theories.10 Most of the studies analyze a
single event and cannot evaluate the generality of the 
results.11 The analysis of debt crisis is limited to the U.S. 
banks, despite the fact that the problem has international 
ramifications.
10Although Musumeci and Sinkey (1990a) mention capital 
adequacy in analyzing the Brazilian moratorium event, it is 
not the focus of their article and, hence, is not 
developed in detail.
"An exception is Viswanathan and Philippatos (1989) who 
compare the Mexican and Brazilian moratoria.
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Table 2.1
Theories Proposed to Explain Specific Events of 
the Latin American Debt Crisis
Theory/Hypothes is Authors
1. New Information 
Hypothesis
2. Information Leakage
Hypothesis
3. Rational Pricing
Hypothesis
4. Contagion
Hypotheses
5. IMF Bailout Theory
6. Federal Bailout
Theory
7. Market Learning
Theory
Schoder and Vankudre (1986) 
Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) 
Bruner and Simms (1987) 
Viswanathan and Philippatos (1989) 
Musumeci and Sinkey (1990 a,b)
Cornell and Shapiro (1986)
Schoder and Vankudre (1986) 
Smirlock and Kaufold (1987) 
Bruner and Simms (1987)
Glascock, Karafiath, and Strand 
(1986)
Bruner and Simms (1987)
Musumeci and Sinkey (1990a)
Lamy, Marr, and Thompson (1986) 
Billingsley and Lamy (1988)
Glascock, Karafiath, and Strand 
(1986)
Viswanathan and Philippatos 
(1989)
8. Bargaining Position 
Model
Ozler (1989)
CHAPTER 3 
DESCRIPTION OF EVENTS AND DATA
The Latin American debt problem provides an excellent 
opportunity to analyze the longitudinal impact of multiple 
events as shocks to banking system. An important feature of 
the problem is that an event like the Mexican moratorium was 
followed by similar actions from Argentina, Bolivia, and 
Brazil. This allows the possibility of extending the 
explanatory ability of the proposed theories by replication 
and generalization. Another interesting aspect of the Latin 
American problem is that it affected not only the U.S. banking 
industry but also the British and the Canadian banks due to 
their substantial concentration on Latin American borrowers. 
This permits study of international differences in capital 
adequacy and access to capital markets.
A careful selection of events incorporating all the 
unique features cited above is thus crucial to the study of 
debt problem. The description of events selected for detailed 
study is the subject of this chapter. Section A examines the 
information content of each event and its perceived a priori 
impact on the stock prices of the affected banks. Section B 
outlines the differences in the institutional environment that 
characterize the three banking systems. Section C describes 
the sample of the U.S., U.K., and Canadian banks used in the
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study. The last section summarizes the chapter.
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A. Description of Events
The list of events selected for detailed analysis and the 
corresponding event dates are shown in Table 3.1. The list 
consists of twelve events reflecting several dimensions of the 
debt problem as discussed above.
To facilitate generalization of the results, the events 
are classified into four categories: (1) borrower-induced
events, (2) lender-induced events, (3) events initiated by 
both borrower and lender jointly, and (4) events which are 
exogenous to the borrower-lender relationship.
Borrower-induced events are those initiated by the Latin 
American countries. The moratoria declared by Mexico, 
Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil constitute this category. A 
typical feature of borrower-induced events is their likely 
impact on the entire group of banks with Latin American loans.
Lender-induced events relate to the actions taken by 
banks in response to the debt situation. The loan loss 
provision made by Citicorp is the sole example of events which 
are lender-induced. Unlike borrower-induced events, the 
lender-induced events may or may not affect the other banks.
Events initiated by both borrower and lender reflect 
agreements arrived at mutually. The debt-rescheduling 
agreement between Mexico and the creditor banks is the only 
event of this category.
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The last category comprises events that are external to 
the borrower-lender relationship, but may affect the bank 
stock prices. The Falkland war, legislative actions, 
Cartagena declaration, Peru's declaration, Baker plan and oil 
price slump comprise this category.
One major difference characterizes the first three 
categories of events on the one hand and the last category on 
the other. Events of the first three types involve 
optimization decisions by the borrower or lender or both 
jointly. Thus, in the case of Mexican moratorium event, the 
Mexican government has two choices: either to continue
servicing the debt or to declare a moratorium on debt 
repayment. The government weighs the two choices and makes 
that decision that maximizes its social utility function. On 
the other hand, the last category of events does not involve 
decision making by the borrowers or lenders. In that sense, 
the events are external to the system.
The events are selected in such a way that they are 
almost evenly distributed in time. The chronological 
distribution of the events in Table 3.2 shows that there are 
two events each year during 1984-1987, three in 1982, and one 
in 1983. A brief description of each event follows.
1. Borrower-Induced Events 
Mexican Moratorium (August 1982)
In August 1982, the Mexican government declared a
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suspension of interest and principal payments on its $80 
billion foreign debt. The Mexican debt moratorium is often 
considered the commencement of the international debt crisis. 
The U.S. banks account for about 70% of the $60 billion debt 
owed by Mexico to foreign banks. Hence, the implications of 
a possible Mexican default to the U.S. banks are overwhelming. 
The fragility of the U.S. banking system prompted fears about 
possible run on the banks as a consequence of the Mexican 
moratorium. Since the Mexican moratorium was the first major 
shock of its kind, this event may be expected to result in 
significant negative excess returns for the banks exposed to 
Mexico.
Though the Mexican debt crisis is the culmination of 
several internal and external forces, three factors 
contributed significantly to the problem. These are: (1) the 
rise in real interest rates in the early 1980s, (2) the
adverse terms of trade, and (3) the faulty economic policies 
followed by Mexico. The weakening oil market in 1981 
contributed significantly to Mexico's balance of payment 
problem since oil constituted about 70% of Mexico's exports.
In early 1982, Mexico's situation deteriorated rapidly. 
In February 1982, the peso plunged 28% against the dollar 
resulting in the decision to let the currency float. 
Inflation increased from 35% to 60% in 1981. In June 1982, 
Mexico's primary international reserves plummeted by $1.5 
billion in five months. In early August 1982, the government
30
established two exchange rates for the peso: a floating rate 
for most transactions, and a "preferential" rate for crucial 
imports and interest payments on foreign debt. The situation 
worsened with the government closing the foreign-exchange 
markets on August 16. Finally, on August 19 the moratorium on 
all foreign debt was announced.1 
Argentinean Moratorium (September 1982)
On September 3, 1982, the Wall Street Journal (WSJ)
reported that a strong rumor swept through the financial 
markets on the previous day that Argentina would default on 
its external debt and nationalize the banks. The rumor sent 
gold prices soaring to the highest level in 11 months. 
Argentina, with a foreign debt of $39 billion, is the third 
largest debtor. This event occurred two weeks after the 
Mexican moratorium, thus providing an opportunity to 
generalize theoretical explanations of the Mexican moratorium 
event.
Bolivian Moratorium (May 1984)
The WSJ (5/31/1984) reported that on May 30, 1984,
commercial banks voiced concern over rumors of Bolivian 
default of its external debt. On May 31, Bolivia officially 
announced suspension of payments because of economic 
difficulties. The $3.7 billion external debt of Bolivia is 
insignificant compared to that of the big three (Argentina,
•Kraft (1984) provides an excellent discussion of events 
leading to the Mexican moratorium.
Brazil, and Mexico account for $287 billion). Hence, this 
event should have very little impact on bank stock prices. 
However, if investors perceived that the announcement of 
Bolivian moratorium indicated impaired value for the entire 
Latin American loan portfolio (irrespective of the nature of 
the individual borrowing countries), then this event will 
result in negative excess returns similar in magnitude to 
those for the Mexican moratorium event. Thus, an issue is 
whether to consider the entire debt of Latin America or the 
debt of individual countries in measuring the impact of debt 
crisis on bank stocks. Two studies (Schoder and Vankudre 
1986, and Cornell and Shapiro 1986) use the total Latin loans 
outstanding as a measure of exposure whereas two other studies 
(Smirlock and Kaufold 1987, and Bruner and Simms 1987) employ 
only the Mexican loans outstanding. This study explores both 
possibilities, that investors are sensitive to total Latin 
American loan exposure or, alternatively, they differentiate 
the debtors on individual basis.
Brazilian Moratorium (February 1987)
On February 20, 1987, Brazil unilaterally suspended
interest payments on its external debt. Brazil, with a total 
foreign debt of $108 billion, is the world's largest debtor 
country. Brazil's economic performance was so spectacular 
that bankers considered Brazilian moratorium a remote 
possibility. Brazil recorded three years (1984-86) of high 
domestic growth resulting in annual trade surpluses of about
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$12 billion. The economy enjoyed the benefits of lower oil 
prices and lower international interest rates. The moratorium 
announcement, thus, came as a grim remainder that the debt 
crisis was not over.
The crisis in the Brazilian economy was the consequence 
of internal policy snags and not global shocks (Cline 1987). 
The main cause was the sudden collapse of exports in the 
fourth quarter of 1986. Unlike the Mexican moratorium event 
which was preceded by a lot of activity (e.g., devaluation of 
peso, closing of foreign exchange markets), the Brazilian 
moratorium announcement had a strong element of surprise.
2. Lender-induced Events 
Citicorp's Loan-Loss Provision Enhancement (May 1987)
On May 19, 1987, Citicorp announced a provision of $3
billion against its loans to developing countries that had 
been experiencing debt-servicing difficulties. This sudden 
action meant that Citicorp would report a loss of $2.5 billion 
for the second quarter of 1987, effectively wiping out its 
1987 profit. However, increasing loan loss reserves is only 
an accounting adjustment and should not have any effect on the 
value of the banks concerned.
Market reaction to Citicorp's action may be theorized as 
positive due to several reasons. The action was described by 
the U.S. government officials as a sign of strength. It not 
only reduced uncertainty among investors but also earned the
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bank more bargaining power in negotiations with its troubled 
debtors. Standard and Poor Corporation described the decision 
as "a positive response to a deteriorating situation". This 
move also brought Citicorp's reserve protection more in line 
with its international peers "restoring confidence in the 
integrity of its balance sheet" (WSJ 5/20/1987) . In summary, 
it is suggested that market reaction to Citicorp's 
announcement would result in positive excess returns.
Although Citicorp's decision is classified as a firm- 
specific event, there may be industry wide response due to 
Citicorp's preeminent position in the banking industry. 
Citicorp was the largest lender to developing countries and it 
had played a leading role in many debt rescheduling 
negotiations. Subsequent to Citicorp's action, other major 
U.S., British and Canadian banks with Latin American loans 
boosted their loan-loss reserves. Immediately following 
Citicorp's announcement, the Bank of England urged British 
banks to step up efforts to increase their loan-loss reserves 
for Third World debt (WSJ 5/21/87). The market response to 
Citicorp's announcement on a firm-specific or industry-wide 
level is an empirical question to be addressed in the study.
3. Events Initiated by Borrower and Lender 
Debt-Rescheduling Agreement Between Mexico and Banks 
(September 1986)
Since the declaration of moratorium by Mexico in 1982,
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there have been numerous debt-rescheduling agreements between 
Mexico and the creditor banks. However, the rescheduling 
agreement signed in September 1986 is crucial since it set a 
precedent for other countries to follow.
Two devastating earthquakes in September 1985 and the 
slump in oil prices between November 1985 and April 1986 
jolted the Mexican economy. After months of disrupted talks 
with the IMF on an economic program, Mexico reached an 
agreement with the IMF in July 1986 and with its commercial 
bank creditors on September 30, 1986. The rescue package
provided for additional loans of $12 billion, half from the 
international development banks and half from the private 
banks. The terms were the most lenient to be extended to a 
major debtor, with an interest margin of less than 1% above 
the London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR). The commercial 
banks agreed to restructure $43 billion debt over a period of 
20 years with a seven year grace period. The agreement also 
envisaged an additional $1.7 billion in loans in case of 
further deterioration in the Mexican economy.
Although the agreement was hailed as a model for other 
debtor countries, its usefulness is questionable from the 
investors' point of view. The decrease in interest margin may 
result in lower earnings for the banks. Investors may also 
feel skeptical over the commitment of banks for additional 
lending and the long maturity period of the existing loans. 
Hence, the expected effect for this event is ambiguous.
4. External Events
Falkland War (1982)
The Falkland War had a dramatic impact on the Argentinean 
economy and significantly impaired Argentina's ability to 
repay its foreign debt. Although the Falkland war spans a 
rather lengthy period between April 2, 1982, and June 22, 1982 
and encompasses a number of events, the following dates are 
identified as relevant for analysis in this study:
April 2- Argentina invaded the Falklands.
April 3- The British government imposed economic sanctions 
and froze Argentinean deposits in London Banks.
May 3- An Argentine cruiser was sunk with 1852 men on 
board.
May 4- A British destroyer was sunk.
May 5- Argentina devalued its peso by 14.3 percent.
This event preceded the Mexican moratorium announcement 
which is often considered the commencement of the 
international debt crisis. Analysis of this event provides 
insights regarding investor perceptions of the impending 
crisis with the Latin American loans.
Legislative Actions (1983)
The Mexican debt crisis of 1982 triggered a national 
debate on the role of regulation governing foreign activities 
of the U.S. banks and resulted in enactment of the 
International Lending Supervision Act (ILSA) in 1983. The Act 
has two important features. First, it established a
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comprehensive and uniform regulatory framework guiding the 
foreign operations of the U.S. banks. The provisions of the 
Act include, among other things, disclosure of detailed data 
on country exposure, establishing a special Allocated Transfer 
Risk Reserve against certain categories of international 
assets, and relating capital adequacy to country exposure. 
The ILSA marks the first successful effort to directly 
supervise the concentration of foreign loans in bank 
portfolios.
The second feature of ILSA is the increase in the U.S. 
quota in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by $8.4 billion 
and an expansion of the IMF's General Arrangements to Borrow. 
U.S. support for the IMF was important because the IMF's 
resources were dangerously low, and it is an indication of a 
positive change in the U.S. administration's attitude towards 
the international financial institutions (Pastor 1987). The 
IMF is often considered as a 'lender of last resort' (e.g., 
Lamy, Marr, and Thompson 1986). Billingsley and Lamy (1988) 
argue that bank stockholders may view greater U.S. support 
for the IMF as an increase in the extent to which the IMF can 
subsidize their bank's international loan risk exposure. 
Thus, the net effect of ILSA on bank stock prices is 
determined by stockholders' perception of the trade-off 
between the benefits of increased IMF quota and the new 
restrictions that international lending is subjected to. 
Analysis of this event includes the dates of introduction and
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passage of the relative bills in the House or the Senate. The 
following event dates are identified (these are the same dates 
used by Billingsley and Lamy 1988):
7 March 1983 Introduction of S.695: Proposal to
increase the U.S. quota to IMF
5 May 1983 Introduction of International Recovery
and Financial Stability Act (H.R. 2930)
10 May 1983 H.R. 2957 introduced. Continuation of
H.R. 2930
8 June 1983 S. 695 passed by the Senate
3 August 1983 H.R. 2957 passed by the House. House
passes S. 695
17-18 November 1983 H.R. 3959 passed: supplemental
appropriations bill covering the ILSA 
and increased U.S. quota to the IMF
30 November 1983 President signs legislation into law
Cartagena Declaration (June 1984)
The foreign and finance ministers of eleven Latin 
American nations with large external debts met at Cartagena 
(Bolivia) to discuss the debt crisis. They maintained that 
the Latin American debt problem was largely due to factors 
beyond the control of the debtor countries, namely, drastic 
changes in world interest rates, and a decline in commodity 
prices. They called on industrialized countries and 
commercial banks to share the burden of resolving the 
international debt crisis. The proposals of the meeting 
include:
a) that renegotiation of external debts should not compromise
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export revenues beyond reasonable percentages,
b) that debtor countries should be granted much longer terms 
and more preferential interest rates in the renegotiation of 
their debts.
The Cartagena declaration is an important event in the debt 
crisis in the sense that for the first time all the Latin 
American debtors presented a joint front. However, they shied 
away from calling themselves a debtors' cartel (WSJ 6/22/1984) 
and stated that each country is responsible for the 
negotiation of its own external debt. They reiterated their 
intention to fulfill their pledges regarding their external 
debts.
The impact of this event on bank stock returns is difficult 
to predict. The call for reduction of interest rates and 
preferential terms in negotiations might prolong uncertainty 
for a long time. However, investors are reassured by the 
absence of a debtors' cartel and the promise to fulfill the 
debt obligations by the Latin American countries. The effect 
of this event on bank stock prices is determined by the 
interaction of these positive and negative factors.
Peru's Declaration (July 1985)
Alan Garcia, Peru's president-elect, announced at his 
inauguration in July 1985 that Peru would not pay more than 10 
percent of the value of its annual export earnings towards the 
servicing of external debt. He tried to persuade his fellow 
presidents to support and adopt his proposal. Peru's
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declaration represented a shock to the markets, albeit not as 
severe as a moratorium. Hence, negative returns may be 
expected.
Baker Plan (October 1985)
The U.S. Treasury Secretary, James Baker III, proposed a 
plan to resolve the debt crisis at the IMF/World Bank annual 
meeting on October 8 in Seoul, South Korea. The plan called 
for a tripartite strategy for dealing with the debt problem: 
structural adjustment by debtor countries, additional lending 
by banks, and financial support from international agencies 
and industrial country governments. In concrete terms, the 
plan envisages net new lending of $20 billion in bank loans to 
the developing countries for the next three years, and 
adoption of less statist, more export-oriented policies 
(including trade liberalization and encouragement of foreign 
investment) by the debtor countries.
The importance of the Baker plan lies in its timing. It 
signified a positive response from the U.S. government at a 
time when the political and financial strains were
intensifying in Latin America. The Latin American countries 
('Cartagena Group') were trying to adopt a unified approach to 
the debt problem. In July 1985, the President of Peru stated 
that he would limit debt repayments to 10% of Peru's export 
earnings. In September 1985, the Mexican President predicted 
a renewed debt crisis unless a 'new formula' was found for 
dealing with Latin American debtors (WSJ 9/10/1985). The U.S.
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Government seized the initiative by launching the Baker plan 
in October 1985. Hence, positive excess returns may be 
expected from this event.
Slump in Oil Prices (February 1986)
The price of oil declined dramatically between November, 
1985, and April, 1986— from more than $30 a barrel to $11.30 
a barrel— a decline of 64 percent. In February 1986, Mexico 
and Venezuela slashed their oil prices by as much as $4 a 
barrel in a bid to remain competitive in the world market. 
They called for an emergency meeting of the Cartagena group to 
discuss ways to ease the region's $360 billion foreign debt 
(WSJ 2/3/1986). Both Mexico and Venezuela rely heavily on oil 
revenue to service their debt. Oil accounts for about 75% of 
Mexico's foreign exchange earnings. The collapse in oil 
prices translates to a loss of about $7 billion in oil 
revenues for Mexico in 1986. International bankers expected 
Mexico to demand new loans and interest concessions.
This is an unanticipated and external event. The 
dramatic collapse in oil prices derailed the Baker plan 
(announced in October, 1985) even before it was given a trial. 
This event can have a very differential impact on debt crisis. 
It should help the oil importers (Brazil and Argentina) and 
hurt oil exporters (Mexico and Venezuela). For example, 
Mexico experienced a loss of about $7 billion in oil revenue 
while Brazil had a windfall gain of about $6 billion from 
lower oil prices. Thus, banks having large amounts of loans
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to Brazil and Argentina should experience positive returns 
while those having heavy loans to Mexico and Venezuela should 
have negative returns.
B. Institutional Background
1. U.S. Banks
The U.S. banking system is characterized by a large 
number of banks (nearly 15,000) compared to other 
industrialized countries. Banks in the U.S. are highly 
regulated. Banks may obtain charters from either the federal 
government or the state government. The important regulatory 
agencies are: Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, Comptroller of the Currency, and state agencies. 
Regulation takes the form of restricting, among other things, 
the entry of new institutions, consolidation of existing 
institutions by mergers and acquisitions, the types of 
products they may offer, and branching across state lines, and 
establishing minimum reserve and capital ratios. Banks are 
prohibited from non-banking activities such as underwriting 
corporate securities. There are limits to the amount that 
banks can lend to an individual borrower.
2. British Banks2
In England there is no legal definition of a bank. There 
are certain laws that refer to particular activities and the
2Source: Mastropasqua (1978).
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banks are only recognized as such within the limits set up by 
these laws.3
The main categories of the British banks are:
i) the deposit banks, 18 in number;
ii) the accepting houses, 29 in number; and
iii) the overseas banks, the consortium banks and the foreign 
banks forming a total of about 2 00.
Amongst the British banks, the London "big four" 
(National Westminster Bank, Midland Bank, Barclays Bank and 
Lloyds Bank) occupy a special place due to their enormous 
network of agencies and deposit accounts.
There is no limitation to the opening of agencies 
(branches) by banks registered in England. Also, there is no 
restriction on opening of branches abroad by British banks.
An important characteristic of the British banking system 
is the flexibility of relations between the monetary 
authorities and the credit institutions. These relations are 
typically governed by "moral persuasion" and "gentlemen's 
agreement". The Bank of England's control over banks is 
traditionally personalized and participative due to the lack 
of legislative sanctions. The Bank of England has been 
reluctant to impose a system of rigid ratios uniformly on all 
banks. Instead, it prefers to tender advice to each bank on
3To be a banker a significant proportion of the business 
must consist of conduct of current accounts, and collection 
and payment of cheques (Cf. United Dominions Trust vs. 
Kirkwood 1965).
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the relation between capital and reserves and their 
employment. An important difference between the American and 
the British banking systems is that both bonds and equity are 
recognized by U.K. supervisors as capital.
3. Canadian Banks
The Canadian banking system is governed by the Bank Act. 
A unique aspect of Canadian banking law is that it expires at 
the end of every 10 years, thus enabling a systematic and 
comprehensive review of banking laws on a regular basis. 
Under the Bank Act charters can be granted to financial 
institutions to operate as banks. The 1980 revision of the 
Bank Act allows foreign banks to operate in Canada, but they 
are subject to a variety of regulations, limitations, and 
reciprocal arrangements. For example, the total assets of all 
foreign banks operating in Canada cannot exceed 8% of total 
domestic assets of all banks in Canada.4
There are two classes of banks in Canada: Schedule A
banks (also called Chartered banks) and Schedule B banks. 
Schedule B banks have the same general powers as Schedule A 
banks, but are subject to additional restrictions regarding 
size and branch offices. The big five chartered banks are the 
Royal Bank, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Bank of 
Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, and Toronto Dominion Bank. 
Commercial banks offer a wide range of retail and wholesale
4Source: George and Giddy (1983).
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banking services. There is no restriction on the amount that 
Canadian banks can lend to a single borrower.
Canadian banks are regulated by the Inspector General of 
Banks. There are fewer restrictions on Canadian banks 
compared to banks in other countries. Like U.S. banks, they 
are not allowed to underwrite corporate equities. However, 
they can purchase stock up to a maximum of 10 percent of any 
Canadian firm.5
The equivalent of primary capital is the base capital in 
Canada. However, the base capital ratios of Canadian banks 
are not directly comparable to those of U.S. banks because of 
differences in calculation. Unlike U.S. banks, Canadian banks 
cannot include reserves for possible loan losses in base 
capital. Investments in affiliated corporations are deducted 
from the base capital. Another restriction is that the
components of base capital represented by items other than 
common shareholders' equity may not exceed 20% of total base 
capital. Also, the off-balance sheet items (letters of credit 
and guarantees) are added to the asset base to calculate the 
base capital ratio. Because of a more conservative approach 
in defining base capital, the capital ratios of Canadian banks 
are generally lower than those of U.S. banks.
5Source: Madura (1989)
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C. Data Description
1. U.S. Banks
The sample consists of the set of banks or bank holding 
companies (BHCs) listed on either the New York or the American 
Stock Exchanges. The list of firms used in the study are 
shown in Table 3.3. The sample consists of 67 firms out of 
which 60 are listed on the New York Stock Exchange and 7 on 
the American Stock Exchange. Out of 67 firms, 40 are common 
to all events, that is, daily return data are available 
throughout the study period (1982-1987) . Since the remaining 
firms are either listed or delisted during the study period, 
the sample size varies for each event. To be included in the 
sample for any event, the firm should have sufficient daily 
returns available for the event to permit estimation of the 
market model. Daily return data are obtained from the CRSP 
tapes.
Data on the dollar amount of loans to Mexico, Brazil, and 
Latin America are obtained from the annual reports and 10-K 
reports filed by the banks involved. The exposure of each 
bank to Mexico/Brazil/Latin America is measured as the ratio 
of the quantity (face value) of loans to Mexico/Brazil/Latin 
America divided by the market value of bank equity. The 
market value of equity is calculated as the number of shares 
outstanding prior to the relevant event multiplied by the 
price of shares eleven days prior to the event. The degree of 
exposure of the sample banks to Latin America at the time of
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Mexican, Bolivian, and Brazilian moratoria are presented in 
Table 3.4. It can be seen from the table that there is a 
progressive decline in bank exposure levels.
The sample is subdivided into three groups according to 
the level of exposure to Latin America: high exposure banks, 
medium exposure banks, and zero exposure banks. Banks with 
exposure above the mean exposure of the sample of exposed
banks are categorized as high exposure group, and those below
the mean exposure form the medium exposure group. The
definition of high- and medium-exposure is arbitrary. For 
example, Bruner and Simms (1987) use the median exposure ratio 
to sort banks into high- or low-exposure groups.
Notwithstanding the subjectivity in the determination of the 
cut off point, most of the money-center banks and other big 
banks comprise the high exposure group. A discrepancy arises 
only in the case of a few banks. Hence, the results of the 
study would not be materially altered due to this problem.
The zero exposure group functions as a control group to 
isolate industry-specific effects. The arrival of information 
pertinent to the entire industry at the market during the 
event period should affect all the three groups. On the other 
hand, the information content of the events considered in this 
study should affect only the banks with Latin American 
exposure and not the zero exposure group. Thus, the zero 
exposure group is useful to distinguish industry-wide events 
from the events related to the Latin American debt problem.
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The Wall Street Journal is used to identify any firm- 
specific events during the event period. Firms with 
significant contaminating events during the period immediately 
before or after events of interest are excluded. For example, 
three banks--Bancal Tristate Corp., Depositors Corp., and 
Union Commerce Corp.—  were eliminated for the Mexican 
moratorium event because they were targets of takeover bids 
and had abnormally high stock returns during the event period.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 present descriptive statistics of the 
sample of U.S. banks with Latin American debt for the years 
1982 and 1986. In 1982, the mean Latin American exposure of 
the sample as a percentage of the market value of equity is 
292%. For high exposure banks, the mean ratio is 482%. By 
1986, the exposure level has dramatically declined for medium 
exposure banks from 197% to 40%, whereas for the high exposure 
group, the ratio is still high at more than 200%. Although 
the ratio of Latin loans to equity has decreased in absolute 
terms, the average amount of Latin American loans for the 
entire group has increased from $1799 million to $2118 
million. The primary capital ratio has gone up from 5.6% to 
7.3%. For high exposure banks, the improvement is more 
spectacular—  from 4.6% in 1982 to 7.3% in 1986—  an increase 
of about 60%. In 1986, the primary capital ratio of both 
high- and medium-exposure banks are equal. Another 
interesting observation is the discrepancy between the book 
value and the market value of equity for the sample of banks.
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In 1982, the market value of equity is about half of the book 
value. In 1986, the two values are almost equal.
2. British Banks
The sample of British banks consists of five banks: 
Barclays bank, Lloyds bank, Midland bank, National Westminster 
bank, and Standard Chartered bank. The loan exposure of the 
U.K. banks to Latin America in 1983 and 1986 is shown in Table 
3.7. The mean exposure of the U.K. banks in 1983 is more than 
100% of their capital. However, it is much less than the 1982 
mean exposure of the U.S banks at 292%. In 1986, the exposure 
levels of the U.S. and the U.K. banks are comparable. Among 
the British banks, the Lloyds bank and the Midland bank have 
considerably higher exposure levels. The daily price data 
for the British banks are obtained from the London Financial 
Times. The FTSE All Share index is used as a proxy for the 
market index.
3. Canadian Banks
The sample of Canadian banks consists of six banks: Bank 
of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce, National Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, and 
Toronto Dominion Bank. These six banks account for more than 
90% of the total domestic assets held by the Canadian banks. 
Table 3.8 shows the Latin American loans as a percentage of 
total assets and bank capital for the Canadian banks. The 
exposure of the Canadian banks in 1983 is about 200% of 
capital or 7.1% of assets. By 1986, the Canadian banks
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reduced their exposure level to 132% of capital or 6.0% of 
assets, although the absolute level of Latin American loans 
increased from Cdn.$3614 million to Cdn.$4010 million— an 
increase of 11%. Because of the conservative definition of 
capital, the exposure of Canadian banks as a percent of 
capital appears to be higher than what it would be if the U.S. 
capital standards are applied. Thus, the exposure levels of 
the Canadian banks may be comparable to the medium exposure 
group of the U.S. banks.
Daily stock price data for the Canadian banks are 
collected from the Wall Street Journal. The return on the 
equally-weighted index of the Toronto Stock Exchange is used 
as the market return.
D. Chapter Summary
This chapter identifies twelve events for detailed 
analysis. The events are classified into four categories: (1) 
borrower-induced events, (2) lender-induced events, (3) events 
initiated by borrower and lender jointly, and (4) events 
exogenous to the borrower-lender relationship. A brief 
description of each event and its hypothesized impact on bank 
stock prices are provided. A preliminary analysis of the 
sample of banks shows that the American, the British, and the 
Canadian banks are comparable in terms of their level of 
exposure to Latin America.
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Table 3.1 
Sample of Events
Event Date Type*
1. Falkland War E
(a)
(b)
Commencement of war 
Devaluation of Peso
04/02/82
05/05/82
2. Mexican moratorium 08/19/82 B
3. Argentinean moratorium 09/02/82 B
4.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
Legislative actions 
Introduction of S. 695 
Introduction of H.R. 2930 
Introduction of H.R. 2957 
S. 695 passed by the Senate 
S. 695 and H.R. 2957 passed 
H.R. 3959 passed 
President signs legislation
03/07/83
05/05/83
05/10/83
06/08/83
08/03/83
11/17/83
11/30/83
E
5. Bolivian moratorium 05/31/84 B
6. Cartagena declaration 06/21/84 E
7. Peru's declaration 07/29/85 E
8. Baker Plan 10/07/85 E
9. Slump in oil prices 02/04/86 E
10. Debt-rescheduling by Mexico 09/30/86 J
11. Brazilian moratorium 02/23/87 B
12. Citicorp's loan loss provision 05/19/87 L
* B = Borrower-induced event 
L = Lender-induced event
J = Event induced by borrower and lender jointly 
E = Exogenous event
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Table 3.2
Chronological Distribution of Events
Year Number of Events
1982 3
1983 1
1984 2
1985 2
1986 2
1987 2
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Table 3.3 
Sample of U.S. Banks
Bank
Amsouth Bancorp 
Banc One Corp 
Bancal Tri State Corp 
Bank of Boston Corp 
Bank New York Inc 
BankAmerica Corp 
Bankers Tr NY Corp 
Barnett Banks Inc 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
Chemical NY Corp 
Citicorp
Citizens First Bancorp 
Continental 111. Corp 
Crocker Natl. Corp 
Depositors Corp 
Equimark Corp 
Fidelity Un Bancorp 
First Atlanta Corp 
First Bank Sys Inc 
First Bankers Corp Florida 
First Chicago Corp 
First City Bancorp Texas 
First Fidelity Bancorp 
First Interstate Bancorp 
First Penn Corp 
First Republicbank Corp 
First Virginia Banks Inc 
First Wachovia Corp 
First Wisconsin Corp 
First Wyoming Bancorp 
Fleet Finl. Group Inc 
General Bancshares Corp 
Guarantee Bancorp 
Harris Bancorp 
Horizon Bancorp 
Interfirst corp 
Irving Bancorp 
Keycorp
Landmark Bancshares Corp 
Mcorp
Manufacturers Hanover Corp
Ticker Start End Exch*
Symbol date date#
ASO 810520 - 1
ONE 830929 - 1
BCL 700109 840618 1
BKB 710107 - 1
BK 691204 - 1
BAC 760628 - 1
BT 690516 - 1
BBI 791217 - 1
CMB 650315 - 1
CHL 690305 - 1
CCI 681101 - 1
CFB 781227 - 2
CIL 730910 - 1
CKN 701209 850524 1
DEP 680725 840228 2
EQK 710720 - 1
FDU 710510 840404 1
FAC 810630 851204 1
FBS 840507 - 1
FBF 801027 860516 1
FNB 711230 - 1
FBT 761201 - 1
FFB 710517 - 1
I 620702 - 1
FPA 720110 - 1
FRB 760923 - 1
FVB 710419 - 1
FWB 851223 - 1
FWB 710913 - 1
WYO 730208 - 2
FLT 681115 - 1
GBS 620702 860327 1
GB 791227 840117 2
HBC 760421 840904 1
HZB 800523 - 1
IFC 730511 870605 1
V 680923 - 1
KEY 830527 - 1
LBC 841121 - 1
M 770914 - 1
MHC 690428 - 1
Table 3.3 (contd.)
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Bank Ticker Start End Exch*
Symbol date date#
Marine Midland Banks Inc 
Mellon Bank Corp 
Money Management Corp 
J.P. Morgan 
NCNB Corp 
NBD Bancorp 
Norstar Bancorp 
Northeast Bankshares Assn. 
Northwest Bancorp 
Pan American Banks Inc 
Republic NY Corp 
Seafirst Corp 
Security Pacific Corp 
Signet Banking Corp 
Southeast Banking Corp 
Southwest Florida Banks Inc 
Sterling Bancorp 
Sun Banks Inc 
Suntrust Banks Inc 
Texas Amern. Bancshares Inc 
Texas Commerce Bancshares 
Union Commerce Corp 
United Jersey Banks 
Wachovia Corp 
Wells Fargo 
Worthen Banking Corp
MM 620702 871215 1
MEL 810710 - 1
MGT 760427 860630 2
JPM 690401 - 1
NCB 790605 - 1
NBD 730221 - 1
NOR 820104 - 1
NBA 790124 830531 2
NOB 621210 - 1
PAB 810819 851230 1
RNB 720112 - 1
SFC 771209 830701 1
SPC 790314 - 1
SBK 710106 - 1
STB 720807 - 1
SFB 780111 840531 1
STL 620702 - 1
SU 810821 850628 1
STI 850701 - 1
TXA 820623 - 1
TCB 740919 870430 1
UCM 720515 830330 1
UJB 701123 - 1
WB 700302 851204 1
WFC 700209 - 1
WOR 830815 - 2
* Exchange 1 = NYSE; 2 = AMEX
# indicates that the firm is listed on the
exchange beyond 871231.
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Table 3.4
Latin American Debt Exposure* of U.S. Banks
Bank Exposure at the time of moratorium bv
Mexico Bolivia Brazil
Amsouth Bancorp 
Bancone Corp 
BankAmerica Corp 
Bank Calif NA 
Bank of Boston 
Bank New York Inc.
Bankers Tr NY Corp 
Barnett Banks Fla Inc 
Chase Manhattan Bank 
Chemical NY Corp 
Citicorp
Citizens 1st National Bank 
Continental 111. Corp 
Crocker Natl. Corp 
Depositors Corp 
Equimark Corp 
Fidelity Un Bancorp 
First Atlanta Corp 
First Bankers Corp Florida 
First Chicago Corp 
First City Bancorp Texas 
First Intl. Bancshares 
First National St. Bancorp 
First Penn Corp 
First Virginia Bankshares 
First Wisconsin Bankshares 
General Bancshares Corp 
Guarantee Bancorp 
Harris Bancorp 
Horizon Bancorp 
Industrial Bancorp 
Irving Bancorp 
Keycorp
Landmark Bancshares Corp 
Manufacturers Hanover 
Marine Midland 
Mellon National 
Mercantile Texas 
Money Management Corp 
J.P. Morgan 
NCNB Corp 
NBD Bancorp
0.3636 0.2002 0
- - 0
2.8573 2.5087 4.0943
- 1.1557 -
1.7295 1.4198 0.5896
2.1326 1.4527 0.3426
3.2949 2.4385 0.8569
0 0 0
5.4043 4.0042 2.1739
6.0438 3.8745 2.1177
3.3762 2.8673 1.5043
0 0 0
3.4370 - 3.5452
5.3562 5.0584 0
0 - -
3.9382 - 0.3264
0 - -
0.8978 0.3343 -
0 0 -
3.9934 2.5306 1.4260
0.5042 0.4995 -
0.4416 0.4649 1.2673
1.2612 0.7421 0.1849
.1.8103 5.3153 2.0370
0 0 0
4.6760 1.9284 0.6478
0 0 -
0 - -
1.8905 0.6098 -
0 0 0
1.0967 0.4750 0.1068
7.7023 4.1474 2.0460
- - 0
- - 0
7.4659 6.5300 4.3558
4.8407 3.7812 1.7603
2.3902 1.6327 0.9936
0.3625 0.3061 0.4611
0 0 0
2.1684 1.5816 0.7561
0.7516 0.3121 0.7842
1.1851 0.5161 0.1997
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Table 3.4 (contd.)
Bank Exposure at the time of moratorium bv
Mexico Bolivia Brazil
Northeast Bankshares 
Norstar Bancorp 
Northwest Bancorp 
Pan American Banks 
Republic National Bank NY 
Republic Texas Corp 
Seafirst Corp 
Security Pacific Corp 
Signet Banking Corp 
Sterling Bancorp 
Southeast Banking Corp 
Southwest Florida Banks 
Sun Banks 
Suntrust Banks 
Texas American Bancshares 
Texas Commerce Bancshares 
United Jersey Banks 
Union Commerce Corp 
Wachovia Corp 
Wells Fargo 
Western Bancorp 
Worthen Banking Corp 
Wyoming Bancorp
0 - -
- 0 0
0.8392 0.5107 0
- 0 -
6.3868 3.3609 0.6876
1.3506 0.9755 1.5002
2.8590 - -
2.2826 1.1468 0.5465
2.1762 1.2030 0.2877
0 0 0
1.1699 0.7788 0.4042
0 - -
- 0.3154 -
- - 0.0564
- 0.0448 0.1152
0.5523 0.3085 0.5050
0 0 0
0 - -
0.2696 0.4577 0.1064
3.1705 4.0747 0.6596
1.4331 0.9020 0.6465
- - 0
0 0 0
*Latin American exposure is defined as loans to Latin 
America divided by the market value of shareholders' 
equity.
Source: Annual Reports and 10-K Reports
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Table 3.5
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample of U.S. Banks (1982)
(Mean Values)
Variable High Exposure 
Group
Medium Exposure All
Group Exposed
Assets($ mil.) 47447.1 16401.1 26749.7
Equity($ mil.) 
(book value)
1786.8 795.6 1126.0
Equity($ mil.) 
(market value)
908.0 467.9 614.6
Primary Capital 
($ mil.)
2157.9 820.5 1266.3
Primary Capital 
Ratio
4.6 6.0 5.6
Latin Loans 
($ mil.)
3630.5 853.3 1799.0
LAMVAL# (%) 481.57 197.09 291.92
LATASET@ (%) 7.27 4.69 5. 55
N 13 26 39
Source: Annual Reports and 10-K reports.
# LAMVAL = Latin American loans outstanding divided by 
market value of equity.
@ LATASET = Latin American loans outstanding divided 
by total assets.
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Table 3.6
Descriptive Statistics of the Sample of U.S. Banks (1986)
(Mean Values)
Variable High Exposure 
Group
Medium Exposure All 
Group Exposed
Assets($ mil.) 57471.7 23100.9 37831.3
Equity($ mil.) 
(book value)
2878.6 1226.9 1934.8
Equity($ mil.) 
(market value)
2405.4 1465.4 1857.0
Primary Capital 
($ mil.)
4152.1 1658.3 2727.1
Primary Capital 
Ratio (%)
7.3 7.3 7.3
Latin Loans 
($ mil.)
4115.9 621.3 2118.9
LAMVAL# (%) 202.90 39.57 109.57
LATASET@ (%) 6.73 2.45 4.29
N 15 21 36
Source: Annual Reports and 10-K reports.
# LAMVAL = Latin American loans outstanding divided by 
the market value of equity.
@ LATASET = Latin American loans outstanding divided 
by total assets.
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Table 3.7
Latin American Debt Held by the U.K. Banks
1983 1986
Bank Amount 
(£ mil.)
% Of
Assets
% Of
Capital
Amount 
(£ mil.)
% Of
Assets
%of
Cap.
Barclays
Bank
1886 2.9 94.0 1870 2.9 61.1
Lloyds Bank 3122 7.1 152.1 2675 6.6 97.4
Midland
Bank
2999 5.7 157.9 3298 5.7 178.6
Nat. West­
minster Bank
1456 4.5 93.4 1153 1.6 38.8
Std. Char­
tered Bank
1180 3.4 89. 3 895 2.5 69.1
Mean 2129 4.7 117.3 1978 3.9 89.0
Source: Annual Reports
Table 3.8
Latin American Debt Held by the Canadian Banks
1983 1986
Bank Amount % of 
(Cdn.$) Assets 
(millions)
% of 
Capital
Amount % of %of 
(Cdn.$) Assets Capital 
(millions)
Bank of 
Montreal
4540 7.7 220.6 5402 6.6 180.4
Bank of Nova 
Scotia
3087 5.6 180.7 3883 6.4 137.7
Can. Imp.Bk. 
of Commerce
3393 5.0 142.4 4090 4.9 116.5
National Bk. 
of Canada
1780 10. 0 289.9 1848 6. 6 135.0
Royal Bank 
of Canada
6439 8.4 201.3 6166 6.2 135.2
Toronto 
Dominion Bk.
2442 5.8 143.1 2670 5.2 86.4
Mean 3614 7.1 196.3 4010 6.0 131.9
Source: Annual Reports
CHAPTER 4 
THEORY AND METHODOLOGY
Among the various hypotheses (discussed in Chapter 2) 
that attempted to explain the events related to the Latin 
American debt crisis, the new information hypothesis has made 
significant contributions to our understanding of the problem 
by its focus on the information content of specific events. 
The capital regulation hypothesis, proposed in this 
dissertation, analyzes the debt crisis from another crucial 
perspective, that is, capital regulation of the banking 
industry. This chapter elaborates on both of these 
theoretical perspectives and derives testable hypotheses. The 
proposed methodology to measure the event period excess 
returns and to test the hypotheses is also discussed. Another 
important issue addressed in this chapter is the potential 
shift in risk characteristics of bank stocks around the 
events.
This chapter consists of four sections. Section A 
contains a discussion of the two hypotheses proposed in the 
dissertation, the new information hypothesis and the capital 
regulation hypothesis. Section B describes the methodology to 
test the hypotheses. Section C discusses the analysis of the 
change in risk characteristics of bank stocks as a result of 
the events. The last section summarizes the chapter.
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A. Theory
1. New Information Hypothesis
According to this hypothesis events related to the Latin 
American debt crisis impound new information about the quality 
of assets of the banks that are lenders to Latin American 
countries. In an efficient capital market, any information 
about bank loans should be reflected immediately and without 
bias in the stock prices of the banks exposed to Latin 
American debt. The event has information content if it makes 
investors reassess their valuation of the bank loans. For 
example, the announcement of a debt moratorium may adversely 
affect investors' beliefs about the probability that the Latin 
American loans may be repaid. Consequently, bank stock prices 
may decline immediately following the announcement of the 
moratorium.
If investors are rational, the size of response should be 
related to the degree of exposure of each bank to Latin 
America. In other words, investors should be able to 
discriminate among banks that are exposed to Latin America and 
those that are not. However, it should be noted that exposure 
levels of banks to individual countries were not publicly 
known prior to 1983. Thus, testing of relationship between 
excess returns and the Latin American exposure of each bank 
for the events before 1983 is, in fact, a test of the strong- 
form efficiency of the market. For events after the Mexican 
moratorium, the test is concerned with semi-strong form
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efficiency.
Most of the studies on the Mexican moratorium event have 
considered the information content of the announcement of the 
moratorium, but none have analyzed the events from the 
perspective of bank capital regulation. Studies on other 
events related to the Latin American debt problem also failed 
to consider the capital regulation aspect in depth.
2. Capital Regulation Hypothesis
It is argued here that the interaction of bank capital 
adeguacy regulation and bank examination procedures can induce 
the financial market to alter assessments of bank value in 
response to external events, even if the announcements contain 
little new information about the market value of relevant 
assets. The rationale behind this is that bank regulatory 
procedures and the application of capital adequacy standards 
influence levels of permissible leverage. Thus, publicly 
announced external events can induce regulators to enhance 
pressures on banks to increase capital. This increases the 
probability that banking firms will seek external equity 
financing.
Regulators are concerned about bank capital because 
capital provides a cushion to absorb losses. When a loan 
turns bad, a bank has to dip into its retained earnings and 
then its capital. From the regulators' point of view, as 
capital increases, the risk exposure of the deposit insurance
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system decreases.1 Shortage of capital curtails banks' 
freedom of action on issues such as mergers and acquisitions, 
dividend payments, branch expansion, and advertising 
expenditures . For example, Federal Reserve approval for Bank 
Holding Company acquisitions is linked to acceptable capital 
ratios. Capital regulation can force managers to take actions 
that would not be taken in the absence of regulation (for 
example, managers may be forced to go to the capital markets 
to raise equity in order to satisfy the requirement of minimum 
regulatory capital ratios).
The capital ratios for large, publicly traded banks 
declined over a long period during the 1960s and 1970s. 
Realizing the importance of capital adequacy and the secular 
decline in capital ratios of major banks, regulators 
strengthened capital requirements in 1981. In December 1981, 
minimum primary capital was set at 6% of assets for banks and 
bank holding companies with assets less than $1 billion and 5% 
for organizations with assets of $1 billion or more.2 Primary 
capital is defined as shareholders' equity, perpetual 
preferred stock, reserves for loan and lease losses, some
deposit insurance can be regarded as a put option on the 
assets of the bank at a striking price equal to the promised 
maturity value of the insured deposits (Merton 1977). The 
value of the option increases as the capital-to-assets ratio 
decreases or as asset risk increases since both factors 
increase default risk (Keeley 1989).
Multinational bank holding companies were not formally 
brought into the purview of capital regulation in 1981, but 
they were to be judged individually.
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mandatory convertible debt, minority interest in consolidated 
subsidiaries, and net worth certificates. Thus, regulation 
limits bank leverage by mandating that only certain types of 
debt qualify as primary capital. Capital regulation can force 
banks to change their capital structure if they are deficient 
of regulatory capital.
Regulatory assessments of bank capital (and thus 
permissible leverage) are directly influenced by examiner 
decisions about the asset quality of a bank's portfolio. Bank 
portfolios are generally dominated by non-marketable assets 
(loans) that impound considerable private information.3 Under 
normal circumstances these assets are recorded at cost on bank 
accounting statements. Nevertheless, regulators irregularly 
but actively exercise their right to require banks to mark-to- 
market loans that are deemed to have fallen in quality. Thus, 
regulatory assessment of bank capital (and in turn permissible 
leverage) are directly influenced by examiner decisions about 
the asset quality of a bank's portfolio.4 In particular the 
declaration that certain loans are to be regarded as non­
performing or classified, reduces permissible leverage and
3The asset services models of the banking firm indicate 
how banks have a comparative advantage at collecting private 
information about loan clients. An implication of these 
models is that bank assets are not easily valued in public 
securities markets. See Diamond (1984) and Ramakrishnan and 
Thakor (1984) for models of this type.
4Altman (1985) provides an analysis of the bank 
examination process and how regulators adjust bank book values 
to reflect perceptions about loan quality.
increases pressure on managers to raise new equity. In 
effect, regulators' judgments about loan quality reduce bank 
regulatory capital. In turn, this reduction in regulatory 
capital (and in permissible leverage) can induce banks to 
reduce leverage (such as by selling assets or canceling plans 
to acquire new assets) and thus forego some positive net 
present value projects or alternatively, to issue seasoned 
equity. Either action would result in a reduction in the 
market value of the banking firm. It should be noted that a 
public event such as the Mexican moratorium can increase the 
probability that a set of loans will be marked to market even 
if the event does not directly influence the financial 
market's assessment of the value of the loans in question. 
The rationale behind this is that the financial market must 
continuously estimate both the market value of the loans in 
question and the probability that the regulator will mark 
these loans to market and thus increase the pressure on bank 
managers to take actions to increase capital.
The objective of mark-to-market is that banks would 
exercise greater restraint in sovereign lending at an early 
stage.5 In the absence of mark-to-market policy, banks can 
indefinitely postpone writeoffs of loans to countries 
experiencing payment problems. If these loans are
periodically marked to market, investors evaluate the
5See Gutentag and Herring (1985).
66
probability of default as the debtor countries become 
unstable. Hence, rate spreads will rise to reflect the 
increase in perceived risk of the loans. Consequently, banks 
are forced to writeoff the loans to reflect the market value. 
A mark-to-market policy would make it easier for bank 
creditors and shareholders to assess the impact of a bank's 
foreign loan portfolio on its value.
Bank examination procedures are designed to insure that 
bank capital and loan loss allowances reflect the regulator's 
assessment of the condition of the bank's loan portfolio. If 
bank examiners perceive a reduction in the probability that 
certain loans will be repaid in a timely fashion, those loans 
may be categorized as "classified". This classification 
requires that the banks increase loan loss reserves to cover 
the anticipated losses. Thus, it follows that, at irregular 
intervals bank examiners may order the adjustment of bank 
capital ratios to reflect accumulated changes in perceived 
loan quality. Such downward adjustments may alter the 
financial market's perception about the probability that a 
bank will enter the capital market to bolster its regulatory 
capital. This effect is aside from any impact of the market's 
assessment of the market value of the loans at issue.
Previous literature documents that seasoned equity issue 
announcements generate a significant reduction in share 
prices. Studies of seasoned common stock issues by 
nonfinancial firms report a negative effect of approximately
2.5% (Smith 1986). For bank seasoned stock issues, Polonchek, 
Slovin, and Sushka (1989) report a statistically significant 
negative share price effect of approximately -1.3%. Wansley 
and Dhillon (1989) examine the valuation effects of six types 
of securities issuance by BHCs during the period 1978-1985: 
common stock, preferred stock, convertible preferred stock, 
straight debt—  non-shelf and shelf—  and debt-for-equity 
swaps. They find statistically significant excess returns of 
-1.5% for common stock, significant positive returns of 0.8% 
for preferred stock and no significant excess returns for 
other securities. Wall and Peterson (1988) study the 
valuation effects of common stock, preferred stock, 
convertible debt, mandatory convertible debt, and subordinated 
debt issuance by BHCs during the period 1982-1986. They 
report a statistically significant excess return of -1.5% for 
common stock issuance, but no significant effects for other 
types of securities.
It is hypothesized that the financial markets interpret 
the announcement of the Mexican moratorium and other events in 
terms of increased probability that this debt would be 
categorized by regulators as nonperforming. As a result, the 
events should generate a more deleterious effect for 
commercial banks that were already poorly capitalized (in 
terms of regulatory capital) than for banks that were well- 
capitalized. Thus, according to the capital regulation 
hypothesis, the subset of banks with both exposure to Latin
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American debt and an existing deficiency of regulatory capital 
would be under increased pressure to strengthen their capital. 
As a result, these events would be a precursor to either new 
equity issues or curtailments in bank leverage, actions that 
would have a negative impact on bank value.
It is worthwhile to note the regulators' response to the 
Mexican moratorium event. The three U.S. federal bank 
regulatory agencies— the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, the Federal Reserve, and the Comptroller of the 
Currency—  have explicitly recognized the "transfer" risk in 
sovereign lending.6 Among various measures proposed, three 
are important: a) greater public disclosure of country
exposure, b) definition of new loan classifications, and c) 
higher capital ratios and relating capital to country lending. 
These three measures are discussed in the following 
paragraphs.
a) Disclosure Requirements
Immediately following the Mexican moratorium 
announcement, bank regulators and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission made it mandatory for banks to disclose to the
6Country risk is defined as the risk that a debtor 
country fails to accumulate enough foreign exchange to meet 
debt-service obligations on loans denominated in foreign 
currency. Country risk is divided into two categories: 
sovereign risk and transfer risk. Sovereign risk arises when 
a sovereign borrower reneges on its external obligations and 
no legal redress may be available. When a private-sector 
borrower is unable to obtain foreign exchange to service his 
foreign debt, the risk is classified as transfer risk. See 
Friedman (1983) for a full discussion.
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public information on foreign loan exposure. Banks are 
required to report individual country exposures that exceed
0.75% of total assets or 15% of primary capital, whichever is 
less. The purpose of public disclosure is that it would 
enable financial markets to discipline banks incurring 
excessive risks.
b) Reserve and Loan Classification
In September 1983, the three federal bank agencies 
adopted a new classification system for loans affected by 
transfer risk. The three categories are: substandard, value 
impaired, and loss.7 Loans classified as "loss" are deducted 
from capital.
During February 1984 the regulators implemented a 
provision of the International Lending Supervision Act (1983) 
that requires banks to establish a special Allocated Transfer 
Risk Reserve (ATRR) against certain categories of 
international loans. The ATRR is charged against current 
income and is not considered as part of capital and surplus or 
allowances for possible loan losses for regulatory, 
supervisory, or disclosure purposes. The ATRR is applicable 
for value-impaired loans.
7For a full discussion of these categories, see Joint 
Press Release, Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and Federal Reserve Board, "Interagency 
Statement on Examination Treatment of International Loans," 
December 15, 1983.
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c) Capital Adequacy
The most important response of bank regulators to the 
debt crisis has been to extend and enhance the minimum capital 
ratios for all banks. In June 1983, the Federal Reserve Board 
issued guidelines requiring multinational banks to maintain 
primary capital equal to 5% or more of total assets. It may 
be noted that the multinational BHCs are highly exposed to 
Latin America and are operating at capital ratios of about 4%. 
The joint memorandum of the three federal agencies proposed 
that the regulators should "highlight certain large
concentrations of credit" and factor these "into the 
evaluation of a bank's capital adequacy".8 In other words, 
banks with high exposure to a particular country are expected 
to maintain higher capital ratios than those with more 
diversified portfolios.
The International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 
required the federal banking agencies to cause banking
institutions to achieve and maintain adequate capital by 
establishing minimum levels of capital and other appropriate 
measures. It further provided that the agencies may issue
directives to banking institutions with deficient capital
ratios to submit and adhere to plans to achieve required 
levels of capital. In June 1985, the federal banking agencies
8Joint memorandum, Conover, Issac, and Volcker, "Program 
for Improved Supervision of International Lending," April 7, 
1983.
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issued new capital adequacy standards under which bank holding 
companies and commercial banks are expected to maintain a 
minimum primary capital to total assets ratio of 5.5% and a 
minimum total capital to total assets ratio of 6%.9 The
regulations also provided that capital directives having the 
force of cease and desist orders may be issued to mandate the 
maintenance of adequate capital levels.
In 1988, the regulators from twelve leading industrial 
countries adopted a more stringent set of ''risk-based” capital 
requirements to be implemented in stages.10 These guidelines 
are designed to achieve more consistent capital measurements 
and standards to be applied to banks engaged in international 
business. Bank assets are divided into four risk classes and 
are assigned different weights on the basis of estimated 
counterparty risk. Capital is classified as core ("Tier I”) 
or supplementary ("Tier II”). Tier I capital is basically 
common shareholders' equity. Tier II capital includes 
subordinated debt and most preferred shares. For the first 
time, off-balance sheet items are brought into the purview of 
capital regulation.11
9Total capital is defined as the sum of primary capital 
and secondary capital, where secondary capital includes 
limited life preferred stock, subordinated notes and 
debentures.
10These countries include U.S.A., U.K., and Canada.
"Under these guidelines, off-balance sheet commitments 
are converted to equivalent balance sheet risks for 
determining total risk-weighted assets. A credit conversion 
factor of zero to 100 per cent is applied to the principal
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It is clear from the above discussion that the thrust of 
regulation after the Mexican moratorium is to strengthen and 
enforce capital standards on all banks and to factor the 
country risk into bank capital. As a result, the capital 
ratios of banks have improved considerably since 1982. For 
example, the average primary capital ratio for the 15 largest 
BHCs increased from 4.6% in 1982 to 6.27% at the end of 1984 
and to 7.3% in 1986. The nine largest banks raised a primary 
capital of $5.3 billion between the end of 1982 and September 
1984 (Bergsten, Cline, and Williamson 1985). As shown in 
Table 4.1 there are 69 security issuances between 1982 and 
1986 compared to 38 between 1975 and 1981.12
In summary, two hypotheses are proposed in this section. 
The new information hypothesis involves three propositions. 
The first one is whether the event has information content 
affecting all banks in general. The second proposition is 
whether the market differentiated banks with Latin American 
loans from those which do not have such loans. The third 
proposition relates to market discrimination of banks within 
the exposed group according to the level of exposure of each
amount of credit instruments to arrive at a balance sheet 
equivalent amount. This is further discounted using the 
balance sheet risk factor applicable to the counterparty. For 
example, interest rate and exchange futures are estimated by 
applying a prescribed risk factor to the notional principal 
amount of individual contracts outstanding.
12The sample consists of securities issued by Bank Holding 
Companies (BHCs) and the data are from Irving Trust's Capital 
Securities Issued: Commercial Banking. See Keeley (1989).
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bank to Latin America. The capital regulation hypothesis 
tests whether the market could distinguish banks according to 
capital adequacy. The two hypotheses are not mutually 
exclusive. An event can have information content about the 
quality of bank assets having Latin American loans. The event 
can also induce the financial market to alter assessments as 
to whether regulators will exercise their authority to require 
banks to mark to market loans that have sustained reduction in 
quality. Thus, the market can distinguish banks according to 
exposure levels or capital adequacy or both.
B. Methodology
The hypotheses testing proceeds in two stages. In the 
first stage, excess returns during event period are estimated 
using event study method. Two estimation techniques, the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method and the Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) method, 
are employed. If the excess returns for any event are not 
statistically significant on the event day, it is inferred 
that the event has no information content. And no further 
analysis for that event is performed.13 If the excess returns 
are significant, then the second stage of analysis is
!3Even though the average excess return is not 
significantly different from zero, the individual excess 
returns could still be significant and may provide 
information. Hence, in this study hypotheses testing is 
performed if a majority of event-day individual excess returns 
are statistically significant for any event.
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undertaken. In this stage, a set of regressions between 
excess returns and other relevant variables (e.g., Latin 
American exposure, primary capital ratio) is estimated to test 
the two hypotheses. The remainder of this section discusses 
the event study method, the GARCH model as a technique to 
overcome some shortcomings in the OLS market model, and the 
regression models to test the two hypotheses proposed in 
Section A.
1. Event Study Method
Like most other studies on the Latin American debt crisis 
(except Cornell and Shapiro 1986) this dissertation employs 
event study method to analyze the events identified in Chapter
3. The basic method for event studies is described in Fama et 
al. (1969) . Since then event studies have become an important 
tool of empirical research in finance. Event studies examine 
the impact of specific events on the price/return of the firms 
affected by the event.
The objective of an event study is to see whether there 
are any excess returns for the stocks affected by the event in 
the period surrounding the event. The excess return is the 
difference between observed return and the return generated by 
an appropriate model. There are three methods currently in 
use for measuring excess returns: the mean adjusted returns 
method, the market adjusted returns method, and the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) market model.
Brown and Warner (1985) report that when event dates are
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clustered, market-adjusted methods are better than non-market 
adjusted methods. In this study, the entire sample has only 
one event date for each event, a case of perfect clustering. 
Also, keeping in view the wide usage of the OLS market model 
in the literature, this dissertation employs OLS market model, 
a discussion of which follows next.
2. OLS Market Model
The excess return in OLS market model is specified as
A A
= Rit - aj - biRmt 
eit - N(0,o*j) ,
where Rjt is the observed return for security i on day t, ^  is 
the return on market index on day t, and eit is the 
corresponding excess return. For each firm, the coefficients, 
a; and b;, are estimated over a 250-day pre-event interval 
(t = -260 to t = -ll).14 The average excess return for day t, 
AR, is obtained by averaging the excess returns over all 
securities:
n
AR, = (1/n) £ eit, 
i=l
,4The choice of estimation period is arbitrary and is left 
to the discretion of the researcher. Typical lengths of 
estimation period range from 100 to 300 days. A longer 
estimation period results in improved prediction model, but 
the cost is model parameter instability.
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where n is the number of events. The null hypothesis is that 
the average excess return is equal to zero for each event sub­
period. The test statistic for any day is the ratio of 
average excess return to its estimated standard deviation:
a
t-stat = AR, / SD (AR,) - t (T-l) ,
where
^ ip
SD (AR,) = [ £ (AR, - AR)2/(T-1)]*,
t=l
is the standard deviation of a time series of average excess 
returns over the estimation period, and
  T
AR = (1/T) £ AR,, 
t=l
is the average excess return over the estimation period. If 
AR, is a stationary, normal process, the test statistic is 
distributed as a Student-t under the null hypothesis.
To examine the cumulative effect of a particular event 
over time, the Cumulative Average Excess Return (CAR) approach 
is used. The CAR from day k to m is defined as
m
CARk m = (1/n) £ «■„, 
t=k
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The cumulation is performed over various intervals depending 
on the nature of the problem. The test statistic is the ratio 
of mean cumulative excess return to its estimated standard 
deviation:
A
MCAR^ / SD (MCARkm)
If the ARs or CARs are statistically significant, then it is 
inferred that the event has information content affecting the 
security returns. If the CARs do not return to zero within a 
reasonable period after the event, the event is said to have 
a permanent effect on stock prices.
The OLS market model suffers from some drawbacks which 
are discussed below.
Nonnormalities and nonlinearities:
In testing the statistical significance of the average 
excess returns (ARs) during the event period, the ARs are 
assumed to be independent, identically distributed, and 
normal. The test-statistic is distributed as Student-t under 
the null hypothesis that the AR on day t is zero. However, 
empirical studies (e.g., Brown and Warner 1985) show that the 
daily excess returns from the market model, like daily 
returns, for an individual security are fat-tailed 
(leptokurtic) and nonnorraal. Nonnormality of the error 
distribution may result in higher probability of Type-I error 
(Seber 1977, Brown and Forsythe 1974, Layard 1973, and
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Giaccotto and Ali 1982). Thus, the test of significance may 
be misspecified. A large sample size may diminish the problem 
of nonnormality.
The market model residuals also exhibit significant 
departures from a linear model (e.g., Lee 1976 a,b; McDonald 
1983). The possible sources for these nonlinearities are: i) 
nonnormalities, ii) heteroscedasticity in the error variance, 
and iii) a nonlinear relationship between the variables. 
McDonald and Lee (1988), using generalized functional form of 
the market model, conclude that these nonlinearities are due 
to nonnormalities and unequal variance.
Heteroscedasticity:
A number of studies (e.g., Bey and Pinches 1980, 
Giaccotto and Ali 1982, Brown 1977, and McDonald and Morris 
1983) document the presence of heteroscedasticity in the 
market model. Bey and Pinches (1980) provide a review of 
various studies on heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity is 
also detected in the Canadian and the European markets (e.g., 
Barone-Adesi and Talwar 1983, and Belkaoui 1977).
The existence of heteroscedasticity in the market model 
affects the event studies in two ways. First, it results in 
inefficient parameter estimates and second, it causes biased 
test statistics.
The market model in matrix notation can be written as,
Y = X/3 + e
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A
The variance-covariance matrix of the OLS estimator (/?) is:
A
0,(0) = a'2 (X'X)\
A A A
where a 2 = e' e/(T - k), T is the sample size and k = 2.
In the presence of heteroscedasticity, a consistent estimator 
of the variance-covariance matrix is:
A A
n2(/3) = (X'X)-](X'2X) (X'X)1,
A A
where 2 = diag (e,2,.. . ., eT2) .
The two estimators, n, and n2, will converge to different 
limits.
A
Thus, (/3) is inconsistent if heteroscedasticity is 
present. The variance of /? will be overstated, which implies 
less frequent rejection of the null hypothesis that /3 = 0. A 
second consequence of heteroscedasticity is that estimator of 
the variance of /? is biased. The nature of the bias depends 
on the assumed form of the heteroscedasticity. Another result 
is that the use of OLS to estimate a heteroscedastic process 
could bias the R2 in a positive direction (Kmenta, 1971, pp. 
259-261). It means that the level of systematic risk 
associated with securities will be overstated.
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Variance Increase in Event Studies
The importance of changing variance in event studies is 
well recognized in the literature. Studies by Beaver (1968), 
Patell and Wolfson (1979), Kalay and Lowenstein (1983), 
Christie (1983), Ohlson and Penman (1985), and Billingsley and 
Lamy (1988) document significant increases in variance around 
some events. In testing the statistical significance of 
’’events" it is imperative that a correct estimate of the 
standard errors of the excess returns should be obtained. 
Since the OLS model assumes homoscedasticity, the increase in 
variance will result in misspecification of hypothesis tests 
for testing the significance of excess returns during the 
event period.
Although the problem of changing variance in event 
studies is well recognized, the approach to correct it is 
rather ad hoc. Two important methods suggested to deal with 
increase in variance are the cross-sectional procedures and 
sample partitioning. In cross-sectional procedures (e.g., 
Penman 1982, and Mikkelson 1981), the variance of the mean 
excess returns is estimated each day during the event period 
by the cross-sectional variance. Brown and Warner (1985, 
Table 9) show that statistical tests using cross-sectional 
variance are well-specified even when there is a significant 
increase in variance during the event period. However, the 
tests are misspecified if the variance shift differs across 
sample securities. Moreover, cross-sectional procedures
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ignore pre-event period information resulting in less powerful 
tests. Ball and Brown (1968) suggest partitioning of the 
sample based on an economic model of the effects of the event 
to address the issue of variance increase. This procedure can 
reduce the degree of misspecification in time-series 
procedures.
Karpoff (1987) argues that the rate of information flow 
around "event" periods will be higher than that during the 
non-event period. Hence, the variance of the "true" price 
process will be higher around the event date, implying that 
the OLS model, which assumes constant variance, is 
misspecified. By assuming constant variance, the information 
arriving around the event period is not incorporated in the 
price process. Hence, Karpoff suggests that the sample 
variance around the event period should be adjusted for the 
increased rate of information flow so that the statistical 
tests of excess returns are more accurate and well-specified.
Thus, the problem of variance increase and the need for 
using the appropriate variance estimator in event studies are 
well recognized. To quote Brown and Warner (1985), "while 
nonnormality and biases in estimating the market model are 
unimportant in tests for abnormal performance, the choice of 
variance estimator to be used in hypothesis tests is of some 
concern, affecting both the specification and power of the 
tests... further research is necessary to fully understand the 
properties of alternative procedures for measuring abnormal
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performance in such situations (p26,27)". Since the current 
treatment of the problem of changing variance is rather ad hoc 
in the literature, this study undertakes a systematic approach 
based on the GARCH model.
Cornell and Shapiro's criticism
Cornell and Shapiro (1986) raise an important issue 
regarding the appropriateness of the event study method in the 
analysis of the Latin American debt crisis. They argue that
"classical event studies typically assume that 
information arrives in a form akin to discrete 
'quanta' and that the day of arrival of new 
information can be identified. This makes powerful 
tests possible since the variance of the rate of 
return is approximately a linear function of the 
observation interval. Over short intervals, 
therefore, the variance of stock returns is quite 
low assuring a high signal-to-noise ratio and 
allowing the impact of an event to be isolated 
fairly easily" (p 58).
They propose the 'dribs and drabs' hypothesis, meaning that 
information about Latin America reached the market 
continuously throughout 1982. When information leaks 
continuously it is incorporated into the stock prices before 
the event. Thus, the information arriving on a particular 
date (e.g., the Mexican moratorium announcement day) may not 
be significant. They argue that since the event date cannot 
be pinpointed exactly the event study method cannot be used in 
the case of Latin American debt crisis. Since the OLS model 
calculates only unconditional moments, the information leaking
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prior to the event is not taken into account.
One approach to rectifying deficiencies in OLS market 
model is to use the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model. The GARCH model also seeks 
to address the criticism of Cornell and Shapiro since it 
calculates the conditional variance for each day, 
incorporating prior information. A discussion of the GARCH 
model follows.
3. GARCH Model
The standard approach to heteroscedasticity is to 
introduce an exogenous variable which is a function of 
variance. For example, in the studies on heteroscedasticity 
in the market model, the variance of the residuals is assumed 
to be a function of the return on the market index. The 
following functional form is specified (e.g., McDonald and 
Morris 1983, McDonald and Lee 1988):
a2 = a + bRmt + cR^
This conventional solution to the problem of 
heteroscedasticity seems unsatisfactory since it is often 
difficult to recognize the exogenous variables that affect the 
variance. The selection of the variables is rather ad hoc.
Engle (1982) proposed a class of models called 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedastic (ARCH) models to
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deal with the problem of heteroscedasticity in time series 
data and pioneered a rich stream of literature in recent 
years.15 These models recognize that both conditional mean 
and variance jointly evolve over time. Heteroscedasticity is 
parameterized as a simple linear process facilitating easy 
statistical estimation.
Consider a process
yt = xtb + et,
where xt is a known vector, b is a vector of unknown parameters 
and et is the white noise. The conditional mean given the 
past information set, ^t.,, is bxt and unconditional variance is 
a2. If the process follows a conditional normal distribution, 
then the ARCH regression model is specified as:
Ytl^t-i ~ N(xtb,ht)
P
h, = co + E ajC2,.; 
i=l
For the ARCH process to satisfy the regularity conditions, it 
is assumed that co > 0, and ax , a2 ,...., ap > 0. p is 
called the order of the ARCH process. If p = 0, the process 
is Gaussian white noise. If the sum of the a/s exceed one the 
process will have an infinite unconditional variance.
,5For a review of ARCH modeling in finance, see Bollerslev 
et al. (1990).
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Engle (1982) established that the information matrix is 
block diagonal, which implies that the maximum likelihood 
estimators of a and b are independent. Thus, a and b can be 
estimated separately without asymptotic loss of efficiency. 
Engle also established that the maximum likelihood estimators 
of a and b are asymptotically normal if the conditions of 
Crowder (1976) are satisfied. The log likelihood function for 
a sample of size T is the sum of the conditional log 
likelihoods:
T
L-r = 1/T E 1„ 
t=l
lt = ” l^n(h,) - %e2tht‘‘ - %ln(2ll),
where lt is the log likelihood of the t th observation. Engle 
suggests use of scoring method to obtain the maximum 
likelihood estimates since it requires only the first 
derivatives of the likelihood function. The Lagrange 
Multiplier test is used to test for the presence of the ARCH 
process.
The ARCH process generates fatter tails for the 
conditional distribution than the normal. This property is 
useful in explaining the speculative price behavior. It has 
long been established that the daily stock returns data 
exhibit fatter tails than the normal distribution (e.g., Fama 
1965). Empirical research showed that the daily excess
86
returns from the market model, like daily returns, for an 
individual security are leptokurtic (e.g., Brown and Warner 
1985). The stock return distribution also exhibits 
persistence of volatility (e.g., Mandelbrot 1963, and Fama 
1965). Mandelbrot notes that large price changes are followed 
by large changes of unpredictable sign. These two properties 
(leptokurtosis and persistence of volatility) can be modeled 
by the ARCH process. Since the conditional variance is a 
function of the past squared errors in the ARCH model, large 
values of variance are followed by large values of either 
sign. Thus, the ARCH process reflects available information 
not only in the first moment but also in the second moment.
In empirical applications of the ARCH model it has been 
found that a high order p is required to fit to the data. 
Moreover, to avoid the problem of negative variance parameter 
estimates a fixed lag structure is imposed. Hence, Bollerslev 
(1986) generalizes the ARCH model as Generalized 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model 
which has a longer memory and a more flexible lag structure. 
The GARCH model allows the conditional variance to be a simple 
linear function of the past errors and the past conditional 
variances. Hence, GARCH model represents some sort of 
adaptive learning mechanism based on the past variances. The 
GARCH(p,q) regression model is specified as:
y, = bx, + e,,
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Ytl^ n ~ F (Mt/ ht) ,
M, = bxt,
p q
h ,  —  CO +  £  Q£j  6 2  t . j  +  2  t
i = l  j = l
where
p > 0 and q > 0,
co > 0, a; > 0, i = 1,....,p
/?j > 0, 3 — l,....,q
The non-negativity condition for the parameters ensures a well 
defined process. When q = 0, the ARCH(p) model results and 
when p = q = 0, the process is Gaussian white noise. F(jUt,h,) 
is the conditional distribution of yu conditional on the 
information set, \j/ul.
Bollerslev (1986) shows that the GARCH(p,q) process can 
be approximated by a stationary ARCH(p) process for a 
sufficiently large value of p. Thus, GARCH is a parsimonious 
model compared to the ARCH model. Stationarity conditions 
require that the sum of a/s and /?/s is less than one. GARCH 
process, like the ARCH process, is leptokurtic. If a or ^ is 
positive , then shocks to volatility persist over time. Since 
the conditional variance depends on the available information
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set, it is affected by large shocks (positive or negative) in 
yt . The conditional variance is large when the past errors 
(e2t.lf e2t.2, . ..) and past realized variances (ht.,,h,.2, . ..) are 
large. This property is useful in event studies since the 
variance is found to increase substantially around the event 
date and may persist for some time.
Bollerslev shows that the autocorrelations and partial 
autocorrelations for e2, can be used in preliminary 
identification and checking of the GARCH model in the variance 
equation. As in the case of the ARCH process, the information 
matrix for the GARCH model is also block diagonal. Thus, the 
parameters of the GARCH model can be estimated independently 
without loss of asymptotic efficiency. For estimating the 
GARCH model the method of scoring will be very complicated, 
due to the presence of the recursive part in the derivatives 
of the variance function, ht. Hence, Bollerslev recommends the 
use of the BHHH (Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman 1974) 
algorithm for maximum likelihood estimation of the GARCH 
model.
Bollerslev (1987) shows that GARCH(1,1) model is a 
parsimonious representation of many economic time series. It 
may so happen that several ARCH(p) and GARCH(p,q) processes 
may be nested within a higher order GARCH model. Likelihood 
ratio tests may be used to select the appropriate model. Let
0 = (oj, a,, / I Pit
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represent the set of parameters of the GARCH(p,q) model.
The log-likelihood function is
T
L(0 |p,q) = £ log f (Mt/ht) ,
t= m ax(p ,q )
where f(^t,ht) is the density function. The likelihood 
function is maximized for several values of p and q. If 
L(0O) and L(0a) are the maximum log-likelihood function values 
for the null and alternative hypotheses, then the likelihood 
ratio,
LR = -2{L (0O) - L(0a)},
is asymptotically chi-square distributed with the number of 
degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the number of 
parameters under the two hypotheses (Akgiray 1989, p.68).
To estimate the GARCH model, the distribution function, 
F(/Lt,,ht) must be specified. Most of the studies assumed 
conditional normal distribution for the error terms (e.g., 
Engle 1982, Bollerslev 1986, Akgiray 1989, and Akgiray, Booth 
and Loistl 1989) . Bollerslev (1987) introduces a
conditionally t-distribution assumption in the GARCH model to
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explain the behavior of speculative price changes.16 The 
unconditional kurtosis in the stock return data can be 
explained either by conditional heteroscedasticity or by a 
conditional leptokurtic distribution. The t-distribution 
assumption allows to distinguish between the two. Bollerslev 
argues that GARCH model with the conditional normal errors, 
although leptokurtic, may not explain the observed 
leptokurtosis in the stock return data. The t-distribution is 
better in explaining the leptokurtosis because an unobservable 
error term is added to the conditional variance equation.
Suppose the conditional distribution of yt is 
standardized t with mean y^ .,, and variance h^ .,.
y« = E (yt | f o- i ) + et = y.|t-i +
~ Me.l&i),
where v is the degrees of freedom and f„ (et| v^ n) is the density 
function of e,, conditional on the information set, The
conditional variance ht can be written as
ht = E(h,| + e, = ht|t.j + et,
1<sNelson (1989) extends the GARCH model with a conditional 
density based on the Generalized Error Distribution or the 
power-exponential distribution as defined by Box and Tiao 
(1973). Booth et al. (1990) report that the power
exponential distribution fits better than the Student-t 
distribution for Finnish stocks.
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where et denotes the prediction error in the conditional 
variance. For large values of v the t-distribution 
approaches the normal distribution. However, for small values 
of v , the t-distribution has fatter tails than the normal 
distribution.
The problem of changing variance in event studies and the 
importance of ARCH models in providing a systematic approach 
to the problem have been recognized in a few event studies 
incorporating the ARCH model.17 For example, Bera, Bubnys, 
and Park (1988), using monthly returns of individual firms on 
CRSP tape for 1976-1983, report that conditional 
heteroscedasticity is more widespread than unconditional 
heteroscedasticity in the market model. They employ the 
ARCH(l) model to estimate the beta and find a marked 
improvement in the efficiency of the market model coefficients 
across all firms in the sample. Connolly (1989) employs the 
GARCH(1,1) model to study the weekend effect on three 
different indices. He reports weaker weekend effects for some 
sub-sample periods when adjustment for the temporal variation 
in conditional variance is applied. Poon (1988) uses the 
GARCH(1,1) model to investigate the stock split event. In 
this model, the conditional variance is governed by the daily 
trading volume instead of the past sampling variance.
The GARCH(p,q) model as applied to the market model is
17For a review of ARCH models in event studies, see 
Bollerslev et al. (1990).
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given by:
R, = a + bR^ + e,, 
etI 'Pi-i ~
=  a  + bR,,,,,
Var (e,| \pul) = h, =
p q
w + £ aje,.;2 + D /3jh,.j, 
i = l  j = l
where f is the conditional distribution, /li, is the conditional 
mean, and h, is the conditional variance, depending on the 
available information set, Maximum likelihood estimates
are obtained by the BHHH algorithm using numerical 
derivatives. The model is estimated for several combinations 
of p and q assuming both the conditional normal and Student-t 
distributions. Likelihood ratio test is used to select the 
best combination of p and q. However, this test only shows 
whether t-distribution is better than normal distribution or 
not. Hence, goodness-of-fit tests may be employed to check 
whether t-distribution fits to the data.18
The Pearson goodness-of-fit test statistic is defined as:
18See Hsieh (1989) for a comprehensive set of diagnostic 
checks.
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k
Qk-i = E (Aji - nPi0)2/nPi0, 
i=l
where k is the number of mutually exclusive cells in which the 
data are subdivided, Pio is the probability of an observation 
occurring in that cell, n is the number of observations, and 
Ait is the standardized residuals for stock i on day t 
calculated as:
Ait = eit / Vhit
Kendall and Stuart (1979) suggest that the class boundaries 
can be determined using an equal probabilities method, where 
Pio is equal to 1/k. The number of classes is calculated using 
the following formula:
k = b{2*(n-l)/(Xa + G'1 [P0]) }2/5,
where b is between 2 and 4, n is the sample size, a is the 
size of the test, Xa is the corresponding statistic from the 
normal or Gaussian probability tables, PQ is the approximate 
power function for the maximization , and G 1 is the inverse of 
the normal or Gaussian probability distribution (Kendall and 
Stuart 1979, p.463). The statistic is distributed as x2(k-i-m)/ 
where m is the number of estimated parameters.
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Using e,.n and ht.u/ the values of e, and h, for each day 
during the period day -10 to day +10 are calculated for each 
stock. The test-statistic for a sample of n stocks is
n
AR< = £ Ait/Vn - N (0, 1) 
i=l
AR, is distributed as standard normal under the null hypothesis 
that the mean excess return on day t is zero.
In summary, the event study method incorporating the 
GARCH model employed in this study has the following 
advantages:
a) The heteroscedasticity in the market model, which is widely 
documented in the literature, is modeled as a simple linear 
process in GARCH affording easy statistical estimation.
b) The issue of variance increase in event studies is 
addressed by using a combination of time-series and cross- 
sectional procedures. The variance for each day during the 
event period is estimated using the pre-event conditional 
variance. Thus, the estimation period data is not ignored, 
unlike in the usual cross-sectional procedures.
c) The benefit of sample partitioning in reducing 
misspecification (e.g., Brown and Warner 1985) in time-series 
estimation procedures is obtained in this study by dividing 
the sample of banks into three categories: high exposure 
banks, medium exposure banks, and zero exposure banks. It is
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hypothesized, a priori, that the effect of any event differs 
according to the degree of exposure of each subsample,
d) The GARCH model meets the criticism of Cornell and Shapiro 
against using the event study method. The model addresses the 
problem of leakage of information prior to the event by 
calculating the conditional first and second moments 
(conditional on previous information) for each day. Thus, all 
information prior to the event is incorporated in the 
statistical tests of significance.
C. Testing of Hypotheses
If the excess returns on the event day obtained from the 
OLS market model or the GARCH model are statistically 
significant, then a series of regressions are performed to 
test the two hypotheses: the new information hypothesis and 
the capital regulation hypothesis. A discussion of the 
regression models follows.
1. New Information Hypothesis
The new information hypothesis is tested in two stages. 
The first test concerns whether the information arriving 
during the event period is reflected in the stock prices of 
banks with Latin American loans. To test whether the market 
could distinguish between exposed and nonexposed banks, the 
daily cross-sectional excess returns (eit) estimated from the
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market model are regressed against a dummy variable for Latin 
American exposure:
eit = a + b DUMEXP; + uit# (t = -1,0) ,
where the dummy variable takes on the value of unity for 
exposed banks and zero for nonexposed banks.
In the second stage, the exposed group is analyzed to 
test whether the event conveys information about the quality 
of Latin American loans. The cross sectional excess returns 
are regressed on a continuous variable for exposure 
(Mexican/Brazilian/Latin American) of each bank among the 
group of exposed banks. The regression equation is:
eu = b, + b2 EXP; + uit, (t = -1,0),
where
eit = the excess return for bank i on day t,
EXP; = the exposure of bank i , where exposure is defined 
as the loans (Mexican/Brazilian/Latin American) divided by the 
market value of equity, and
ujt = idiosyncratic error term.
If the coefficient b2 is statistically significant, it 
indicates that exposure has an effect on event day excess 
returns.
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Capital Regulation Hypothesis
Two regressions are estimated to test the capital 
regulation hypothesis.19
1) The set of exposed banks are disaggregated into subsamples 
of capital sufficient banks and capital insufficient banks.20 
The significance of the difference in excess returns between 
the two groups is tested by regressing the full set of 
announcement returns for exposed banks on a zero one dummy 
variable for capital sufficiency:
eit = b, + b2 DUMCAPj + uit, (t = -1,0),
where DUMCAP is a dummy variable for capital sufficiency. 
DUMCAP = 1  if the primary capital ratio of bank i is 
less than the required minimum ratio.
= 0 otherwise.
If the coefficient b2 is negative and significant it
,9Musumeci and Sinkey (1990a) perform capital adequacy 
tests in case of Brazilian moratorium announcement. However, 
they do not develop the idea further and establish any link 
between capital inadequacy and regulators' reaction. They use 
capital adequacy as a common measure of "safety and soundness" 
(that is financial strength). Moreover, in the regression on 
capital adequacy tests, they use equity to total assets ratio 
rather than primary capital ratio which is a measure of 
adequacy of regulatory capital. Capital adequacy in this 
study refers to conformance with the regulatory requirement of 
minimum primary capital ratio.
20Capital sufficiency is defined with respect to the ratio 
of primary capital to total assets in comparison to the 
applicable regulatory minimum.
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indicates that investors could differentiate between capital 
sufficient and capital deficient banks among the exposed 
group.
2) The excess returns are regressed against the primary 
capital ratio of each bank.
eit = b, + b2 PCAPj + uit/ (t = -1,0) f
where PCAP( is the primary capital ratio of bank i. The 
expected sign of b2 is positive.
D. Shift in Risk Characteristics
It is interesting to observe how the risk characteristics 
of bank stocks changed in response to different events of the 
Latin American problem. Among the empirical studies on the 
Latin American debt problem, only Billingsley and Lamy (1988) 
analyze both the return and risk characteristics of stocks 
around the enacting of International Lending Supervision Act 
and find that the total riskiness of the sample increased.
The systematic risk is also found to change in some event 
studies. Thus, Kalay and Lowenstein (1986) report that the 
systematic risk of a sample of stocks increased on the two 
days around a dividend announcement. Brennan and Copeland 
(1988) find a permanent increase in the beta coefficient 
following stock splits.
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The total risk of a portfolio of stock returns, Rp, is 
calculated as:
Var(Rp) = 02p varfRJ + Var(ep) ,
where Var is the variance function, R,„ is the return on the 
market portfolio, and ep is the average residual variance of 
the portfolio of stocks. To test whether the total risk has 
changed after the event, the null hypothesis is:
H0: a\ = a2 A,
where ct2b and a2A are the variance of the portfolio before and 
after the event. The test statistic is given by the ratio of 
the sample variances before and after the event:
s 2b / s 2a ,
The decision rule is:
If F(a/2; nB-l, nA-l) < s2B/s2A < F(l-a/2; nB-l, nA-l) ,
conclude H0. Otherwise, conclude H„. Here nB and nA are 
sample sizes before and after the event.
To test for the change in portfolio beta after the event, 
the test statistic is:
t = (/3B - £A)/Vs2(l/nB + l/nA) ,
1 0 0
where s2 is the pooled variance
s2 = {(nB-l) s2b + (nA-l) s 2a} / (nB+nA-2) ,
and j8B and /SA are the beta coefficients of the portfolio of 
stocks before and after the event. The test statistic is 
distributed as Student-t under the null hypothesis that the 
betas are equal.
E. Chapter Summary
This chapter proposes two testable hypotheses, the new 
information hypothesis and the capital regulation hypothesis, 
to interpret the significance of the events related to the 
Latin American debt crisis. Event study method is employed to 
estimate excess returns during the event period. The OLS 
market model, which is widely used in event studies to measure 
excess returns, suffers from some drawbacks like nonnormality, 
nonlinearities, and heteroscedasticity. The problem of 
changing variance during the event period is well recognized 
in the literature, but the approach to deal with it is rather 
ad hoc. These deficiencies affect the estimates of the market 
model parameters and the statistical tests of significance for 
event period excess returns. Cornell and Shapiro point out 
that the standard event study method is not suitable for the
Latin American debt problem since it cannot handle the leakage 
of information prior to the event. This study attempts to 
address these methodological issues by employing the GARCH 
model which incorporates prior information by calculating the 
conditional moments. A series of regression models are
proposed to test the two hypotheses. Finally, tests for 
changes in the risk characteristics of the stocks as a result 
of the events are considered.
1 0 2
Table 4.1
Distribution of Security Issuance by U.S. BHCs (1982-1986)
Security 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Total
Common Stock 2 4 4 3 2 15
Preferred Stock 8 12 3 3 1 27
Convertible Debt 1 1 2
Mandatory 
Convertible Debt 3 12 6 1 22
Multiple Issue 2 1 3
Total 15 16 20 13 5 69
Source: Keeley (1989)
CHAPTERS 
MEASURING EXCESS RETURNS
The purpose of this chapter is to measure the excess 
returns of the sample of U.S. bank stocks for each of the 
events identified for analysis in Chapter 3. The first step 
in measuring excess returns during the event period is to 
establish the distributional properties of the residuals of 
the market model. The first section of this chapter discusses 
the distributional properties of the error terms of the market 
model using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the 
Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity 
(GARCH) estimation methods. Section B contains a description 
of the event study results for each event. The last section 
concludes the chapter.
A. Distributional Properties of the Market Model Residuals
The market model is estimated for each stock over a period 
of 250 days (t = -260 to t = -11) for the Mexican moratorium 
event using the OLS estimation method. The distributional 
properties of the OLS market model residuals are shown in 
Table 5.1. The table reports the Kolmogorov-Smirnov D- 
statistic for testing normality, mean, variance, skewness, 
kurtosis, and Durbin-Watson statistics. The market model 
parameter estimates are also reported. The p-values are shown
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in parentheses.
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects normality in 39 out 
of 54 firms. Zero skewness cannot be rejected in a majority 
of cases (30 out of 54) whereas normal kurtosis cannot be 
rejected in only 8 cases. Thus, the market model residuals, 
in general, exhibit nonnormality with fat tails. This result 
is consistent with the findings of previous researchers (e.g., 
Brown and Warner 1985) .
Table 5.2 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of the 
GARCH market model. The table includes estimates of market 
model parameters, a/s, /3/s, 1/v and the best model (based on 
the likelihood ratio test). The model is estimated using 
different starting values for the parameters to ensure that 
global maxima are obtained in each case. The sum of a/s and 
jSj's is less than unity in most of the cases, indicating that 
the process has a finite conditional variance. Comparing the 
market model beta estimates of OLS and GARCH models, it can be 
seen that the GARCH estimates are, on average, about 3 0%-40% 
lower than the OLS estimates.
The results from Table 5.2 suggest that the Student-t 
distributed model provides a better fit than the normal for 37 
firms. To check goodness of fit, Pearson x2 test is performed 
on the high exposure group of stocks. This test provides a 
statistical comparison of the theoretical distribution based 
on the estimated parameters and the empirical distribution of 
the standardized residuals, et/Vht. The results of Pearson
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test, shown in Table 5.3, indicates that the Student-t 
distribution provides a good fit in 7 cases and the null 
hypothesis of a good fit is rejected in 6 cases.
B. Event study Results
This section discusses event study results for each event 
using the OLS and the GARCH models. Each table shows average 
excess returns (ARs) and cumulative average excess returns 
(CARs) for high exposed banks, medium exposed banks, all 
exposed banks, and non-exposed banks. The t-statistics are 
shown in parentheses. The event day is designated as day 
'O'. A discussion of results for each event follows.
1. Borrower-induced Events 
Mexican Moratorium
The event study results for the Mexican moratorium 
announcement using OLS are reported in Table 5.4. For the set 
of all banks with Latin American debt exposure the results 
indicate a negative average excess return of -1.77% on the 
event day with a t-statistic of -7.70. In contrast, for the 
sample of banks with no exposure to such debt the relevant 
returns are a positive 0.69% with a t-statistic of 1.93 which 
is not significant at the conventional 5% significance level. 
These results are consistent with those reported by previous 
studies such as Bruner and Simms (1987) and Lamy, Marr, and 
Thompson (1986). The high exposure group experienced excess
106
returns of -2.22% (t = -6.56) and the medium exposure group 
had -1.43% (t = -4.48).
The table also shows the CARs from day -1 through day 
+10. The CARs taken as the sum of the average excess returns 
between two points in time show the impact of the event over 
a period of time. The CARs for the zero exposure group and 
the exposed banks are mostly non-significant. The CARs for 
the medium exposure group are not significant till day 5 and 
become significant afterwards. In contrast, the CARs for the 
high exposure group remain significant throughout (day -1 to 
day +10), indicating that the event has a lasting impact on 
this set of banks. The CARs for the high exposure group 
increase from -1.83% (t = -3.74) to -4.46% (t = -3.19) between 
day -1 and day 10. Surprisingly, the medium exposure group 
have positive CARs from day 5 (1.50%) to day 10 (2.84%).
Table 5.5 shows the event study results using GARCH 
model. The abnormal return, et, and conditional variance, ht, 
for day -11 are used to calculate et, and ht from day -10 to 
day +10. The difference in the OLS and the GARCH models may 
be analyzed with respect to three measures: the significance 
level (as measured by the t-statistics), the excess return 
(AR) , and the daily conditional variance, h,.
Considering the high exposure group, the significance 
level for OLS and GARCH is different on day -5 and day 8 . On 
day -5, the t-statistics for OLS is -3.19 and for GARCH it is 
only -1.97. On day 8, the excess return is significant for
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OLS at 95% level and insignificant for GARCH. For medium 
exposure group, the significance levels are different for the 
two models on day -10, day 1, day 2, and day 6. For zero 
exposure group, the excess returns are significant (at 95% 
level) with GARCH on day -9, day 1, day 5 and day 9, and are 
not significant with OLS. In general, the t-statistics for 
GARCH model are smaller than that for the OLS model in the 
case of high exposure group whereas the opposite is true for 
zero exposure group. For the medium exposure group, no 
general pattern can be delineated.
A possible explanation of the difference in t-statistics 
obtained may lie in comparing the daily conditional variances 
of GARCH and the average residual variance for the OLS, which 
are used in calculating the respective t-statistics. For high 
exposure group, the daily conditional variances (ht) are 
consistently higher than the average residual variance by 
about 30%-60% and it is exactly the opposite case (except on 
days -10 to -6 and day 10) for zero exposure group. For 
medium exposure group, the hts are, in general, higher than the 
OLS variance. Another interesting observation is that for 
high exposure group, the conditional variance started 
increasing from day -1 through day 3 and then started 
declining. On day -1 there is an increase of about 25% in 
daily variance. For medium exposure group, the variance 
increased from day -3 through day 2.
The above findings are in tune with the results of
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previous studies by Beaver (1968), Patell and Wolfson (1979), 
Kalay and Lowenstein (1983), Christie (1983) and Ohlson and 
Penman (1985), which establish a substantial increase in 
variance of a security's return around the event dates. The 
conditional variance remained fairly stable in the case of 
zero exposure group. Thus, the effect of the event for the 
three groups on the first and second moments of the security 
returns is consistent.
The excess returns as measured by the two models do not 
differ substantially except in a few cases. For example, the 
AR on day -2 for the medium exposure group using the GARCH is 
higher by 62% than that for the OLS. For the zero exposure 
group the AR for GARCH is less than that for the OLS by 37% on 
day 1. The average beta with the GARCH model is less than 
the average beta with the OLS by 6% to 13%. However, this 
difference in beta is not translated into a difference in 
daily excess returns during the event period due to very low 
market returns on these days.
The excess returns are significant for the five days 
(except on day -4) prior to the event date. It seems there is 
a lot of activity in the market before the Mexican moratorium 
event. For example, the Wall Street Journal reports that on 
August 17 (day -2) the stock prices soared and the trading 
reached near record level. To incorporate all the information 
prior to the event, the GARCH model is estimated again from 
day -253 to day -3. The excess returns and the t-statistics
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are calculated using the new estimates and the results are 
shown in Table 5.6. The results are very similar to those in 
Table 5.5.
Since the Student-t distribution did not provide a good 
fit in a number of cases (Table 5.3), the GARCH model is 
estimated again for the high exposure group using normal 
distribution assumption for all the stocks. The average 
excess returns and daily conditional variance for the Mexican 
moratorium event calculated under the normal distribution 
assumption are found to be similar to the results reported in 
Table 5.4. Thus, the assumption of the underlying 
distribution of the market model residuals does not seem to 
make much difference in the event study results with GARCH 
model.
In the next stage, the set of exposed banks are 
disaggregated into subsamples of capital sufficient banks and 
capital deficient banks based on each bank's ratio of primary 
capital to assets in comparison to the applicable regulatory 
minimum. The results are reported in Table 5.7. Average 
excess returns for the set of exposed banks that possess 
sufficient regulatory capital is -1.34% while average excess 
returns for capital deficient banks are -2.64%, a decline that 
is approximately twice in magnitude. Both figures are 
statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. The 
capital deficient group produced highly significant CARs which 
increase from -2.91% (t = -5.14) to -6.17% (t = -3.38) between
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day -1 and day 10. The capital sufficient banks have positive 
CARs which increase from 1.82% (t = 2.36) to 2.79% (t = 2.63) 
between day 6 and day 10. Thus, the results indicate that the 
capital deficient banks experienced highly significant and 
lasting negative excess returns following the Mexican 
moratorium announcement.
Argentinean Moratorium
The event study results using OLS are reported in Table
5.4, where the event day is t = +10. The non-exposed banks 
have average excess returns on the event day close to zero and 
are not statistically significant. In contrast, for the set 
of all exposed banks the excess return is -0.72% with a t- 
statistics of -2.70. Among the exposed banks, the high 
exposed group experienced an average excess return of -1.30% 
(t = -2.93) and the medium exposure group has statistically 
non-significant negative excess returns.
The event study results with GARCH model, shown in Table
5.5, and 5.6, are very similar to the OLS results. The only 
difference is that, for the high exposure group, the average 
excess returns are significant at 1% confidence level (t = 
-2.93) for the OLS model and are significant at 5% level (t = 
-2.15) for the GARCH model.
The disaggregation of exposed banks into capital 
sufficient and capital deficient subsamples resulted in 
average excess returns of -1.74% (t = -3.49) for capital 
deficient banks (Table 5.7). In contrast, the average excess
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returns for capital sufficient banks with Latin American debt 
exposure are close to zero on the announcement day.
Bolivian Moratorium
Information about the Bolivian moratorium arrived on two 
consecutive days: May 31, 1984, and June 1, 1984. The Wall 
Street Journal of May 31, 1984, reported an unconfirmed news 
item that Bolivia may suspend payments on its foreign debt. 
The next day the Bolivian government officially declared 
suspension of payments. Hence, a two-day event period (day 
-1 and day 0) approach was adopted for the analysis.
From Table 5.8, the average excess returns for all 
exposed banks are -0.60% (t = -2.73) on day 0 and -1.12%
(t = -3.53) for two days. The excess returns are not
significant for the non-exposed group. Among the exposed 
group, the high exposure group has two-day excess returns of 
-2.18% (t = -4.62) which are of similar magnitude to those for 
the Mexican moratorium event (-2.22%). The medium exposure 
group experienced insignificant excess returns.
It is seen from Table 5.9 that the capital deficient 
group had an average excess return of -1.94% (t = -3.97) on 
day 0 and -4.00% (t = -5.77) for the two-day period. In 
contrast, the capital sufficient group had insignificant 
excess returns. Thus, the market clearly distinguished 
capital deficient and capital sufficient banks.
The CARs also show the differential impact of the event 
on different categories of banks. The zero exposure group has
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insignificant CARs whereas the exposed banks have increasing 
and significant CARs. Among the exposed banks, the subset of 
capital sufficient banks have insignificant CARs. For the 
capital deficient group, the CARs increase from -4.00% (t = - 
5.77) to -6.46% (t = -3.96), implying that the event has a 
lasting impact on this group.
Brazilian Moratorium
The OLS results of the Brazilian announcement as shown in 
Table 5.10, indicate that the group of all exposed banks have 
average excess returns of -1.12% (t = -4.64) on day 0 and - 
1.35% (t = -4.08) for the two-day period. On the other hand, 
the non-exposed banks have insignificant excess returns. For 
the high exposure group, the event effect is felt on two 
consecutive days: an average excess return of -0.91% on day 
-1 and -1.98% on day 0, both being significant at 5% level. 
The two-day return for this group is -2.88% (t = -5.36). In 
contrast, the moratorium announcement has no effect on the 
medium exposure group. The pattern of CARs is similar to that 
observed for the Mexican and the Bolivian moratoria.
The exposed banks were not partitioned according to 
sufficiency of capital for this event because all the banks in 
the sample met the requirement of regulatory capital. The 
mean primary capital ratio of the group of all exposed banks 
at the end of 1986 is 7.23%. Between 1982 and 1986, banks 
have built up sufficient capital to satisfy regulatory 
requirements.
The event study results of the Brazilian moratorium using 
the GARCH model are shown in Table 5.11. In general, the 
results with the OLS and the GARCH models are very similar 
except in a few cases. For example, the excess returns for 
the high exposure group on day -8 are significant at 5% 
confidence level with the GARCH model whereas they are not
significant with the OLS model. For the medium exposure
group, the average excess return on day 7 is higher for the 
OLS model than that for the GARCH model by about 21%. They 
also differ in significance levels (t = -2.76 for OLS and t = 
-2.01 for the GARCH) . For the zero exposure group, the excess 
returns on day 6 are significant at 1% level (t = 2.91) for 
the GARCH model and insignificant for the OLS model. The 
average beta for each group with the GARCH model is less than 
the corresponding beta for the OLS model: the difference
ranging from -6.3% for the high exposure group to -19.3% for 
the zero exposure group. The differences between the OLS and
the GARCH models are less pronounced in the case of the
Brazilian moratorium event than for the Mexican moratorium 
event.
The results for the OLS and the GARCH models suggest that 
the GARCH model does not make significant difference in this 
study. Hence, for the remaining events, only the OLS results 
are reported.
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2. Lender-induced Events 
Citicorp Loan-Loss-Provision Event
The event study results of the Citicorp loan-loss 
enhancement are shown in Table 5.12. The results indicate 
non-significant excess returns for all groups of banks on the 
event day. On the other hand, Citicorp experienced negative, 
but insignificant, excess returns of -1.08% on day 0. The 
next two days (day 1 and day 2) the firm has significant 
positive excess returns of 5.57% (t = 4.13) and 4.63% (t = 
3.43). Hence, the results suggest that investors treated the 
event as a firm-specific event rather than as an event with 
industry-wide ramifications. However, logically a mere 
accounting adjustment (loan-loss-provision involves transfer 
of funds from profit and loss account to the reserve for loan- 
loss account) should not result in positive excess returns of 
about 10% in two days for Citicorp. One possible explanation 
is that Citicorp's action reduced uncertainty and allowed the 
bank more bargaining power in its negotiations with the 
troubled debtor countries.
3. Events Initiated by Borrower and Lender 
Mexican Debt-Rescheduling Agreement
The results of the Mexican debt rescheduling agreement 
event, shown in Table 5.13, indicate average excess returns of 
-0.83% (t = -3.01) on the event day for the exposed banks and 
insignificant excess returns for the non-exposed banks. Among
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the exposed banks, the high exposure group experienced 
significant excess returns of -1.12% (t = -2.51) whereas the 
medium exposure group have insignificant excess returns. But, 
the pattern of CARs is quite different for the medium- and 
high-exposure groups for this event as compared to other 
events. The CARs for the high exposure group are 
insignificant and return to zero, whereas they increase from 
day -1 to day 3 and remain significant for the medium exposure 
group. The group of exposed banks, as a whole, experience 
significant CARs. As in other events, the CARs for the zero 
exposure group remain insignificant.
The agreement between Mexico and the creditor banks in 
1986 was hailed as a model for other debtor countries. The 
agreement provides for additional loans and restructuring of 
the existing loans over a long period. The interest margin is 
also reduced to less than 1% over the LIBOR rate. These terms 
of the agreement, especially the new additional lending and 
reduction in spread that results in reduced earnings for the 
banks, may have triggered off an unfavorable reaction from the 
investors resulting in negative returns for the high exposure 
group of banks.
4. External Events 
Falkland War
The Falkland war event is analyzed for two dates: April
2, 1982, when Argentina invaded the Falklands and May 5, 1982,
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when Argentina devalued the peso by 14.3%.
Table 5.14 shows the results of Falkland war event for 
the first event date. The average excess returns for all 
groups of banks are insignificant on day 0 and day -1. Thus, 
the beginning of the Falkland war has no effect on stock 
prices of the banks with Latin American loans, probably 
because it was treated as a political event. In contrast, the 
second event has significant effect as shown in Table 5.15. 
On day 0, the banks exposed to Latin America have average 
excess returns of -0.57% (t = -2.07) and the zero exposure 
group have insignificant excess returns. The exposed group 
experienced significant excess returns of -0.74% (t = -2.78) 
on day -2 and -0.52% (t = -2.06) on day -1. On day -2 an 
Argentine cruiser was sunk with 1852 men on board and on day 
-1 a British destroyer was sunk. These events indicate the 
intensification of the war. The two-day (day -1 and 0) excess 
returns for the exposed group are -1.08% (t = -2.94) which are 
of similar magnitude to the excess returns of moratorium 
announcements. The high exposure group have significant 
average excess returns of -0.70% (t = -2.00) on day -2, -0.83% 
(t = -2.48) on day -1, and -1.02% (t = -2.48) on day 0. The 
two-day excess returns for the high exposure group add up to 
-1.84% (t = -3.34) and the corresponding figure for the
Mexican moratorium event is -1.83 (t = -3.74). The
similarity of investor reaction to the Falkland war and the 
Mexican moratorium events, suggests that investors started
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discounting the Latin American debt even before the Mexican 
moratorium event.
Legislative Actions
The results of the legislative events are reported in 
Table 5.16. The exposed banks experienced average excess 
return of 0.66% (t = 2.26) on the day of introduction of the 
legislation (S. 695) proposing an increase in the U.S. quota 
to the IMF. The unexposed sample did not react significantly. 
Investors may have viewed the increased U.S. support for the 
IMF favorably. On the other hand, the passage of S. 695 in 
the Senate on June 8, 1983, evoked a negative reaction by the 
stockholders. According to Billingsley and Lamy (1988) the 
reason for this result is the investors' suspicion that the 
increased IMF protection needs additional constraints on 
foreign lending.
Perhaps, the negative excess returns for the exposed 
banks on two consecutive days (day 0 and day 1) may have been 
caused by another event. The Wall Street Journal of June 10, 
1983, reports that capital rules were set by regulators for 
big banks. The big (multinational) banks were not brought 
into the purview of the capital regulation in 1981, so as to 
give them sufficient time to build up required capital. The 
international debt crisis hastened the process and the capital 
regulation was extended to the big banks with low capital 
ratios in 1983. The result is negative reaction by the 
investors for the exposed banks. Billingsley and Lamy (1988)
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did not consider the capital aspect in their explanation of 
the controversy.
To summarize, the excess returns are significant only on 
the day of introduction of the proposal to increase the U.S. 
quota to the IMF and insignificant for the ILSA. The 
subsequent stages of the legislation evoked no response from 
the investors. It seems that the investors valued the support 
of the U.S. to the IMF favorably.
Cartagena Declaration
The results of the Cartagena declaration event are 
presented in Table 5.17. The exposed group have positive 
average excess returns of 0.68% (t = 3.08) on the event day 
and the non-exposed group have no effect. Among the exposed 
banks, the high exposed group have insignificant excess 
returns whereas the medium exposure group have significant 
positive excess returns of 0.73% (t = 2.41). The two-day (day 
-1 and 0) excess returns for all the groups are not 
statistically significant. The cumulative excess returns for 
all the groups are mostly insignificant. Investors recognized 
the fact that the Latin American countries did not form a 
debtor cartel at Cartagena and pledged to fulfill their 
commitments to repay their external debts, resulting in 
positive returns. However, investor reaction is not strong 
indicating that the investors treated the event as 
predominantly political.
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Peru's Declaration
The event study results of Peru's declaration (Table 
5.18) indicate that the event has no significant effect on any 
group of banks. Peru, with a foreign debt of $14 billion, is 
a small debtor. Peru's President-elect declared that his 
country would limit the repayments to not more than 10% of the 
country's export earnings. He unsuccessfully tried to 
organize other Latin American countries to accept his stand. 
Investors might have treated the declaration as a political 
event without any economic implications.
Baker Plan
The results of Baker plan event are presented in Table 
5.19. The high exposure group have average excess returns of 
1.17% (t = 3.08) on day -1 and 0.92% (t = 2.75) on day 0, for 
a two-day excess return of 2.09% (t = 4.12). The exposed 
banks as a group have excess returns of 0.58% (t = 2.22) on 
day -1, 0.61% (t = 2.73) on day 0, and a two-day return of 
1.19% (t = 3.50). The event has no effect on medium exposure 
and zero exposure groups. The CARs for the exposed banks are 
positive and remain significant, implying a lasting effect of 
the event. The CARs for the high exposure group increase from 
2.09% (t = 4.12) to 3.93% (t = 5.28) between day -1 and day 3. 
The results suggest a strong positive reaction from the 
market. The investors treated the announcement of Baker plan 
as a positive response from the government to the worsening 
political and economic situation in Latin America. Although
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Baker plan does not suggest bailing out of banks by the 
government, it does indicate that the government is concerned 
with the problem and is willing to exercise its political and 
economic clout in solving the debt crisis.
Slump in Oil Prices
The event study results for the slump in oil prices in 
February 1986 are shown in Table 5.20. The non-exposed group 
have little effect on any day. The exposed group experienced 
average excess returns of -1.04% (t = -3.41) on day 0 and 
-1.43% (t = -5.82) on day 1 for a total two-day (day 0 and 1) 
excess return of -2.47%. The corresponding excess returns for 
the high exposure group are -1.94% (t = -6.01%) on day 0 and 
-2.05% (t = -5.85) on day 1, and about -4.00% for the two 
days. For the medium exposure group, the excess returns are 
insignificant on day 0, but on day 1 the excess returns are 
-0.90% (t = -2.40).
This is a purely exogenous and unanticipated event. The 
fall in oil prices was steep and sudden. In October 1985, the 
Baker plan was announced to solve the debt crisis. The 
decline in oil prices jeopardized the Baker plan even before 
it was tried. The impact of the declining oil prices on the 
Mexican and the Venezuelan economies is devastating. Press 
reports indicated that Mexico may demand for additional debt. 
Mexico and Venezuela called for an emergency meeting of the 
'Cartagena Group' to discuss ways to ease the Latin American 
debt burden. Another news item reported that banks with big
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loans to Mexico were concerned about the impact of the falling 
oil prices (WSJ 1/27/1986). Thus, this event has information 
content for banks with Latin American loans as reflected in 
the stock prices.
The results of all events are summarized in Table 5.21. 
The table shows the average excess returns on the event day 
(or for two-day period, wherever appropriate) for all the 
events analyzed. The non-exposed group of banks have 
consistently insignificant excess returns for all events 
(except for two days relating to the legislative actions). 
Thus, this group serves as an effective control group which 
helps in distinguishing between industry-wide events and 
events related to the Latin American problem. The impact of 
the events on the exposed banks is consistent with prior 
predictions. The predominantly political events (the 
beginning of the Falkland war and the declaration by Peru's 
president) have no effect on the set of all exposed banks. 
The Cartagena declaration event has a mild effect on medium 
exposure group and no effect on the high exposure group. The 
four moratoria, as a class, have consistently negative impact 
on the exposed banks. The purely exogenous events, the 
Falkland war involving the devaluation of peso, the Baker 
plan, and the slump in oil prices, which have wide economic 
ramifications on the loan portfolios of the banks with Latin 
American debt have resulted in significant excess returns. 
The debt-rescheduling agreement between Mexico and the
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creditor banks, the only event involving both the borrower and 
lenders, is considered as unfavorable to the value of the 
banks, although the agreement is hailed as a model for other 
debtor countries. Citicorp's loan-loss-provision event, the 
only event initiated by the creditor banks, is treated as a 
firm-specific event resulting in significant excess returns 
only for Citicorp. Baker plan and Cartagena declaration 
events have positive information content whereas all other 
events conveyed unfavorable news.
The differential impact of the events on the high- and 
medium-exposure groups is clearly brought out in Table 5.21. 
The impact of all events (except, the Cartagena declaration 
event) is very strong and highly significant for the high 
exposed banks. The excess returns are close to 2% for each 
event. On the other hand, the excess returns for the medium 
exposure group are much less than those for the high exposure 
group. For most of the events, the impact on the medium 
exposure banks is insignificant.
The CARs also show a consistent pattern for the events. 
The CARs for non-exposed group are mostly insignificant for 
all the events. For the high exposure group, the CARs for 
most of the events are highly significant, suggesting that the 
events have a lasting effect. The medium exposure group have 
mostly insignificant CARs. The exception to this general 
pattern is the Mexican debt-rescheduling event for which the 
CARs for the medium exposure group are significant and those
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for the high exposure group are not. The events, in general, 
have a lasting effect on the group of all banks with Latin 
debt in that the CARs do not return to zero.
5. On the Significance of Excess Returns Before the Event
In a pure (i.e., totally unanticipated) event study, the 
excess returns in the pre-event period should be 
insignificant. As information about the event reaches the 
market on the event day, there will be significant change in 
the returns of the stocks affected by the event, if the event 
has information content to affect the net present value of the 
firm. However, if the event is anticipated (fully or 
partially) or if information leading to the event reaches the 
market before the event, then the average excess returns 
before the event may be significant.
In the present study, the excess returns (during the 
interval day -10 to day -1) are found to be statistically 
significant before the event day. For example, in the case of 
the Mexican moratorium event, the group of banks with Latin 
American loans, experienced average excess returns of -0.49% 
on day -5, 1.36% on day -3, 1.03% on day -2, and 1.21% on day 
-1, which are all statistically significant.
Bruner and Simms (1987) do not report daily average 
excess returns prior to the event day. Lamy, Marr, and 
Thompson (198 6) report excess returns from day -3 0 through day 
+10, but none of them are significant, except the day 0 excess
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returns. They point out that the market was driving up the 
prices of the bank stocks prior to the Mexican moratorium 
announcement. They argue that such a behavior is consistent 
with the IMF bailout theory since Mexico, the IMF and the 
Federal Reserve were close to finalizing a lending agreement. 
When the agreement was not reached, the market treated it as 
'bad news'. Viswanathan and Philippatos (1989) note that the 
excess returns for the three days before the Mexican 
moratorium were positive and mostly significant; for the 
remainder of the test period (day -30 to day +30) the excess 
returns were evenly split between positive and negative. They 
attribute the positive excess returns and cumulative excess 
returns to the upward trend in the stock market from July 
1982. Thus, the previous studies on the Mexican moratorium 
event did not take enough cognizance of the significant pre­
event excess returns.
The events relating to the Latin American debt problem 
cannot be treated as pure events, wherein the information 
arrives in one burst on the event day. Information about 
Latin America reached the market continuously prompting the 
investors to change the valuation of bank assets as 
information arrived. In the case of some events, the 
information prior to the event may suggest the impending 
event. For example, one week before the Mexican moratorium 
event, the Mexican government devalued peso. Two days before, 
the government closed the foreign exchange markets and
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announced that all money in foreign-currency accounts could 
only be withdrawn in pesos. Meanwhile, negotiations were in 
progress with the IMF and the Federal Reserve to arrange for 
credits. Thus, it is more appropriate to treat the events of 
the Latin American problem as 'partially anticipated' events.
Malatesta and Thompson (1985) define a partially 
anticipated event as an event with an ex ante probability that 
is positive, but less than one. They distinguish two types of 
effects for a partially anticipated event: the economic effect 
and the announcement effect. The economic effect is the 
difference in firm value given that the event occurs now and 
firm value given that the even does not occur (p. 237) . It is 
the net present value of the event. An anticipated event 
still does not provide investors with information about the 
exact timing of the event. The announcement of the event 
resolves this uncertainty. Thus, the announcement effect is 
the change in firm value associated with the resolution of the 
uncertainty. The economic effect and the announcement effect 
are equal only when the prior probability of the event is 
zero. Malatesta and Thompson argue that in the case of 
partially anticipated events, the announcement effect is an 
attenuated measure of the event's economic impact. Thus, the 
event day results reported in this study may be considered as 
attenuated measures of the economic effect of the events. The 
results would have been stronger if the events were completely 
unanticipated.
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the GARCH model is 
employed to incorporate the information arriving prior to the 
event. The model is estimated in two ways: from day -260 to 
day -10, and from day -253 to day -3. By estimating the model 
right up to day -3, all the information prior to the event can 
be taken into account. The results are not significantly 
different from the results of Ordinary Least Squares 
estimation method. The plausible explanation is that the
economic impact of the events is very strong and it is not 
attenuated significantly by prior information.
C. Chapter Summary
This chapter tests the information content of events by 
measuring excess returns during the event period. The results 
indicate that all the events (except Peru's declaration event) 
produced significant excess returns for the group of U.S. 
banks with Latin American loans. In contrast, the non-exposed 
banks experienced no effect, which implies that the events 
convey information about the changing value of Latin American 
loans. The four moratoria, as a class, produced strong and 
consistent results. The market distinguished banks broadly as 
high-, medium-, and zero-exposure groups, as the excess 
returns vary systematically for each group. The excess 
returns also vary based on capital adequacy.
The results of the GARCH model, which is used to correct 
for heteroscedasticity in the OLS market model, show that the
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correction has only marginal impact on the statistical tests 
of significance.
The events for which the event day excess returns are 
substantial and statistically significant are selected for 
further analysis in the next chapter. These events include 
the four moratoria, the Falkland war, and the Oil price slump 
event. The remaining six events—  Citicorp loan-loss 
provision event, legislative actions, Cartagena declaration, 
Peru's declaration, Mexican debt-rescheduling agreement, and 
Baker plan—  are dropped at this stage, either because the 
excess returns are not significant or are too low to warrant 
further analysis.
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Table 5.1
Descriptive Statistics of Market Model Residuals for 
Mexican Moratorium Event Using Ordinary Least Squares Method
Sym­
bol
D-St
(P>
Mean Vari­
ance
(P)
Skew­
ness
(P)
Kurt-
osis
D-W 
St at.
Market Model 
Parameters 
a b 
(t) (t)
1. ASO 0.06
(.05)
0.00 0.0008 0.158
(.30)
0.18
(.55)
2.215 -0.0002
(-0.3)
0.19
(2.9)
2. BAC 0.07
(.01)
0.00 0.0003 -0.035
(.82)
1.26
(.00)
1.783 0.0002
(0.2)
1.05
(9.1)
3. BBI 0.07
(.01)
0.00 0.0003 0.643
(.00)
3.35
(.00)
2.406 -0.0001
(-0.1)
0.46
(4.0)
4. BCL 0.08
(.01)
0.00 0.0004 0.470
(.00)
3.42
(.00)
1.922 -0.0010
(-0.9)
0.21
(1.5)
5. BK 0.06
(.05)
0.00 0.0002 0.433
(.01)
2.42
(.00)
1.960 0.0010
(1.1)
0.56
(5.2)
6. BKB 0.07
(.01)
0.00 0.0002 0.211
(.17)
3.77
(.00)
1.792 0.0003
(0.3)
0.60
(6.2)
7. BT 0.04
(.20)
0.00 0.0003 0.083
(.59)
0.03
(.33)
1.991 0.0011
(1.1)
1.14
(9.7)
8. CCI 0.05
(.15)
0.00 0.0002 0.082
(.59)
1.43
(.00)
1.830 0.0012
(1.3)
1.34
(12.8)
9. CFB 0.24
(.01)
0.00 0.0004 3.099
(.00)
26.90
(.00)
2.343 0.0012
(0.9)
0.03
(0.8)
10. CHL 0.05
(.10)
0.00 0.0002 0.124
(.42)
0.47
(.13)
1.946 0.0001
(0.01)
0.82
(8.2)
11. CIL 0.10
(.01)
0.00 0.0004 -1.422
(.00)
6.64
(.00)
2.008 -0.0021
(-1.8)
0.77
(5.7)
12. CRN 0.13
(.01)
0.00 0.0003 -4.875
(.00)
50.20
(.00)
2.171 -0.0016
(-1.5)
0.25
(2.1)
13. CMB 0.09
(.01)
0.00 0.0002 -0.192
(.21)
3.93
(.00)
1.761 -0.0004
(-0.4)
0.98
(9.3)
14. DEP 0.12
(.01)
0.00 0.0002 3.321
(.00)
31.00
(.00)
1.520 0.0022
(2.8)
0.08
(0.9)
15. EQK 0.16
(.01)
0.00 0.0011 -2.397
(.00)
20.40
(.00)
2.357 -0.0019
(-0.9)
0.12
(0.5)
16. FAC 0.09
(.01)
0.00 0.0003 0.114
(•46)
2.20
(.00)
2.023 -0.0002
(-0.2)
0.16
(1.3)
Table 5.1 (contd.)
Sym­
bol
D-St
(P)
Mean Vari­
ance
(P)
Skew­
ness
<P)
Kurt-
osis
D-W 
Stat.
Market Model 
Parameters 
a b 
(t) (t)
17. FBF 0.08
(.01)
0.00 0.0002 -0.068
(.66)
1.34
(.00)
2.043 0.0000
(0.0)
0.24
(2.5)
18. FBT 0.05
(.20)
0.00 0.0004 -0.155
(.31)
0.20
(.65)
2.044 -0.0018
(-1.4)
0.99
(6.6)
19. FDU 0.05
(.10)
0.00 0.0001 0.099
(.52)
0.65
(.04)
1.955 -0.0001
(-0.1)
0.16
(1.9)
20. FFB 0.07
(.01)
0.00 0.0002 0.181
(.24)
3.57
(.00)
2.354 0.0009
(1.1)
0.33
(3.4)
21. FLT 0.07
(.01)
0.00 0.0002 0.218
(.16)
2.25
(.00)
1.729 0.0007
(0.8)
0.27
(3.1)
22. FNB 0.08
(.01)
0.00 0.0003 0.174
(.26)
1.61
(.00)
1.930 0.0001
(0.1)
0.96
(7.3)
23. FPA 0.09
(.01)
0.00 0.0014 0.052
(.74)
0.46
(.14)
2.494 -0.0009
(-0.3)
0.83
(3.1)
24. FVB 0.07
(.01)
0.00 0.0004 0.416
(.01)
0.84
(.01)
2.582 0.0005
(0.4)
0.56
(3.8)
25. FWB 0.06
(.05)
0.00 0.0002 -0.169
(.27)
1.39
(.00)
2.165 -0.0004
(-0.5)
0.31
(3.2)
26. GB 0.12
(.01)
0.00 0.0013 0.104
(.50)
0.30
(.29)
2.549 -0.0006
(-0.3)
0.22
(0.9)
27. GBS 0.06
(.05)
0.00 0.0002 0.430
(.01)
1.75
(.00)
1.908 0.0001
(0.10)
0.29
(2.9)
28. HBC 0.05
(.20)
0.00 0.0003 0.380
(.01)
1.49
(.00)
2.146 0.0005
(0.5)
0.69
(5.8)
29. HZB 0.08
(.01)
0.00 0.0002 0.212
(.17)
1.55 
(.00)
2.471 0.0005
(0.5)
0.27
(2.7)
30. I 0.09
(.01)
0.00 0.0002 0.856
(.00)
4.29
(.00)
2.141 -0.0007
(-0.7)
0.62
(5.6)
31. IFC 0.07
(.01)
0.00 0.0004 -0.174
(.26)
2.12
(.00)
1.939 -0.0007
(-0.5)
0.93
(6.2)
32. JPM 0.05
(.10)
0.00 0.0001 -0.034
(.82)
0.75
(.01)
1.747 0.0006
(0.8)
0.83
(9.9)
Table 5.1 (contd.)
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Sym­
bol
D-St
(P)
Mean Vari­
ance
(P)
Skew­
ness
(P)
Kurt-
osis
D-W
Stat.
Market Model 
Parameters 
a b 
(t) (t)
33. M 0.06
(.05)
0.00 0.0002 0.412
(.01)
1.94
(.00)
1.859 -0.0008
(-0.8)
0.60
(5.3)
34. MEL 0.05
(.15)
0.00 0.0002 0.204
(.19)
1.12
(.00)
1.796 -0.0004
(-0.5)
0.27
(2.9)
35. MGT 0.17
(.01)
0.00 0.0007 -0.284
(.07)
2.19
(.00)
2.247 -0.0001
(-0.2)
0.26
(1.4)
36. MHC 0.06
(.05)
0.00 0.0002 -0.087
(.57)
0.77
(.01)
1.968 0.0004
(0.4)
0.94
(9.9)
37. MM 0.03
(.20)
0.00 0.0003 0.116
(.45)
0.15
(.62)
2.025 0.0002
(0.2)
0.91
(7.5)
38. NBA 0.12
(.01)
0.00 0.0003 1.800
(.00)
11.80
(.00)
1.484 0.0027
(2.5)
0.13
(1.1)
39. NBD 0.04
(.20)
0.00 0.0001 0.279
(.07)
1.38
(.00)
1.933 -0.0004
(-0.7)
0.30
(3.4)
40. NCB 0.05
(.10)
0.00 0.0002 0.584
(.00)
0.73
(.02)
2.296 0.0001
(0.1)
0.49
(5.2)
41. NOB 0.05
(.20)
0.00 0.0003 -0.247
(.11)
0.98
(.00)
2.115 -0.0006
(-0.5)
0.53
(4.1)
42. RNB 0.07
(.01)
0.00 0.0002 0.918
(.00)
3.66
(.00)
1.778 -0.0013
(-1.6)
0.52
(5.3)
43. SBK 0.04
(.20)
0.00 0.0002 0.128
(.40)
0.38
(.22)
2.436 0.0013
(1.3)
0.40
(3.6)
44. SFB 0.06
(.05)
0.00 0.0004 0.324
(.04)
1.98
(.00)
2.253 -0.0005
(-0.4)
0.58
(4.1)
45. SFC 0.09
(.01)
0.00 0.0004 -1.824
(.00)
13.00
(.00)
1.981 -0.0020
(-1.6)
0.73
(5.0)
46. SPC 0.07
(.01)
0.00 0.0002 -0.343
(.03)
4.69
(.00)
1.928 -0.0005
(-0.6)
0.55
(5.9)
47. STB 0.09
(.01)
0.00 0.0004 0.166
(.28)
1.96
(.00)
2.142 -0.0006
(-0.5)
0.24
(1.6)
48. STL 0.10
(.01)
0.00 0.0005 0.714
(.00)
3.19
(.00)
2.242 -0.0002
(-0.1)
0.39
(2.4)
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Table 5.1 (contd.)
Sym­
bol
D-St
(P)
Mean Vari­
ance
(P)
Skew­
ness
(P)
Kurt-
osis
D-W
Stat.
Market Model 
Parameters 
a b 
(t) (t)
49. TCB 0.05
(.15)
0.00 0.0003 0.168
(.28)
0.99
(.00)
2.061 -0.0002
(-0.2)
0.68
(5.1)
50. UJB 0.05
(.15)
0.00 0.0003 0.344
(.03)
0.68
(.03)
2.470 0.0009
(0.8)
0.56
(4.2)
51. V 0.07
(.01)
0.00 0.0002 -0.172
(.27)
2.22
(.00)
1.813 -0.0007
(-0.8)
0.49
(5.0)
52. WB 0.06
(.05)
0.00 0.0002 0.265
(.09)
0.91
(.00)
2.085 0.0006
(0.7)
0.45
(4.6)
53. WFC 0.08
(.01)
0.00 0.0003 1.023
(.00)
3.18
(.00)
2.008 -0.0005
(-0.5)
0.76
(6.2)
54. WYO 0.09
(.01)
0.00 0.0002 0.752
(.00)
2.71
(.00)
2.108 -0.0006
(-0.6)
0.38
(3.6)
Estimation period 250 days (t = -260 to t = -11) before the 
Mexican moratorium event.
P = p-value 
t = t-statistics
D-St = Kolmogorv-Smirnov D-statistics for normality 
D-W Stat. = Durbin-Watson Statistics
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Table 5.2
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of GARCH Market Model 
For Mexican Moratorium Event
Sym­
bol
Market Model 
Parameters 
a b
oo
3 
O P. a,+P, Model 1/v
1. ASO -0.0002
(-0.3)
0.20
(3.0)
0.0853
(11.20)
- - - OLS -
2. BAC -0.0002
(-0.2)
1.10
(10.1)
0.0432
(1.12)
0.1332
(1.65)
0.6929
(3.43)
0.8261 GARCH -
3. BBI -0.0005
(-0.5)
0.43
(4.3)
0.2581
(6.33)
- - - OLS 0.2084
(3.31)
4. BCL -0.0019
(-1.7)
0.29
(2.5)
0.4267
(4.43)
- - - OLS 0.2619
(3.57)
5. BK 0.0007
(0.8)
0.52
(5.7)
0.2159
(8.21)
- - - OLS 0.1570
(2.77)
6. BKB -0.0001
(-0.1)
0.50
(6.5)
0.0255
(1.28)
0.1836
(1.64)
0.6951
(4.76)
0.8787 GARCH(t ) 0.2237
(14.49)
7. BT 0.0010
(0.1)
1.14
(9.7)
0.2623
(11.60)
- - - OLS -
8. CCI 0.0009
(1.0)
1.38
(14.0)
0.2082
(7.93)
- - - OLS 0.1419
(4.19)
9. CFB 0.0002
(0.3)
0.04
(0.6)
0.0074
(2.24)
0.0633
(2.54)
0.8802
(24.50)
0.9435 GARCH(t ) 0.2839
(6.73)
10. CHL 0.0001
(0.1)
0.81
(8.5)
0.1948
(12.12)
- - - OLS -
11. CIL -0.0012
(-1-6)
0.50
(6.3)
0.0069
(0.92)
0.1505
(2.08)
0.8578
(12.96)
1.0083 GARCH(t ) 0.2510
(20.72)
12. CRN -0.0004
(-0.6)
0.46
(5.8)
0.1340 
(4.30)
0.3856
(1.89)
- 0.3856 ARCH(t ) 0.2543
(17.61)
13. CMB 0.0001
(0.2)
0.91
(11.7)
0.0000
(0.00)
0.0608
(2.37)
0.9554
(32.85)
1.0162 GARCH(t ) 0.2093
(2.74)
14. DEP 0.0018
(3.5)
-0.03
(-0.6)
0.1554
(1.96)
- - - OLS 0.3824
(5.46)
15. EQK -0.0015
(-0.9)
0.13
(0.7)
0.8308
(5.98)
0.1582
(1.04)
- 0.1582 ARCH(t ) 0.2329
(11.21)
16. FAC -0.0009
(-0.9)
0.16
(1.3)
0.0500
(1.08)
0.1175
(1.45)
0.7315
(3.97)
0.8490 GARCH(t) 0.2037
(4.24)
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Table 5.2 (contd.)
Sym­
bol
Market Model 
Parameters 
a b
(>)
('000)
Pi «i+Pi Model 1/v
17. FBF 0.0005
(0.6)
0.22
(2.3)
0.1866
(6.16)
- - - OLS 0.1782
(13.83)
18. FBT -0.0018
(-1.3)
1.01
(6.1)
0.4418
(11.14)
- - - OLS -
19. FDU -0.0001
(-0.1)
0.17
(1.8)
0.1342
(11.6)
- - - OLS -
20. FFB 0.0007
(1.0)
0.22
(2.5)
0.1602
(4.35)
0.1898
(1.33)
- 0.1898 ARCH(t) 0.2557
(7.74)
21. FLT 0.0006
(0.9)
0.26
(3.9)
0.0154
(1.37)
0.1950
(1.83)
0.7386
(6.17)
0.9336 GARCH (t ) 0.2391
(2.37)
22. FNB -0.0006
(-0.7)
0.88
(7.6)
0.0368
(0.99)
0.1135
(1.42)
0.8071
(5.88)
0.9206 GARCH(t ) 0.2688
(3.48)
23. FPA -0.0006
(-0.3)
0.83
(3.3)
0.1415
(11.75)
- - - OLS -
24. FVB 0.0009
(0.6)
0.57
(4.7)
0.4227
(12.55)
- - - OLS -
25. FWB -0.0003
(-0.4)
0.26
(3.3)
0.1322
(5.16)
0.2822
(2.01)
- 0.2822 ARCH(t ) 0.1659
(2.33)
26. GB -0.0009
(-0.4)
0.20
(0.7)
0.1277
(9.99)
- - - OLS -
27. GBS -0.0001
(-0.1)
0.34
(4.2)
0.0266
(1.36)
0.1736
(1.84)
0.7014
(4.90)
0.8750 GARCH(t ) 0.1782
(7.88)
28. HBC -0.0003
(-0.3)
0.61
(6.0)
0.0580
(1.44)
0.2447
(1.87)
0.5682
(2.78)
0.8129 GARCH(t ) 0.1200
(2.32)
29. HZB 0.0001
(0.2)
0.22
(2.6)
0.1393
(5.81)
0.3077
(2.37)
- 0.3077 ARCH(t ) 0.1187
(8.55)
30. I -0.0016
(-2.2)
0.47
(5.4)
0.0259
(1.46)
0.1722
(1.53)
0.7344
(5.55)
0.9066 GARCH(N) -
31. IFC -0.0014
(-1.2)
0.72
(5.6)
0.0001
(0.66)
0.0460
(1.45)
0.9335
(17.52)
0.9795 GARCH(t ) 0.2061
(14.41)
32. JPM 0.0005
(0.7)
0.74
(9.4)
0.1089 
(5.84)
0.2193
(1.61)
- 0.2193 ARCH(t ) 0.1492
(2.86)
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Table 5.2 (contd.)
Sym­
bol
Market Model 
Parameters 
a b
oo
3 
O «i P. «i+Pi Model 1 / v
33. M -0.0013
(-1.4)
0.54
(5.1)
0.2595
(5.32)
- - - OLS 0.2092
(11.73)
34. MEL -0.0006
(-0.8)
0.27
(3.0)
0.1676
(7.21)
- - - OLS 0.1455
(7.87)
35. MGT 0.0005
(0.3)
0.24
(1.5)
0.5982
(3.65)
0.2791
(1.73)
- 0.2791 ARCH(t) 0.2468
(3.43)
36. MHC 0.0004
(0.4)
0.88
(10.2)
0.1737
(5.87)
- - - OLS 0.1587
(5.22)
37. MM -0.0001
(-0.1)
0.93
(7.7)
0.2791
(11.0)
- - - OLS -
38. NBA 0.0013
(1.8)
0.14
(1.7)
0.0263
(1.43)
0.1587
(1.70)
0.7647
(6.56)
0.9234 GARCH(t ) 0.2703
(7.98)
39. NBD -0.0007
(-0.9)
0.26
(3.1)
0.1495
(8.18)
- - - OLS 0.1309
(8.31)
40. NCB 0.0000
(0.0)
0.48
(4.9)
0.1717 
(11.2)
- - - OLS -
41. NOB -0.0006
(-0.5)
0.41
(3.0)
0.3391
(5.83)
- - - OLS 0.1696
(6.16)
42. RNB -0.0022
(-3.0)
0.39
(4.3)
0.1924
(4.84)
- - - OLS 0.2580
(4.98)
43. SBK 0.0013
(1.3)
0.41
(3.9)
0.2374
(11.3)
- - - OLS -
44. SFB -0.0011
(-1.0)
0.44
(3.7)
0.0855
(1.13)
0.1316
(1.33)
0.6574
(2.72)
0.7890 GARCH(t ) 0.1997
(4.95)
45. SFC -0.0009
(-1.0)
0.52
(5.0)
0.0337
(1.43)
0.1068
(1.65)
0.8021
(8.05)
0.2341 GARCH(t ) 0.2341
(3.76)
46. SPC -0.0002
(-0.3)
0.44
(5.6)
0.1618
(6.11)
- - - OLS -
47. STB -0.0010
(-0.9)
0.18
(1.5)
0.4739
( 3 . 3 3 )
- - - OLS 0.2719
(9.85)
48. STL -0.0013
(-1.2)
0.23
(1.6)
0.3381
(6.50)
0.2855
(1.94)
- 0.2855 ARCH(t ) 0.1817
(14.41)
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Table 5.2 (contd.)
Sym­
bol
Market Model 
Parameters 
a b
Ci>
('000)
“ i P, a,+ Pi Model 1/v
49. TCB -0.0004
(-0.4)
0.60
(4.8)
0.0554
(1.15)
0.1509
(1.79)
0.6911
(3.62)
0.8420 GARCH(t ) 0.1319
(3.09)
50. UJB 0.0015
(1.4)
0.44
(4.0)
0.0036
(0.40)
0.0644
(1.89)
0.9237
(18.19)
0.9881 GARCH(N) -
51. V -0.0008
(-1.0)
0.41
(4.8)
0.0000
(0.00)
- - - OLS 0.2627
(3.30)
52. WB 0.0002
(0.2)
0.35
(3.9)
0.0212
(1.83)
0.1948
(2.66)
0.7021
(6.96)
0.8969 GARCH(N) -
53. WFC -0.0016
(-1.6)
0.71
(6.4)
0.2769
(8.23)
- - - OLS -
54. WYO -0.0012
(-1.4)
0.35
(3.6)
0.2207
(5.18)
OLS 0.2348
(6.92)
Estimation period 250 days (t = -260 to t = -11) before the 
Mexican moratorium event
t-statistics in paretheses
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Table 5.3
Goodness of Fit Test Results for High Exposure Group 
of U.S. Banks for Mexican Moratorium Event 
(Student-t distribution)
Stock X2 value
BAC 29.67
BK 25.97
CCI 24.35
CIL 38.23*
CKN 26.10
CMB 41.47*
FNB 34.99*
FWB 35.22*
MHC 28.74
RNB 45.17*
SFC 24.58
V 52.12*
WFC 28.05
The critical value at 95% confidence level is 32.67. 
A '*' indicates that the null hypothesis of 
t- distribution is rejected.
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Table 5.4
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns around 
Mexican Moratorium Event Using OLS model 
(according to exposure level)
(Event Date 820819)
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
Day High Medium All Zero
Exposure Exposure Exposed Exposure 
Group Group Group Group
-10 0.0021 -0.0042 -0.0015 0.0031
(0.47) (-1.43) (-0.77) (0.50)
-9 -0.0071 -0.0001 -0.0030 -0.0043
(-1.24) (0.10) (-0.74) (-1.16)
-8 0.0050 -0.0104 -0.0037 -0.0166
(1.44) (-2.79)** (-1.15) (-3.00)
-7 0.0021 0.0015 0.0017 0.0076
(0.02) (0.47) (0.37) (1.38)
-6 -0.0006 -0.0022 -0.0015 -0.0020
(0.16) (-0.74) (-0.45) (-0.64)
-5 -0.0114 -0.0002 -0.0049 0.0048
(-3.19)** (-0.04) (-2.14)* (1.03)
-4 0.0023 -0.0009 0.0005 -0.0075
(0.69) (-0.48) (0.09) (-1.25)
-3 0.0181 0.0102 0.0136 0.0121
(3.86)** (3.06)** (4.84)** (2.34)
-2 0.0172 0.0050 0.0103 0.0019
(3.99)** (1.66) (3.88)** (-0.18)
-1 0.0039 0.0185 0.0121 0.0105
(1.28) (6.20)** (5.50)** (2.06)
0 -0.0222 -0.0143 -0.0177 0.0069
(-6.56)** (-4.48)** (-7.70)** (1.93)
1 -0.0024 -0.0075 -0.0053 -0.0046
(-0.69) (-2.39)* (-2.25)* (-0.81)
2 -0.0020 0.0056 0.0023 -0.0037
(-0.91) (2.20)* (1.05) (-1.09)
3 0.0006 0.0012 0.0010 0.0084
(0.56) (0.44) (0.70) (1.44)
4 -0.0072 -0.0052 -0.0060 -0.0006
(-1.85) (-1.52) (-2.37)* (-0.10)
5 -0.0022 0.0166 0.0084 0.0031
(-0.56) (4.08)** (2.70)** (0.92)
6 -0.0038 0.0107 0.0044 0.0091
(-0.34) (2.77)** (1.86) (2.05)•
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Table 5.4 (contd.)
High
Exposure
Group
Medium
Exposure
Group
All
Exposed
Group
Zero
Exposure
Group
7 -0.0060 -0.0020 -0.0037 -0.0022
(-1.82) (-0.15) (-1.31) (-0.92)
8 0.0063 0.0108 0.0088 -0.0005
(2.21)* (2.87)** (3.61)** (-0.11)
9 0.0034 -0.0033 -0.0004 0.0027
(0.55) (-0.65) (-0.13) (1.00)
10 -0.0130 -0.0028 -0.0072 -0.0005
(-2.93)** (-1.02) (-2.70)** (-0.01)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 -0.0183 0.0042 -0.0056 0.0174
(-3.74)** (1.22) (-1.55) (2.82)**
-1 +1 -0.0207 -0.0032 -0.0109 0.0128
(-3.45)** (-0.38) (-2.57)* (1.84)
-1 +2 -0.0227 0.0024 -0.0086 0.0090
(-3.44)** (0.77) (-1.70) (1.05)
-1 +3 -0.0221 0.0036 -0.0076 0.0175
(-2.83)** (0.88) (-1.21) (1.58)
-1 +4 -0.0293 -0.0016 -0.0136 0.0181
(-3.34)** (0.18) (-2.07)* (1.40)
-1 +5 -0.0315 0.0150 -0.0053 0.0211
(-3.30)** (1.71) (-0.90) (1.64)
-1 +6 -0.0353 0.0257 -0.0009 0.0302
(-3.21)** (2.58)** (-0.18) (2.26)*
-1 +7 -0.0413 0.0237 -0.0046 0.0280
(-3.63)** (2.38)* (-0.61) (1.83)
-1 +8 -0.0350 0.0345 0.0042 0.0284
(-2.75)** (3.17)** (0.57) (1.78)
-1 +9 -0.0316 0.0312 0.0038 0.0311
(-2.45)* (2.82)** (0.50) (2.00)*
-1 +10 -0.0446 0.0284 -0.0034 0.0306
(-3.19)** (2.41) * (-0.30) (1.91)
N 17 22 39 14
Avg res var 0.31756 0.28150 0.29722 0.39472
('000s)
Avg Beta 0.7868 0.4931 0.6211 0.3247
t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1%
Estimation period 250 days (t = -260 to t = -11)
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Table 5.5
Average Excess Returns and Conditional Variance around 
Mexican Moratorium Event Using GARCH model 
(Estimation period t = -260 to t = -11)
(Event Date 820819)
High Exposure Medium Exposure Zero Exposure
Group Group Group
Day AR(et) Var(h,) AR(et) Var (ht) AR(et) Var (h,)
(000) (000) (000)
-10 0.0017 0.459 -0.0045 0.274 0.0031 0.485
(0.37) (-1.62) (0.68)
-9 -0.0076 0.421 -0.0005 0.292 -0.0044 0.472
(-0.84) (0.09) (-2.16)*
-8 0.0048 0.427 -0.0106 0.293 -0.0166 0.415
(1.14) (-2.90)** (-3.71)**
-7 0.0020 0.406 0.0015 0. 318 0.0078 0.525
(-0.06) (0.55) (0.99)
-6 -0.0007 0.388 -0.0022 0.272 -0.0018 0.447
(-0.15) (-0.69) (-1.72)
-5 -0.0115 0.432 0.0002 0.268 0.0050 0.394
(-1.97)* (-0.04) (1.78)
-4 0.0029 0.430 0.0001 0.269 -0.0068 0. 378
(0.23) (-0.37) (-2.33)*
-3 0.0182 0.401 0.0106 0.288 0.0125 0.363
(3.19)** (3.09)** (2.61)**
-2 0.0192 0.406 0.0081 0.328 0.0038 0.363
(3.85)** (2.47)* (1.74)
-1 0.0040 0.509 0.0187 0.342 0.0108 0. 348
(1.22) (6.27)** (2.23)*
0 -0.0220 0.501 -0.0139 0.342 0.0073 0.370
(-5.13)** (-4.36)** (1.70)
1 -0.0009 0.506 -0.0051 0. 378 -0.0031 0.341
(-0.41) (-1.13) (-2.44)*
2 -0.0008 0. 547 0.0076 0.407 -0.0024 0.363
(0.09) (2.80)** (-1.48)
3 0.0005 0. 555 0.0012 0. 366 0.0086 0.404
(0.51) (0.01) (0.76)
4 -0.0062 0. 549 -0.0036 0. 358 0.0017 0. 364
(-1.64) (-1.11) (-0.50)
5 -0.0017 0.518 0.0174 0.366 0.0038 0.372
(-0.36) (4.16)** (2.82)**
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Table 5.5 (contd.)
High Exposure 
Group
Medium Exposure 
Group
Zero Exposure 
Group
Day AR(et) Var (ht) AR(et) Var (ht) AR(et) Var (ht)
(000) (000) (000)
6 -0.0043 0.505 0.0101 0.395 0.0089 0.372
(-0.40) (2.18)* (2.40)*
7 -0.0057 0.481 -0.0015 0.346 -0.0018 0.345
(-1.74) (-0.11) (-1.78)
8 0.0070 0.466 0.0120 0.341 0.0013 0. 350
(1.80) (3.05)** (0.06)
9 0.0020 0.459 -0.0037 0.335 0.0027 0. 345
(0.40) (-0.58) (4.56)**
10 -0.0123 0.441 -0.0015 0.324 0.0004 0.450
(-2.15)* (-0.79) (0.02)
N 17 22 14
Avg. Beta 0.7414 0.4278 0.2869
Avg. h, 0.467 0.329 0.394
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
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Table 5.6
Average Excess Returns and Conditional Variance around 
Mexican Moratorium Event Using GARCH Model 
(Estimation period t = -252 to t = -3)
(Event Date 820819)
High Exposure 
Group
Medium Exposure 
Group
Zero Exposure 
Group
Day AR(et) Var (ht) 
(000)
AR (et) Var (ht) 
(000)
AR(et) Var (ht) 
(000)
-2 0.0190 0. 373 0.0082 0. 327 0.0040 0.371
(4.48)** (2.52)* (1.17)
-1 0.0039 0.502 0.0187 0.344 0.0105 0.355
(1.34) (6.27)** (2.22)*
0 -0.0221 0.504 -0.0139 0.339 0.0070 0.384
(-6.03)** (-4.40)** (1.94)
1 -0.0010 0. 489 -0.0050 0.371 -0.0031 0.352
(-0.52) (-1.15) (-0.72)
2 -0.0009 0.536 0.0077 0.395 -0.0025 0.377
(0.03) (2.88)** (-1.04)
3 0.0005 0.546 0.0012 0. 362 0.0082 0.420
(0.68) (0.02) (1.16)
4 -0.0063 0.526 -0.0035 0.353 0.0015 0.380
(-1.81) (-1.06) (0.14)
5 -0.0018 0.493 0.0174 0.363 0.0035 0.383
(-0.39) (4.20)** (1.80)
6 -0.0043 0.477 0.0101 0.391 0.0085 0.383
(-0.46) (2.19)* (2.07)*
7 -0.0058 0.449 -0.0015 0.344 -0.0021 0. 362
(-1.95) (-0.14) (-1.00)
8 0.0069 0.44 0 0.0121 0.339 0.0011 0. 369
(2.09)* (3.05)** (0.08)
9 0.0030 0.440 -0.0037 0.336 0.0023 0. 368
(0.43) (-0.56) (0.82)
10 -0.0124 0.420 -0.0015 0.322 0.0002 0.476
(-2.52)* (-0.85) (0.05)
N 17 22 14
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
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Table 5.7
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns around 
Mexican Moratorium Event Using OLS Model 
(according to capital adequacy)
(Event Date 820819)
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
Day Capital Capital All Zero
Deficient Sufficient Exposed Exposure
-10 0.0004 -0.0024 -0.0015 0.0031
(0.11) (-1.02) (-0.77) (0.50)
-9 -0.0088 -0.0001 -0.0030 -0.0043
(-1.40) (0.08) (-0.74) (-1.16)
-8 0.0038 -0.0074 -0.0037 -0.0166
(1.47) (-2.44)* (-1.15) (-3.00)*
-7 0.0058 -0.0003 0.0017 0.0076
(0.75) (-0.08) (0.37) (1.38)
-6 -0.0011 -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0020
(0.13) (-0.64) (-0.45) (-0.64)
-5 -0.0133 -0.0006 -0.0049 0.0048
(-3.39)** (-0.22) (-2.14)* (1.03)
-4 0.0082 -0.0033 -0.0005 -0.0075
(1.57) (-1.00) (0.09) (-1.25)
-3 0.0139 0.0135 0.0136 0.0121
(2.38)* (4.25)** (4.84)** (2.34)*
-2 0.0114 0.0098 0.0103 0.0019
(2.14)* (3.24)** (3.88)** (-0.18)
-1 -0.0026 0.0195 0.0121 0.0105
(-0.28) (6.93)** (5.50)** (2.06)*
0 -0.0264 -0.0134 -0.0177 0.0069
(-6.99)** (-4.48)** (-7.70)** (1.93)
1 0.0052 -0.0105 -0.0053 -0.0046
(0.58) (-3.16)** (-2.25)* (-0.81)
2 -0.0020 0.0044 0.0023 -0.0037
(-0.43) (1.59) (1.05) (-1.09)
3 -0.0018 0.0023 0.0010 0.0084
(-0.65) (1.31) (0.70) (1.44)
4 -0.0043 -0.0069 -0.0060 0.0006
(-1.11) (-2.12)* (-2.37)* (-0.10)
5 0.0011 0.0120 0.0084 0.0031
(-0.16) (3.41)** (2.70)** (0.92)
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9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Table 5.7 (contd.)
Capital Capital All Zero
Deficient Sufficient Exposed Exposure
-0.0082
(-1.30)
-0.0103
(-2.10)*
0.0003
(0.34)
0.0048
(0.89)
-0.0174 
(-3.49)**
-0.0208 
(-4.54)** 
-0.0084 
(-2 .12)* 
0.0068
(2.40)* 
0.0093 
(1.20) 
-0.0001 
(-0.51) 
-0.0010 
(-0.04) 
0.0164
(4.08)** 
0.0146 
(3.51)** 
0.0126 
(2.85)** 
0.0101
(1.61)
0.0106 
(3.20)** 
-0.0004 
(-0.13) 
0.0131 
(4.19)** 
-0.0030 
(-0.78)
- 0.0021
(-0.84)
-0.0125 
(-3.57)** 
-0.0056 
(-1.65) 
-0.0027 
(-1.00) 
0.0011 
(0.32)
0.0001 
(-0.26) 
0.0056
(1.62)
0.0061
(2.29)* 
0.0147 
(4.98)** 
0.0154 
(5.48)** 
-0.0008 
(-0.28)
0.0044 
(1.86) 
-0.0037 
(-1.31) 
0.0088 
(3.61)** 
-0.0004 
(-0.13)
-0.0072 
(-2.70)**
-0.0153 
(-5.54)** 
-0.0065 
(-2.56)* 
0.0005 
(0.57)
0.0038 
(0.96)
0.0000 
(-0.51) 
0.0034
(1.30)
0.0095 
(4.22)** 
0.0146
(6.09)** 
0.0145 
(6.12)** 
0.0028 
(0.71)
0.0091
(2.05)* 
- 0.0022 
(-0.92) 
0.0004 
(0.16) 
0.0027 
(1.00)
-0.0005
(-0.01)
0.0000 
(0.39) 
0.0057
(1.30) 
-0.0050 
(-1.06) 
0.0006 
(0.71) 
-0.0091 
(-1.68) 
0.0014 
(0.30) 
-0.0056 
(-0.83) 
-0.0039 
(-0.74) 
0.0046
(1.09)
0.0065 
(0 .68)
Table 5.7 (contd.)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
Cumulation Capital Capital All Zero
Period Deficient Sufficient Exposed Exposure
-1 0 
-1 +1 
-1 +2 
-1 +3 
-1 +4 
-1 +5 
-1 +6 
-1 +7 
-1 +8 
-1 +9 
-1 +10 
9 +10
-0.0291 
(-5.14)** 
-0.0239 
(-3.86)** 
-0.0259 
(-3.56)** 
-0.0277 
(-3.47)** 
-0.0320 
(-3.62)** 
-0.0309 
(-3.41)** 
-0.0391 
(-3.65)** 
-0.0493 
(-4.14)** 
-0.0490 
(-3.83)** 
-0.0442 
(-3.38)** 
-0.0617 
(-4.24)** 
-0.0126 
(-1.84)
0.0062 
(1.73) 
-0.0043 
(-0.41) 
0.0001 
(0.44) 
0.0025 
(0.98) 
-0.0045 
(0.03) 
0.0075 
(1.32) 
0.0182 
(2.36)* 
0.0177 
(2.18)* 
0.0308
(3.40)** 
0.0279 
(3.00)** 
0.0257
(2.63)** 
-0.0051 
(-1.14)
26
0.24739
0. 5341
-0.0056 
(-1.55) 
-0.0109 
(-2.56)* 
-0.0086 
(-1.70) 
-0.0076 
(-1.21) 
-0.0136 
(-2.07)* 
-0.0053 
(-0.90) 
-0.0009 
(-0.18) 
-0.0046 
(-0.61) 
0.0042 
(0.57) 
0.0038 
(0.50) 
-0.0034 
(-0.30) 
-0.0076 
(-2 .00)*
39 
0.29722
0.6211
0.0174 
(2.82)** 
0.0128 
(1.84)
0.0090
(1.05)
0.0175 
(1.58) 
0.0181
(1.40) 
0.0211
(1.64)
0.0302 
(2.26)* 
0.0280 
(1.83) 
0.0284 
(1.78) 
0.0311 
(2.00)* 
0.0306
(1.91) 
0.0022 
(0.70)
14
0.39472
0.3247
N 13
Avg res var 0.39688 
('000s)
Avg Beta 0.7951
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
145
Table 5.8
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns around 
Bolivian Moratorium Event Using OLS Model 
(according to exposure level)
(Event Date 840531)
Day High Medium All Zero
Exposure Exposure Exposed Exposure
Group Group Banks Group
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 0.0165 -0.0026 0.0052 -0.0024
(4.41)** (-1.02) (2.04)* (-0.61)
-2 -0.0053 -0.0006 -0.0025 0.0002
(-1.03) (-0.15) (-0.78) (0.03)
-1 -0.0097 -0.0021 -0.0052 -0.0029
(-2.90)** (-0.53) (-2.27)* (-0.45)
0 -0.0122 -0.0017 -0.0060 -0.0023
(-3.64)** (-0.52) (-2.73)** (-0.52)
1 -0.0101 -0.0029 -0.0059 -0.0003
(-2.53)* (-0.88) (-2.30)* (-0.14)
2 0.0088 0.0026 0.0051 -0.0001
(2.62)** (1.18) (2.58)* (0.15)
3 -0.0052 -0.0006 -0.0025 -0.0002
(-1.37) (0.02) (-0.86) (-0.11)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 -0.0218 -0.0038 -0.0112 -0.0052
(-4.62)** (-0.74) (-3.53)** (-0.68)
-1 +1 -0.0319 -0.0067 -0.0171 -0.0055
(-5.24)** (-1.12) (-4.21)** (-0.64)
-1 +2 -0.0232 -0.0041 -0.0119 -0.0056
(-3.22)** (-0.38) (-2.35)* (-0.48)
-1 +3 -0.0284 -0.0047 -0.0144 -0.0059
(-3.50)** (-0.33) (-2.49)* (-0.48)
N 16 23 39 13
Avg res var 0.23191 0.23943 0.23634 0.27381
('000s)
Avg Beta 0. 8280 0.4931 0.6305 0.3653
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
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Table 5.9
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns around 
Bolivian Moratorium Event Using OLS Model 
(according to capital adequacy)
(Event Date 840531)
Day Capital Capital All Zero
Deficient Sufficient Exposed Exposure
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 0.0079 0.0045 0.0052 -0.0024
(1.61) (1.47) (2.04)* (-0.61)
~2 -0.0050 -0.0019 -0.0025 0.0002
(-0.99) (-0.37) (-0.78) (0.03)
-1 -0.0206 -0.0013 -0.0052 -0.0029
(-4.18)** (-0.42) (-2.27)* (-0.45)
0 -0.0194 -0.0025 -0.0060 -0.0023
(-3.97)** (-1.04) (-2.73)*«' (-0.52)
1 -0.0021 -0.0068 -0.0059 -0.0003
(-0.33) (-2.41)* (-2.30)* (-0.14)
2 0.0183 0.0018 0.0051 -0.0001
(3.69)** (1.02) (2.58)* (0.15)
3 -0.0048 -0.0019 -0.0025 -0.0002
(-0.98) (-0.47) (-0.86) (-0.11)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 -0.0400 -0.0038 -0.0112 -0.0052
(-5.77)** (-1.03) (-3.53)** (-0.68)
-1 +1 -0.0421 -0.0106 -0.0171 -0.0055
(-4.90)** (-2.23)* (-4.21)** (-0.64)
-1 +2 -0.0238 -0.0088 -0.0119 -0.0056
(-2.40)* (-1.42) (-2.35)* (-0.48)
-1 +3 -0.0286 -0.0108 -0.0144 -0.0059
(-2.58)** (-1.48) (-2.49)* (-0.48)
N 8 31 39 13
Avg res var 0.18423 0.24979 0.23634 0.27381
('000s)
Avg Beta 0.9000 0.5611 0.6305 0.3653
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
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Table 5.10
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns around
Brazilian Moratorium Event Using OLS Model
(Event Date 870223)
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
Day High Medium All Zero
Exposure Exposure Exposed Exposure
Group Group Group Group
-10 0.0057 0.0061 0.0059 -0.0056
(0.91) (1.27) (1.56) (-0.83)
-9 0.0005 0.0041 0.0026 0.0002
(0.28) (1.13) (1.04) (-0.54)
-8 -0.0065 0.0053 0.0002 0.0027
(-1.60) (1.38) (-0.01) (0.83)
-7 -0.0071 -0.0008 -0.0035 -0.0063
(-1.67) (-0.17) (-1.22) (-1.28)
-6 0.0030 0.0027 0.0028 0.0062
(0.38) (0.76) (0.83) (1.24)
-5 0.0040 0.0001 0.0017 -0.0012
(0.63) (0.28) (0.62) (-0.42)
-4 -0.0136 -0.0068 -0.0097 0.0048
(-2.75)** (-1.77) (-3.13)** (1.09)
-3 0.0090 0.0125 0.0110 -0.0018
(2.99)** (4.08)** (5.04)** (-0.44)
-2 0.0096 0.0027 0.0057 0.0026
(2.62)** (1.63) (2.94)** (0.59)
-1 -0.0091 0.0028 -0.0023 -0.0005
(-2.35)* (0.55) (-1.12) (0.06)
0 -0.0198 -0.0048 -0.0112 -0.0080
(-5.23)** (-1.61) (-4.64)** (-1.44)
1 0.0029 0.0006 0.0016 -0.0009
(0.15) (0.18) (-0.03) (0.15)
2 -0.0100 -0.0010 -0.0049 0.0093
(-3.62)** (-0.25) (-2.56)* (1.82)
3 -0.0075 0.0004 -0.0030 0.0053
(-1.37) (0.25) (-0.71) (1.02)
4 0.0083 0.0018 0.0046 0.0026
(3.00)** (0.77) (2.54)* (0.25)
5 0.0063 0.0069 0.0066 0.0126
(1.32) (2.11)* (2.46)* (2.83)**
6 0.0005 -0.0021 -0.0010 0.0096
(-0.31) (-0.44) (-0.53) (1.92)
7 -0.0100 -0.0100 -0.0100 0.0016
(-2.63)** (-2.76)** (-3.81)** (0.25)
Table 5.10 (contd.)
148
Day High
Exposure
Group
Medium
Exposure
Group
All
Exposed
Group
Zero
Exposure
Group
8 0.0049 -0.0026 0.0006 0.0012
(1.19) (-1.16) (-0.09) (0.22)
9 0.0009 0.0041 0.0027 -0.0071
(-1.04) (0.69) (-0.16) (-1.42)
10 -0.0001 0.0035 0.0020 0.0031
(-0.44) (1.02) (0.49) (0.31)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 -0.0288 -0.0020 -0.0135 -0.0085
(-5.36)** (-0.75) (-4.08)** (-0.97)
-1 +1 -0.0259 -0.0015 -0.0120 -0.0094
(-4.29)** (-0.71) (-3.35)** (-0.71)
-1 +2 -0.0360 -0.0025 -0.0168 -0.0001
(-5.52)** (-0.74) (-4.18)** (0.30)
-1 +3 -0.0435 -0.0021 -0.0198 0.0053
(-5.55)** (-0.55) (-4.05)** (0.72)
-1 +4 -0.0352 -0.0002 -0.0152 0.0079
(-3.85)** (-0.19) (-2.66)** (0.76)
-1 +5 -0.0289 0.0067 -0.0086 0.0205
(-3.06)** (0.62) (-1.53) (1.77)
-1 +6 -0.0284 0.0046 -0.0096 0.0301
(-2.97)** (0.43) (-1.62) (2.34)*
-1 +7 -0.0384 -0.0054 -0.0196 0.0317
(-3.68)** (-0.52) (-2.80)** (2.29)*
-1 +8 -0.0335 -0.0080 -0.0189 0.0328
(-3.11)** (-0.86) (-2.69)** (2.24)*
-1 +9 -0.0326 -0.0040 -0.0162 0.0257
(-3.28)** (-0.61) (-2.61)** (1.71)
-1 +10 -0.0326 -0.0004 -0.0142 0.0288
(-3.27)** (-0.29) (-2.36)* (1.73)
N 15 20 35 13
Avg res var 0.36276 0.31057 0.33294 0.33081
('000s)
Avg Beta 0.9498 0.7522 0.8369 0.5756
t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level
Estimation period 250 days (t = =260 to t = -11)
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Table 5.11
Average Excess Returns and Conditional Variance around
Brazilian Moratorium Event Using GARCH Model
(Event Date 870223)
High Exposure Medium Exposure Zero Exposure
Group Group Group
Day AR(et) VAR(ht) AR(et) VAR (ht) AR(et) VAR (ht)
(000) (000) (000)
-10 0.0062 0.286 0.0064 0.338 -0.0051 0. 302
(1.10) (1.29) (-0.77)
-9 0.0007 0.275 0.0040 0.350 0.0003 0. 300
(0.32) (1.11) (-0.74)
-8 -0.0065 0.252 0.0048 0.333 0.0024 0.352
(-1.97)* (1.22) (0.98)
-7 -0.0060 0.284 0.0007 0.333 -0.0049 0.342
(-1.50) (0.34) (-1.29)
-6 0.0033 0.287 0.0027 0.331 0.0063 0.331
(0.53) (0.69) (1.48)
-5 0.0054 0.274 0.0020 0.332 0.0007 0.334
(1.11) (0.88) (-0.06)
-4 -0.0119 0.267 -0.0043 0.334 0.0071 0. 310
(-2.72)** (-1.24) (1.59)
-3 0.0096 0.283 0.0131 0. 327 -0.0011 0. 302
(3.27)** (3.89)** (-0.75)
-2 0.0103 0.327 0.0035 0. 518 0.0033 0.311
(2.56)* (1.61) (0.76)
-1 -0.0084 0.343 0.0034 0.467 0.0001 0. 319
(-2.28)* (0.85) (0.03)
0 -0.0197 0.287 -0.0052 0.433 -0.0082 0.327
(-5.34)** (-1.40) (-1.53)
1 0.0036 0.394 0.0014 0.460 -0.0001 0.345
(0.65) (0.12) (0.14)
2 -0.0092 0. 293 0.0001 0. 398 0.0103 0. 353
(-3.35)** (-0.15) (1.91)
3 -0.0070 0. 353 0.0007 0.376 0.0057 0. 357
(-1.39) (0.16) (1.02)
4 0.0091 0. 288 0.0029 0. 367 0.0036 0.339
(3.21)** (1.00) (0.65)
5 0.0068 0.299 0.0073 0.379 0.0131 0. 348
(1.54) (2.02)* (2.91)**
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Table 5.11 (contd.)
High Exposure 
Group
Medium Exposure 
Group
Zero Exposure 
Group
Day AR(et) VAR(ht) AR(et) VAR (ht) AR(et) VAR (ht)
(000) (000) (000)
6 0.0013 0.292 -0.0012 0.345 0.0105 0.332
(-0.07) (-0.29) (2.12)*
7 -0.0085 0.269 -0.0079 0.344 0.0035 0.313
(-2.49) * (-2.01) * (0.58)
8 0.0059 0.291 -0.0013 0.345 0.0024 0.309
(1.23) (-1.04) (0.39)
9 0.0015 0.365 0.0047 0.349 -0.0064 0.307
(-0.73) (0.96) (-1.28)
10 0.0002 0.360 0.0034 0.352 0.0031 0. 300
(-0.17) (0.77) (0.40)
N 15 20 13
Avg. beta 0.8927 0.6417 0.4825
Avg. h, 0. 303 0.372 0.325
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
Estimation period 250 days (t = -260 to t = -11)
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Table 5.12
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns around
Citicorp Loan-Loss-Provision Event Using OLS Model
(Event Date 870519)
Day High
Exposure
Group
Medium
Exposure
Group
Zero
Exposure
Group
Citicorp
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 0.0016 0.0033 0.0017 -0.0019
(0.49) (-0.14) (0.23) (-0.14)
-2 -0.0008 0.0046 0.0022 -0.0201
(-0.39) (0.61) (0.33) (-1.48)
-1 0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0152 0.0228
(0.29) (-1.16) (-2.95)** (1.69)
0 -0.0039 -0.0030 -0.0012 -0.0108
(-1.25) (-0.82) (-0.06) (-0.79)
1 -0.0061 -0.0019 -0.0070 0.0557
(-1.53) (-0.09) (-1.61) (4.13)**
2 0.0129 0.0004 0.0027 0.0463
(4.04)** (0.62) (0.86) (3.43)**
3 -0.0026 0.0036 -0.0001 -0.0131
(0.05) (1.19) (-0.23) (-0.97)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 -0.0022 -0.0048 -0.0164 0.0120
(-0.68) (-1.40) (-2.13)* (0.63)
-1 +1 -0.0082 -0.0067 -0.0233 0.0676
(-1.44) (-1.09) (-2.67)** (2.90)**
-1 +2 0.0047 -0.0063 -0.0207 0.1140
(0.78) (-0.63) (-1.88) (4.23)**
-1 +3 0.0021 -0.0027 -0.0208 0.1009
(0.72) (-0.04) (-1.78) (3.35)**
N 15 22 12 1
Avg res var 0.27670 0.47014 0.28717 0.18225
('000s)
Avg Beta 0.6830 0.7636 0.5820 0.9288
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
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Table 5.13
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns around
Mexican Debt-Rescheduling Event Using OLS Model
(Event Date 860930)
Day High Medium All Zero
Exposure Exposure Exposed Exposure
Group Group Group Group
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 0.0046 0.0144 0.0102 0.0014
(0.60) (3.31)** (2.89)** (0.15)
-2 0.0009 0.0007 0.0008 -0.0024
(0.31) (-0.40) (-0.10) (-0.54)
-1 0.0017 -0.0066 -0.0030 -0.0018
(0.39) (-2.16)* (-1.38) (-0.51)
0 -0.0112 -0.0062 -0.0083 0.0001
(-2.51)* (-1.81) (-3.01)** (0.14)
1 -0.0027 -0.0108 -0.0073 0.0096
(-0.49) (-2.75)** (-2.40)* (1.72)
2 -0.0049 -0.0036 -0.0042 0.0046
(-1.45) (-1.18) (-1.84) (0.68)
3 0.0074 -0.0053 0.0001 -0.0056
(1.80) (-1.10) (0.35) (-0.75)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 -0.0095 -0.0128 -0.0114 -0.0016
(-1.50) (-2.81)** (-3.10)** (-0.26)
-1 +1 -0.0122 -0.0236 -0.0187 0.0080
(-1.51) (-3.88)** (-3.92)** (0.78)
-1 +2 -0.0171 -0.0272 -0.0229 0.0126
(-2.03)* (-3.95)** (-4.32)** (1.02)
-1 +3 -0.0097 -0.0325 -0.0227 0.0070
(-1.01) (-4.03)** (-3.70)** (0.57)
N 15 20 35 13
Avg res 0.32029 0. 30020 0. 30881 0.31494
var('OOOs)
Avg Beta 1.0792 0.7938 0.9161 0.5874
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
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Table 5.14
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns around
Falkland War Event Using OLS Model
(Event Date 820402)
Day High
Exposure
Group
Medium
Exposure
Group
All
Exposed
Group
Zero
Exposure
Group
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 -0.0016 -0.0022 -0.0019 -0.0005
(-0.37) (-0.59) (-0.68) (-0.71)
-2 0.0003 0.0009 0.0006 0.0020
(0.41) (0.20) (0.43) (0.45)
-1 -0.0039 -0.0025 -0.0032 -0.0025
(-1.04) (-0.79) (-1.29) (-0.03)
0 0.0053 0.0015 0.0033 -0.0028
(1.58) (0.50) (1.45) (-0.63)
1 0.0028 -0.0054 -0.0015 -0.0040
(0.28) (-1.31) (-0.76) (-0.88)
2 0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0003 -0.0029
(-0.05) (-0.38) (-0.31) (-1.16)
3 0.0027 -0.0006 0.0010 0.0041
(0.28) (-0.36) (-0.07) (0.95)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess :Returns
-1 0 0.0013 -0.0010 0.0001 -0.0052
(0.38) (-0.21) (0.11) (-0.47)
-1 +1 0.0042 -0.0064 -0.0014 -0.0093
(0.47) (-0.92) (-0.35) (-0.89)
-1 +2 0.0048 -0.0075 -0.0017 -0.0121
(0.38) (-0.99) (-0.46) (-1.35)
-1 +3 0.0075 -0.0081 -0.0007 -0.0080
(0.47) (-1.05) (-0.44) (-0.78)
N 17 19 36 14
Avg res var 0.27649 0.22907 0.25146 0.39729
('000s)
Avg Beta 0.7563 0.5344 0.6392 0.3644
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
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Table 5.15
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns around
Falkland War Event Using OLS Model
(Event Date 820505)
Day High Medium All Zero
Exposure Exposure Exposed Exposure
Group Group Banks Group
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 0.0058 0.0055 0.0056 -0.0034
(1.12) (1.61) (1.94) (-0.75)
-2 -0.0070 -0.0078 -0.0074 -0.0063
(-2.00)* (-1.93) (-2.78)** (-1.11)
-1 -0.0083 -0.0024 -0.0052 0.0019
(-2.24)* (-0.71) (-2.06)* (0.43)
0 -0.0102 -0.0016 -0.0057 0.0051
(-2.48)* (-0.53) (-2.07)* (0.61)
1 0.0064 -0.0013 0.0023 -0.0017
(1.06) (-0.25) (0.54) (-0.14)
2 -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0045 -0.0028
(-1.10) (-1.56) (-1.89) (-0.63)
3 0.0045 0.0069 0.0058 0.0019
(0.36) (1.88) (1.61) (0.57)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 -0.0184 -0.0041 -0.0108 0.0070
(-3.34)** (-0.88) (-2.94)** (0.74)
-1 +1 -0.0121 -0.0054 -0.0085 0.0053
(-2.12)* (-0.87) (-2.08)* (0.52)
-1 +2 -0.0165 -0.0099 -0.0130 0.0025
(-2.38)* (-1.53) (-2.75)** (0.14)
-1 +3 -0.0120 -0.0030 -0.0073 0.0044
-(1.96) (-0.53) (-1.74) (0.38)
N 17 19 36 14
Avg res var 0.27520 0.23181 0.25230 0.40164
('000s)
Avg Beta 0.7528 0.5389 0.6399 0.3506
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
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Table 5.16
Average Excess Returns around Legislative Actions
Using OLS Model
Day Average Excess Returns
High Medium All Zero
Exposure Exposure Exposed Exposure
Group Group Group Group
-3 0.0068 0.0026 0.0044 -0.0067
(1.36) (0.72) (1.43) (-1.27)
-2 0.0271 0.0235 0.0250 0.0024
(5.74)** (5.60)** (7.99)** (0.24)
-1 0.0364 0.0149 0.0240 -0.0030
(7.74)** (4.06)** (8.13)** (-0.48)
(a) 0 7 March 1983 0.0054 0.0075 0.0066 0.0097
(1.34) (1.83) (2.26)* (1.92)
+1 -0.0107 0.0002 -0.0044 0.0013
(-2.20)* (0.06) (-1.39) (-0.03)
+2 -0.0067 -0.0008 -0.0033 -0.0013
(-1.22) (-0.45) (-1.14) (-0.33)
+3 0.0012 0.0057 0.0038 0.0102
(-0.03) (1.47) (1.10) (1.97)*
-3 -0.0037 -0.0042 -0.0040 -0.0007
(-0.91) (-1.37) (-1.63) (-0.19)
-2 -0.0059 -0.0044 -0.0050 -0.0027
(-1.23) (-1.53) (-1.95) (-1.28)
-1 0.0001 -0.0052 -0.0030 0.0055
(-0.03) (-1.20) (-0.93) (1.23)
(b) 0 5 May 1983 -0.0067 -0.0003 -0.0030 0.0034
(-1.17) (-0.05) (-0.80) (0.91)
+1 0.0038 0.0028 0.0032 0.0024
(0.87) (0.44) (0.90) (0.41)
+2 0.0013 -0.0001 0.0005 0.0079
(0.25) (0.16) (0.28) (1.98)*
(c) +3 10 May 1983 -0.0021 -0.0018 -0.0019 0.0078
(-0.3403) (-0.23) (-0.40) (2.13)*
-3 -0.0041 0.0056 0.0015 -0.0049
(-0.99) (1.60) (0.56) (-0.60)
-2 -0.0050 0.0054 0.0010 -0.0020
(-1.09) (1.54) (0.46) (-0.51)
Table 5.16 (contd.)
156
Day Average Excess Returns
High Medium All Zero
Exposure Exposure Exposed Exposure
Group Group Group Group
-1 0.0015
(0.50)
-0.0031
(-0.71)
-0.0011
(-0.22)
-0.0043
(-0.84)
(d) 0 8 June 1983 -0.0140 
(-2.80)**
-0.0052 
(-2.08)*
-0.0089 
(-3.40)**
-0.0113
(-2.13)*
+1
+2
+3
-0.0045
(-1.27)
-0.0010
(-0.32)
-0.0072
(-1.50)
-0.0077 
(-1.97)* 
0.0006 
(0.17) 
-0.0036 
(-0.87)
-0.0063 
(-2.32)* 
-0.0001 
(-0.08) 
-0.0052 
(-1.64)
-0.0029
(-0.94)
-0.0046
(-0.60)
-0.0015
(-0.53)
-3
-2
-1
-0.0060
(-1.43)
0.0036
(0.68)
-0.0033
(-0.61)
-0.0018 
(-0.23) 
-0.0071 
(-1.95) 
0.0029 
(0.92)
-0.0035 
(-1.08) 
-0.0028 
(-1.10) 
0.0004 
(0.33)
-0.0067 
(-1.39) 
-0.0042 
(-0.88) 
-0.0048 
(-1.14)
(e) 0 3 Aug. 1983 -0.0006
(0.10)
0.0026
(0.28)
0.0013
(0.28)
-0.0057
(-1.28)
+1
+2
+3
-0.0025 
(-0.20) 
-0.0001 
(-0.25) 
0.0042 
(0.84)
-0.0030 
(-0.53) 
-0.0023 
(-0.39) 
-0.0031 
(-1.15)
-0.0028 
(-0.53) 
-0.0014 
(-0.46) 
-0.0002 
(-0.36)
-0.0094 
(-2.32)* 
-0.0020 
(-0.70) 
-0.0157 
(-3.64)**
-3
-2
-1
0.0062 
(1.70) 
0.0010 
(0.12) 
0.0001 
(-0.19)
0.0062 
(2.28)* 
-0.0023 
(-0.58) 
0.0016 
(0.60)
0.0062 
(2.84)** 
-0.0010 
(-0.37) 
0.0010 
(0.34)
0.0048 
(1.06) 
0.0055 
(0.99) 
-0.0067 
(-1.40)
(f) 0 17 NOV. 1983 -0.0016
(-0.40)
0.0029
(1.03)
0.0011
(0.54)
0.0259 
(6.92)**
+1 18 NOV. 1983 0.0038 
(0.95)
0.0015 
(0.75)
0.0024 
(1.18)
0.0012 
(0.06)
Table 5.16 (contd.)
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Day Average Excess Returns
High Medium All Zero
Exposure Exposure Exposed Exposure
Group Group Group Group
+2 -0.0053 0.0037 0.0001 0.0029
(-1.21) (1.27) (0.21) (0.78)
+3 0.0152 0.0040 0.0085 0.0009
(3.81)** (1.15) (3.30)** (0.18)
-3 0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0006 -0.0009
(0.25) (-0.43) (-0.17) (-0.18)
-2 0.0044 0.0039 0.0041 0.0010
(0.87) (1.19) (1.47) (0.36)
-1 0.0028 -0.0005 0.0008 -0.0015
(0.67) (-0.19) (0.27) (-0.38)
(h) 0 30 NOV. 1983 0.0074 0.0005 0.0033 0.0016
(1.85) (0.35) (1.44) (0.12)
+ 1 0.0008 -0.0040 -0.0021 -0.0091
(0.15) (-1.23) (-0.86) (-2.10)*
+2 -0.0045 0.0004 -0.0016 0.0032
(-1.20) (0.14) (-0.65) (0.51)
+3 -0.0044 -0.0048 -0.0046 -0.0020
(-1.20) (-1.50) (-1.92) (-0.27)
N 16 24 40 15
Avg res. var. 0.29864 0. 32515 0.31455 0.33887
('000s)
Avg Beta 0.8802 0.5052 0.6552 0.3384
t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level
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Table 5.17
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns around
Cartagena Declaration Event Using OLS Model
(Event Date 840621)
Day High
Exposure
Group
Medium
Exposure
Group
All
Exposed
Group
Zero
Exposure
Group
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 0.0076 -0.0023 0.0017 -0.0118
(2.12)* (-0.62) (0.87) (-2.74)**
-2 0.0055 0.0016 0.0032 0.0045
(1.46) (0.80) (1.54) (0.90)
-1 -0.0023 -0.0033 -0.0029 -0.0054
(-0.54) (-0.94) (-1.07) (-1.36)
0 0.0060 0.0073 0.0068 0.0014
(1.92) (2.41)* (3.08)** (0.45)
1 -0.0093 -0.0020 -0.0050 0.0017
(-2.75)** (-0.63) (-2.26)* (0.38)
2 0.0022 0.0019 0.0020 0.0042
(0.34) (0.39) (0.52) (0.74)
3 0.0020 -0.0031 -0.0010 0.0024
(0.75) (-1.14) (-0.39) (0.61)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 0.0037 0.0040 0.0039 -0.0040
(0.98) (1.03) (1.42) (-0.64)
-1 +1 -0.0056 0.0021 -0.0011 -0.0023
(-0.79) (0.48) (-0.14) (-0.30)
-1 +2 -0.0034 0.0040 0.0009 0.0018
(-0.51) (0.61) (0.13) (0.11)
-1 +3 -0.0014 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0043
(-0.12) (0.04) (-0.05) (0.37)
N 15 22 37 13
Avg res var 0.22966 0.24577 0.23924 0.26954
('000s)
Avg Beta 0.8599 0.5207 0.6582 0.3556
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
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Table 5.18
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns around
Peru's Declaration Event Using OLS Model
(Event Date 850729)
Day High Medium All Zero
Exposure Exposure Exposed Exposure
Group Group Banks Group
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 -0.0052 -0.0097 -0.0078 -0.0092
(-1.79) (-3.84)** (-4.10)** (-3.09)**
-2 -0.0001 -0.0087 -0.0053 -0.0085
(-0.19) (-3.14)** (-2.55)* (-2.76)**
-1 0.0021 -0.0065 -0.0030 -0.0049
(-0.09) (-2.19)* (-1.75) (-1.39)
0 -0.0013 -0.0056 -0.0039 -0.0060
(-0.02) (-1.59) (-1.24) (-1.74)
1 -0.0069 -0.0014 -0.0036 -0.0071
(-1.47) (-0.67) (-1.46) (-2.17)*
2 0.0018 0.0030 0.0025 0.0002
(0.25) (1.17) (1.06) (0.08)
3 -0.0061 0.0024 -0.0010 -0.0001
(-1.58) (0.82) (-0.37) (0.06)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 0.0007 -0.0121 -0.0069 -0.0110
(-0.08) (-2.68)** (-2.12)* (-2.21)*
-1 +1 -0.0062 -0.0135 -0.0105 -0.0181
(-0.92) (-2.56)* (-2.56)* (-3.06)**
-1 +2 -0.0043 -0.0105 -0.0080 -0.0178
(-0.67) (-1.64) (-1.69) (-2.61)**
-1 +3 -0.0104 -0.0080 -0.0090 -0.0179
(-1.31) (-1.10) (-1.68) (-2.31)*
N 15 22 37 16
Avg res var 0.45935 0.25551 0.33815 0.22080
('000s)
Avg Beta 1.0576 0.7050 0.8480 0. 3540
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
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Table 5.19
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns around
Baker Plan Event Using OLS Model
(Event Date 851007)
Day High Medium All Zero
Exposure Exposure Exposed Exposure
Group Group Banks Group
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 0.0110 0.0027 0.0063 0.0054
(3.51)** (0.72) (2.84)** (1.32)
-2 0.0001 0.0020 0.0012 0.0001
(0.22) (0.94) (0.88) (0.25)
-1 0.0117 0.0015 0.0058 0.0025
(3.08)** (0.26) (2.22)* (1.08)
0 0.0092 0.0038 0.0061 -0.0037
(2.75)** (1.23) (2.73)** (-1.07)
1 0.0022 0.0030 0.0027 -0.0018
(1.16) (0.89) (1.44) (-0.27)
2 0.0058 0.0012 0.0032 0.0120
(1.63) (0.40) (1.37) (3.33)**
3 0.0105 0.0083 0.0092 0.0020
(3.18)** (3.20)** (4.50)** (0.85)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 0.0209 0.0052 0.0119 -0.0013
(4.12)** (1.06) (3.50)** (-0.01)
-1 +1 0.0231 0.0083 0.0146 -0.0031
(4.04)** (1.38) (3.69)** (-0.15)
-1 +2 0.0288 0.0095 0.0178 0.0090
(4.31)** (1.39) (3.88)** (1.54)
-1 +3 0.0393 0.0178 0.0270 0.0109
(5.28)** (2.68)** (5.48)** (1.75)
N 15 20 35 14
Avg res var 0.32686 0.18597 0.24635 0.24706
('000s)
Avg Beta 1.0385 0.7106 0.8511 0.4316
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
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Table 5.20
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns around
Oil Price Slump Event Using OLS Model
(Event Date 860204)
Day High Medium All Zero
Exposure Exposure Exposed Exposure
Group Group Group Group
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 -0.0005 0.0032 0.0008 -0.0032
(-0.31) (1.12) (0.31) (-0.32)
-2 -0.0069 0.0006 -0.0030 0.0014
(-2.19)* (0.10) (-1.49) (-0.02)
-1 0.0011 0.0008 0.0010 -0.0025
(0.56) (0.05) (0.47) (-0.36)
0 -0.0194 -0.0045 -0.0104 0.0015
(-6.01)** (-1.54) (-3.41)** (0.53)
1 -0.0205 -0.0090 -0.0143 0.0036
(-5.85)** (-2.40)* (-5.82)** (1.13)
2 0.0040 -0.0051 -0.0008 0.0016
(1.22) (-1.67) (-0.36) (0.54)
3 0.0010 0.0006 0.0007 -0.0021
(1.00) (0.96) (1.36) (-0.24)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 -0.0183 -0.0037 -0.0104 -0.0010
(-3.85)** (-1.06) (-3.41)** (0.12)
-1 +1 -0.0387 -0.0128 -0.0247 0.0026
(-6.53)** (-2.25)* (-6.14)** (0.75)
-1 +2 -0.0348 -0.0179 -0.0255 0.0042
(-5.04)** (-2.78)** (-5.50)** (0.92)
-1 +3 -0.0338 -0.0173 -0.0247 0.0021
(-4.06)** (-2.06)* (-4.31)** (0.72)
N 15 17 32 14
Avg res var 0.21761 0.18687 0.20051 0.29519
('000s)
Avg Beta 0.9986 0.7399 0.8612 0.4335
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
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Table 5.21
Summary of Event-Day Average Excess Returns
for U.S. Banks
Event High
Exposure
Medium
Exposure
All
Exposed
Zero
Exposure
1. Falkland War 
(a)@ 0.0053
(1.58)
0.0015
(0.50)
0.0033
(1.45)
-0.0028
(-0.63)
(b)# -0.0184
(-3.34)**
-0.0041
(-0.88)
-0.0108 
(-2.94)**
0.0070 
(0.74)
2. Mexican® 
Moratorium -0.0222 
(-6.56)**
-0.0143 
(-4.48)**
-0.0177 
(-7.70)**
0.0069
(1.93)
3. Argentinean® 
Moratorium -0.0130 
(-2.93)**
-0.0028
(-1.02)
-0.0072 
(-2.70)**
-0.0005 
(-0.01)
4. Legislative 
Actions®
(a) 0.0054
(1.34)
0.0075 
(1.83) .
0.0066 
(2.26)*
0.0097 
(1.92)
(b) -0.0067
(-1.17)
-0.0003
(-0.05)
-0.0030 
(-0.80)
0.0034
(0.91)
(c) -0.0021
(-0.34)
-0.0018
(-0.23)
-0.0019
(-0.40)
0.0078 
(2.13)*
(d) -0.0140 
(-2.80)**
-0.0052
(-2.08)*
-0.0089 
(-3.40)**
-0.0113 
(-2.13)*
(e) -0.0006 
(0.10)
0.0026 
(0.28)
0.0013 
(0.28)
-0.0057 
(-1.28)
(f) -0.0016
(-0.40)
0.0029
(1.03)
0.0011
(0.54)
0.0024 
(0.89)
(g) 0.0074 
(1.85)
0.0005
(0.35)
0.0033 
(1.44)
0.0016 
(0.12)
5. Bolivian# 
Moratorium -0.0218 -0.0038 -0.0112 -0.0052
(-4.62)** (-0.74) (-3.53)** (-0.68)
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Table 5.21 (contd.)
Event High Medium All Zero
Exposure Exposure Exposed Exposure
6. Cartagena©
Declaration 0.0060
(1.92)
7. Peru's©
Declaration -0.0013
(-0.02)
8. Baker Plan # 0.0209
(4.12)**
9. Oil Price©
Slump -0.0194
(-6 .01)**
10. Debt-Resch.@
Agreement -0.0112
(-2.51)*
11. Brazilian#
Moratorium -0.0288
(-5.36)**
0.0073 
(2.41)*
-0.0056
(-1.59)
0.0052
(1.06)
-0.0045
(-1.54)
-0.0062
(-1.81)
- 0.0020
(-0.75)
0.0068 0.0014
(3.08)** (0.45)
-0.0039 -0.0060
(-1.24) (-1.74)
0.0119 -0.0013
(3.50)** (-0.01)
-0.0104 0.0015
(-3.41)** (0.53)
-0.0083 0.0001
(-3.01)** (0.14)
-0.0135 -0.0085
(-4.08)** (-0.97)
12 Citicorp© 
Loan Loss 
Provision
-0.0039
(-1.25)
-0.0030 
(-0.82)
-0.0024 -0.0012
(-1.32) (-0.79)
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5% level
** Significant at 1% level
© Day 0 returns
# Two-day (-1,0) returns
CHAPTER 6 
HYPOTHESES TESTING
The significance of excess returns obtained during the 
event period, as discussed in the previous chapter, paves way 
to the testing of various hypotheses proposed to explain the 
Latin American debt problem.
In the next section, the results of new information and 
capital regulation hypotheses tests for each event are 
presented. The results of tests for risk characteristics of 
the sample are discussed in Section B. The last section 
summarizes the chapter.
A. Results of Hypotheses Tests
1. Borrower Induced Events 
Mexican Moratorium
The results of regressions are reported in Table 6.1. 
From Panel (a) of Table 6.1, it is evident that the banks with 
Latin American loans experienced excess returns of nearly 
-2.5% compared to those without the Latin debt. Thus, the 
market could broadly distinguish between the exposed and non­
exposed banks. But, the results of the regression between 
excess returns and the Latin American exposure (Table 6.1 (e)) 
show that there is no effect of exposure on event day excess
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returns.1 This result is consistent with Bruner and Simms 
(1987), but in sharp contrast to Lamy, Marr, and Thompson 
(1986) who find a significant impact of debt exposure on event 
day excess returns. Their regression sample includes both 
exposed and non-exposed banks. When this regression is re- 
estimated to encompass the set of both exposed and non-exposed 
banks, the estimated coefficient, shown below, is close to 
that of Lamy, Marr, and Thompson although not significant at 
the conventional 5% level.
€; = -.0026 -.0111 LAEXP;; R2 = .054; F = 3.0
(-0.46) (-1.73)
Thus, the results indicate that although there is a 
difference in average excess returns between exposed and non- 
exposed banks, there is no systematic relation between excess 
returns and debt exposure within the group of banks that had 
exposure to Latin American debt.
Two plausible explanations can be offered as to why the 
market could not differentiate banks among the exposed group 
according to the level of exposure of each bank. The first 
explanation is that bank exposure levels to individual 
countries were not publicly known at the time of the Mexican 
announcement. Hence, the market could broadly categorize
‘The regression model is also estimated using the Mexican 
exposure as a dependent variable. The results are similar to 
those with total Latin American exposure. Hence, only the 
results with total Latin American exposure are reported here 
for all the events.
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banks as high-, medium-, and zero- exposure groups, but could 
not make finer distinctions within each group. If it could, 
then the market would be strong-form efficient. However, this 
explanation fails in the context of Falkland war event where 
the Latin American exposure variable is statistically 
significant.
An alternative explanation is that even before the 
Mexican moratorium, investors were sufficiently aware of the 
deteriorating market value of Latin American debt and 
impounded it in bank share prices prior to the Mexican 
moratorium announcement. In other words, the moratorium 
announcement has no information content about the quality of 
the Lain American loans. An observation of the trend in oil 
prices and world interest rates could enable investors to 
foresee the impending crisis in the Mexican economy. From 
early 1979, the real interest rates had gone up considerably. 
The interest rates on LDC loans are tied to the London 
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) which increased from 8.7% in 
1978 to 13.0% in 1979 and to 17.5% in 1981. Additionally, the 
export growth of Mexico declined from 54.3% in 1980 to 21.9% 
in 1981 and to 7.3% in 1982. The world oil market weakened 
since 1981. A combination of the above factors forced the 
debt-service ratio of Mexico to leap from 22% in 1974 to 49% 
in 1981 and to 59% in 1982 (Cline 1983, pp. 17-19). The 
severe recession in the world economy in 1980-82 made matters 
worse. It is plausible that investors could have anticipated
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the moratorium announcement as a culmination of all the 
factors described above.
Table 6.1 (d) shows that the market differentiated banks 
in accordance with the bank's capital adequacy. The 
qualitative independent variable for capital adequacy (DUMCAP) 
is significant at 5% level on day 0 with a t-statistic of 
-2.12. The difference in average excess returns between 
capital sufficient and capital deficient banks is 1.31 which 
is statistically significant.
The results of regression between the cross section of 
excess returns and the ratio of primary capital to total 
assets for the set of exposed banks are reported in Table 6.1 
(f). The results indicate that this continuous quantitative 
variable has the expected positive sign and is significant at 
the 10% level for day 0 returns and at 5% level for two-day 
(day -1 and day 0) returns. Thus, these results lend support 
to the hypothesis regarding the differential impact of the 
Mexican moratorium announcement on capital sufficient and 
capital deficient banks. The capital deficient banks 
experienced a loss of about 3.5% in market value in the two- 
day period compared to the capital sufficient banks. The 
market also discounted the capital deficient banks by about 
1.5% for every one percent shortage of regulatory capital. 
Argentinean Moratorium
The set of exposed banks have average excess returns of 
-0.72% (t = -2.70) on the event day of the report of the rumor
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of an Argentinean default. In contrast, the set of non- 
exposed banks have average excess returns for the event day 
that are close to zero and are not statistically significant. 
The difference in returns between the exposed and the non- 
exposed banks, however, is not statistically significant, as 
shown in Table 6.2 (a).
When the sample of exposed banks are disaggregated into 
capital sufficient versus capital deficient subsamples, the 
capital deficient banks experience average excess returns that 
are negative and significant (-1.74%, t = -3.49). The
difference in event day excess returns between capital 
deficient banks and the non-exposed banks is -1.69% and is 
statistically significant at 5% level, as shown in Table 6.2 
(b). In contrast, the average excess returns for capital 
sufficient banks with Latin American debt exposure are close 
to zero on the announcement day (-0.21% with a t-statistic of 
-0.84). The dummy variable for the difference in returns 
between the capital sufficient banks and zero exposure banks 
is not statistically significant (Table 6.2 (c)). Thus, the 
market could clearly distinguish between capital deficient, 
non-exposed banks, but made no distinction between the capital 
sufficient, non-exposed banks.
The dummy variable, DUMCAP, that distinguishes between 
capital sufficient and capital deficient banks, obtains a 
coefficient of -1.53% with a t-statistic of -2.19 (Table 6.2 
(d)) . Thus, the results are statistically significant leading
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to the rejection of the null hypothesis of the equality of the 
means.
The results of the regression between the cross section 
of excess returns for exposed banks and the ratio of primary 
capital to total assets for each bank are reported in Table 
6.2 (f) . The coefficient for the PCAP variable is 0.0058 with 
a t-statistic of 1.75 which is significant at the 10% level. 
Bolivian Moratorium
The event study results for the Bolivian moratorium show 
that the average excess returns for the exposed banks are 
-0.60% (t = -2.73) on day 0 and -1.12% (t = -3.53) for two- 
days (day -1, day 0) . The set of non-exposed banks have 
average excess returns close to zero and are not statistically 
significant. The difference in returns between exposed and 
non-exposed banks is not statistically significant as shown by 
the dummy variable, DUMEXP, in Table 6.3 (a).
The results of the regression between the cross section 
of excess returns for the set of all exposed banks and the 
ratio of Latin American debt exposure to total assets (LAEXP) 
for each bank are reported in Table 6.3 (e). The coefficient 
for the exposure variable obtains a value of -0.0041 (t = 
-2.11) on day 0, and -0.0055 (t = -1.77) for two-day returns. 
This implies that the Bolivian moratorium announcement 
conveyed information to the market about the deteriorating 
quality of the Latin American loans and the market 
distinguished banks according to their exposure to Latin
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America. This result is in contrast to the results of the 
Mexican moratorium event. One possible reason might be that 
by the time of the Bolivian moratorium, information regarding 
the loan exposure levels of banks to individual countries was 
publicly available. Thus, this is a test of semi-strong form 
efficiency of market as opposed to strong-form efficiency test 
in the case of the Mexican moratorium event. Although Bolivia 
is a small country with a total foreign debt of less than $4 
billion, the Bolivian moratorium might have been interpreted 
by the market as a signal of the continuing trouble with all 
the Latin American loans.
The subsample of capital deficient banks experienced 
average excess returns of -1.94% (t = -3.97) on day 0 and 
-4.00% (t = -5.77) for the two-day period. Table 6.3 (b)
shows that the capital deficient banks have higher excess 
returns which are statistically significant as compared to the 
non-exposed group (DUMEXP = -0.0171 on day 0 with a t-
statistic of -2.14). In contrast, the subsample of capital 
sufficient banks have insignificant average excess returns. 
The market did not distinguish the subsamples of capital 
sufficient banks and zero exposure banks (Table 6.3 (c)).
The dummy variable for capital adequacy, DUMCAP, obtains 
a coefficient of -0.0169 (t = -2.14) on day 0, and -0.0363 (t 
= -3.04) for a two-day period. Results that parallel the 
Mexican case are also obtained when the cross sectional 
returns for exposed banks are regressed on the primary capital
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ratio (PCAP) for each bank. The coefficient of the PCAP 
variable for two-day returns is 0.0150 (t = 2.11) which is 
significant at the 5% level. Thus, the market clearly 
distinguished banks according to capital adequacy.
Brazilian Moratorium
The event study results for the Brazilian moratorium show 
that the non-exposed banks have insignificant excess returns. 
In contrast, the exposed group of banks experienced average 
excess returns of -l.12% (t = -4.64) on day 0 and -1.35% (t = 
-4.08) for the two-day period. The difference-in-means test 
using a dummy variable (DUMEXP) shows that the difference in 
average excess returns between exposed and non-exposed groups 
is not statistically significant (Table 6.4 (a)). However, 
the difference in returns between high exposure group and zero 
exposure group is significant (Table 6.4 (b)). The market 
also distinguished between the high- and medium-exposure 
groups as shown by the significance of the dummy variable in 
Table 6.4 (d). The coefficient of this dummy variable takes 
on a value of -0.0157 (t = -2.18) on day 0 and -0.0281 (t = 
-2.88) for the two-day period, both of which are significant 
at the 5% level.
The results of the regression between the excess returns 
for the group of all exposed banks and the level of Latin 
American exposure are reported in Table 6.4 (e) . The
coefficient for the exposure variable has the right sign and 
obtains a value of -0.0091 (t = -2.89) on day 0 and -0.0131
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(t = -2.97) for the two-day period, both of which are
significant at the 1% level. These results confirm the 
conclusions of Musumeci and Sinkey (1990a) who report a 
significant negative relationship between event day excess 
returns and Brazilian exposure.
The sample of the exposed banks could not be subdivided 
according to capital adequacy as all banks in the sample
satisfy the minimum primary capital requirements.
The regression between excess returns for the exposed 
banks and the primary capital ratio shows that capital is not 
relevant at the time of the Brazilian moratorium event (Table 
6.4 (f)). Musumeci and Sinkey (1990a) regress event day
excess returns against each bank's ratio of market value of 
common equity to total assets and find significant 
relationship. However, when they use the book measure of 
total equity (which includes preferred stock), the capital 
variable was not significant. In this study also the equity 
to assets variable was found to be significant, but the
primary capital ratio variable is not significant. Thus, the 
results of this study are in agreement with those of Musumeci 
and Sinkey (1990a).
To summarize, the moratoria by Mexico, Bolivia, and
Brazil follow an interesting pattern of results.2 The events
2The fourth event in this category, the rumor of 
Argentinean default, followed immediately after the Mexican 
moratorium and closely parallels the results of the Mexican 
moratorium event.
have information content in that the exposed banks have 
significant excess returns and the non-exposed banks have no 
effect. For the Mexican moratorium event, the Latin American 
exposure of the banks is not significant, leading to the 
speculation that investors were already aware of the 
deteriorating quality of the Latin debt and incorporated this 
awareness in bank share prices prior to the event. In the 
case of the Bolivian moratorium, both Latin American exposure 
and primary capital ratio are significant. The Bolivian 
moratorium was announced at a time when the debt crisis was at 
its peak, with multiple and multiyear reschedulings. The 
exposure of banks to individual countries is public knowledge. 
Capital regulation was tightened and banks were in the process 
of strengthening their capital ratios by raising capital in 
the market. The capital ratios were still not adequate for 
some big banks. Hence, capital adequacy is relevant at the 
time of the Bolivian moratorium. For the Brazilian 
moratorium, only the Latin American exposure is significant. 
The event occurred at a time when a major rescheduling 
agreement was signed (September 30, 1986) between Mexico and 
the creditor banks and it was hoped that the debt crisis was 
manageable. Thus, the Brazilian moratorium has information 
content, reminding the market that the debt crisis is not yet 
over. However, capital adequacy is no longer an issue because 
all the banks had already built up the required regulatory 
capital. Thus, although the three moratoria form a similar
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category of events with similar pattern of average excess 
returns during the event period, the underlying dynamics of 
each moratorium is different. There is a gradual progression 
of increasing importance of the exposure variable and 
decreasing importance of the capital variable. This suggests 
that the information conveyed by each moratorium event is 
different.
The difference in average excess returns between capital 
sufficient and capital deficient banks for the four events—  
Mexican moratorium, Argentinean moratorium, Bolivian 
moratorium, and Falkland War— is approximately 1.50%.3 This 
figure is close to the estimate of the average excess returns 
associated with announcements of bank seasoned common issues. 
Consequently, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis 
that the reaction of the financial market to these events 
impounded information about the probability of increased 
regulatory pressure on exposed banks with weak regulatory 
capital positions, to enter the capital market and issue 
seasoned equity or to reduce leverage and, therefore, forego 
some positive net present value projects.
2. External Events 
Falkland War
This event relates to the devaluation of peso by
3The results of the Falkland War event are discussed in 
the next sub-section.
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Argentina during the Falkland War. Results show that the 
group of all exposed banks experienced average excess returns 
of -0.57% (t = -2.07) on day 0 and -1.08% (t = -2.94) for the 
two-day (day -1 and day 0) period. In contrast, the non- 
exposed banks have positive, but insignificant excess returns. 
Table 6.5 (a) shows that the difference is statistically
significant.
The regression results in Table 6.5 (e) indicate that 
the exposure variable (LAEXP) has the expected negative sign 
and is statistically significant. This result is in sharp 
contrast to that of the Mexican moratorium event.
Falkland war event precedes all other events selected for 
this study. In 1982, information regarding the exposure of 
banks to individual countries was not public knowledge. In 
spite of this lack of information, the results here indicate 
that the market was able to distinguish banks according to 
level of exposure, thus implying that the market was strong- 
form efficient with respect to this information.
The results in Table 6.5 (b) and 6.5 (c) show that the 
market distinguished capital deficient, non-exposed banks, but 
not the capital sufficient, non-exposed banks. Again, there 
is a systematic difference between the capital sufficient and 
capital deficient banks, as shown by the significance of the 
dummy variable, DUMCAP, for capital adequacy in Table 6.5 (d) . 
The difference in average excess returns between the capital 
deficient and capital sufficient groups is -0.99% (t = -1.95)
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for day 0 and -1.55% (t = -2.61) for the two-day period. The 
results of the regression shown in Table 6.5 (f) indicate that 
the continuous variable, PCAP, is significant at the 5% level 
on day -1 and day 0, and at 1% level for the two-day period.
In sum, the Falkland war event did convey information 
about the quality of the Latin American loans, even before the 
Mexican moratorium announcement. The market discounted the 
Latin American loan portfolios of the banks according to the 
degree of exposure of each bank. The market also 
differentiated banks on the basis of capital adequacy.
Oil Price Slump
The event study results of Oil Price Slump event show 
that the sample of all exposed banks experienced average 
excess returns of -1.04% (t = -3.41) on day 0 and -1.43% (t = 
-5.82) on day 1, for a sum of -2.47% in two-days. The event 
has no effect on the non-exposed group. The difference in 
average excess returns between the exposed and non-exposed 
groups amounts to about -3% and is statistically significant 
(Table 6.6 (a)).
The market could distinguish banks within the exposed 
group according to each bank's exposure to Latin America, as 
is evidenced by the regression results in Table 6.6 (b). The 
coefficient of the Latin American exposure variable (LAEXP) 
for the set of exposed banks is significant on day 0, day 1, 
and for the two-day period (day -1 and day 0) . Thus, the 
declining oil prices conveyed information to the market about
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the deterioration in the quality of bank assets with Latin 
American loans.
Due to the involvement of both oil exporting and oil 
importing countries in the Latin American debt crisis, slump 
in oil prices presents an interesting contrast to examine. 
The sharp decline in oil prices affected the oil-exporting 
countries like Mexico and Venezuela negatively, while giving 
a boost to the oil-importing economies of Brazil and 
Argentina. Thus, banks with loans to Mexico and Venezuela 
should experience negative excess returns while those with 
loans to Brazil and Argentina should have positive excess 
returns. To test this proposition, the following regression 
model is estimated:
eit = a + bj MXVZEXPj + b2 ARBZEXP; + uit, (t = -1,0) ,
where MXVZEXP; is the sum of loans outstanding to Mexico and
Venezuela divided by the market value of equity for bank i, 
and ARBZEXPj is the sum of loans to Argentina and Brazil
deflated by the market value of equity for bank i.
The results of the regression for the set of exposed 
banks, reported in Table 6.6 (c), indicate that the
coefficients b, and b2 have the expected signs and are
significant on day 1. Both the exposure variables are 
statistically significant at 5% level for the high exposure 
banks on day -1 (Table 6.6 (d)). For medium exposure banks,
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the coefficients are significant on day 1. These results 
suggest that the market could analyze the impact of declining 
oil prices on various economies and could incorporate it into 
stock prices of banks with loans to those countries.
The primary capital variable has no effect on excess 
returns of banks with Latin American loans as shown in Table 
6.6 (f) . By 1986, all banks in the sample satisfy the
regulatory requirement of minimum capital ratios.
B. Change in Risk Characteristics
The risk characteristics of different groups of banks in 
the sample before and after each event are shown in Tables 6.7 
to 6.14. The tables show the beta of the portfolio, variance 
of market returns, variance of residual errors (firm-specific 
risk) and variance of the portfolio (total risk).
For the group of non-exposed banks, the change in risk 
characteristics is not statistically significant for any 
event. Thus, this group again acts as a control group. The 
shift in beta for other groups is, in general, insignificant 
for all events, except for the Bolivian moratorium and the 
Mexican debt-rescheduling events. The Bolivian moratorium 
event resulted in an increase in beta of about 25% for the set 
of banks with Latin American debt. Both high- and medium- 
exposure banks experienced similar increases in beta. In 
contrast, the set of all exposed banks had a decline in beta 
of 22% (t = -2.65) after the Mexican debt-rescheduling event.
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For the high exposure group, the beta dropped by 26%
(t = -2.20), whereas for the medium exposure group the change 
is not statistically significant.
For the Falkland War event, the total riskiness of the 
portfolio of all exposed banks increased by about 70%. Both 
systematic and unsystematic components of risk contributed to 
the change in total risk. The residual variance for both the 
high- and medium- exposed banks increased by more than 60% and 
the change is statistically significant. Thus, the first 
event in the Latin American debt crisis in this study resulted 
in significant change in the return and risk characteristics 
of banks having Latin American loans.
The three moratoria by Mexico, Bolivia and Brazil present 
an interesting picture. For the Mexican moratorium event, the 
set of banks with Latin American loans experienced an increase 
of about 24% in total risk which is a direct consequence of an 
increase in the residual variance. During the Bolivian 
moratorium, there is very little increase in the total risk of 
the exposed banks, whereas for the Brazilian moratorium, there 
is a slight decrease in the total risk.
The same pattern is observed for the portfolio of high 
exposure banks: an increase of about 20% for the Mexican
moratorium, little change during the Bolivian moratorium, and 
a decrease of about 8% for the Brazilian moratorium. This may 
be called as adaptive learning by the market. There is a 
gradual change in reaction to successive moratoria as
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investors grew more familiar with them. This trend is 
reflected in the change of risk characteristics.
The other events, Cartagena declaration, Baker plan, oil 
price slump, and Mexican debt-rescheduling agreement, have 
resulted in an increase in the total risk of the exposed 
group. For the oil price slump event, the total risk of 
exposed banks shot up by 54% and is statistically significant. 
Thus, the market is concerned with the impact of declining 
oil prices on the value and riskiness of the bank stocks with 
Latin American loans. In sharp contrast to the above, the 
announcement of Baker plan resulted in positive excess 
returns, but a simultaneous increase in the riskiness of banks 
with Latin loans. The total risk of the high exposure group 
has changed very little. The medium exposure group 
experienced more than doubling of the total risk. Investors 
might have perceived that the benefits of Baker plan accrue 
only to the high exposure group, as they are expected to 
share the new lending of $20 billion proposed in the Baker 
plan. Similar results are obtained for the Mexican debt- 
rescheduling event. There is no effect on high exposure 
banks, whereas the riskiness of the medium exposure banks 
increased by about 50%. The Cartagena declaration is treated 
as a non-event and there is no change in the riskiness of any 
group of banks. The market might have perceived it as a 
political event with very little economic consequences.
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C. Chapter Summary
The results for the four events, Falkland war, Mexican 
moratorium, rumor of Argentinean default, and Bolivian 
moratorium, demonstrate that among the set of exposed banks, 
capital deficient firms sustain significantly more unfavorable 
excess returns in response to these events than do capital 
sufficient ones. The average excess returns for capital 
sufficient firms with debt exposure are either zero or modest. 
This implies that investors were apparently already aware of 
the deteriorating market value of Latin American debt and that 
this was reflected in bank share prices prior to these events.
The interaction of bank capital regulation and bank 
examination procedures can induce the financial market to 
alter assessments as to whether regulators will exercise their 
authority to require banks to mark to market loans that have 
sustained reductions in quality. As a result, the market 
anticipates increased regulatory pressures for exposed banks 
with insufficient regulatory capital to tap the bank equity 
market or to reduce leverage and forego some positive net 
present value projects. The results in this chapter provide 
important perspective on the economic impact of capital 
regulation and clarify the link between external exogenous 
events and bank value. The results also clarify some of the 
ambiguities presented by earlier literature on the Mexican 
debt moratorium.
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Table 6.1
Results of Regressions for Mexican Moratorium Event
a) MODEL: eit = a + b DUMEXP; + uit
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
0 0.0069
(1.01)
-0.0246 
(-3.11)*
0.1591
-1/ o 0.0174 
(1.79)@
-0.0230
(-2.02)#
0.0742
N 53
DUMEXP = 1 
= 0
for exposed banks 
for non-exposed banks
b) MODEL: e* = a + b DUMEXP; + U;,
Cumulation
Period
Capital Deficient 
a b
R2
0 0.0069 -0.0333 
(0.84) (-2.80)*
0.2391
-1, 0 0.0174 -0.0464 
(1.65) (-3.06)*
0.2722
N 27
DUMEXP = 1 for capital deficient banks
= 0 for non-exposed banks
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Table 6.1 (contd.)
C) MODEL: eit = a + b DUMEXPj + uit
Cumulation
Period
Capital Sufficient Group 
a b
R2
0 0.0069
(1.45)
-0.0203 
(-3.42)*
0.2357
-1/ 0 0.0174
(2.42)#
-0.0112
(-1.26)
0.0400
N 40
DUMEXP = 1 
= 0
for capital sufficient banks 
for non-exposed banks
d) MODEL: eit = a + b DUMCAP; + uit
Cumulation All Exposed Banks R2
Period a b
-1 0.0195 -0.0221 0.1618
(4.08)* (-2.67)#
0 -0.0134 -0.0131 0.0519
(-2.52)# (-2.12)#
-1, 0 0.0062 -0.0352 0.1841
(0.88) (-2.89)*
N 39
DUMCAP = 1 for capital deficient banks
= 0 for capital sufficient banks
Table 6.1 (contd.)
e) MODEL: eit = a + b LAEXPj + uit
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
0 -0.0191 0.0005 
(-2.78)* (0.27)
0.0020
-1, 0 -0.0028 -0.0009 
(-0.29) (-0.37)
0.0036
N 39
f) MODEL: eit = a + b PCAPj + uit
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
0 -0.0608
(-2.40)#
0.0077
(1.72)@
0.0742
-1, 0 -0.0921
(-2.64)#
0.0155
(2.52)#
0.1465
N 39
t-statistics in parentheses; 0 Significant at 10% level
# Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 1% level;
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Table 6.2
Results of Regressions for Argentinean Moratorium Event
a) MODEL: eit = a + b DUMEXP; + U;t
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
0 -0.0005
(-0.10)
-0.0067
(-1.10)
0.0235
N 53
DUMEXP = 1 
= 0
for exposed banks 
for non-exposed banks
b) MODEL: eit = a + b DUMEXP; + uit
Cumulation
Period
Capital Deficient 
a b
R2
0 -0.0005 -0.0169 
(-0.12) (-2.69)#
0.2247
N 27
DUMEXP = 1 for capital deficient banks 
= 0 for non-exposed banks
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Table 6.2 (contd.)
c) MODEL: 6 it = a + b DUMEXP; + uit
Cumulation
Period
Capital
a
Sufficient
b
R2
0 -0.0005 
(-0.11)
-0.0016
(-0.27)
0.0019
N 40
DUMEXP = 1 
= 0
for
for
capital sufficient banks 
non-exposed banks
d) MODEL: eit = a + b DUMCAP; + U;t
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
0 -0.0022 -0.0153 
(-0.53) (-2.19)#
0.1145
N 39
DUMCAP = 1 for capital deficient banks 
= 0 for capital sufficient banks
Table 6.2 (contd.)
e) MODEL: eit = a + b LAEXP; + uit
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
0 0.0001 -0.0025 
(0.02) (-1.86)0
0.0859
-i, o -0.0070 -0.0002 
(-0.91) (-0.09)
0.0002
N 39
f) MODEL: eit = a + b PCAP; + uit
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed 
a
Banks
b
R2
0 -0.0397 
(-1.98)@
0.0058 
(1.75)0
0.0678
N 39
t-statistics in parentheses; 0 Significant at 10% level 
# Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 1% level;
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Table 6.3
Results of Regressions for Bolivian Moratorium Event
a) MODEL: 6 u = a + *> DUMEXP; + U;t
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
0 -0.0023 
(-0.43)
-0.0037
(-0.58)
0.0067
-1, 0 -0.0052
(-0.62)
-0.0060
(-0.62)
0.0076
N 52
DUMEXP = 1 
= 0
for exposed banks 
for non-exposed banks
b) MODEL: eit = a + b DUMEXP; + U it
Cumulation
Period
Capital
a
Deficient
b
R2
0 -0.0023 
(-0.47)
-0.0171
(-2.14)#
0.1942
i H O -0.0052
(-0.75)
-0.0349 
(-3.11)*
0.3372
N 21
DUMEXP = 1 for capital deficient banks
= 0 for non-exposed banks
189
Table 6.3 (contd.)
c) MODEL: 6  i t = a + b DUMEXP; + U;t
Cumulation
Period
Capital
a
Sufficient
b
R2
0 -0.0023
(-0.45)
-0.0002
(-0.03)
0.0000
-1/ o -0.0052
(-0.70)
0.0014 
(0.16)
0.0006
N 44
DUMEXP = 1 
= 0
for
for
capital sufficient banks 
non-exposed banks
d) MODEL: 6 it = a + b DUMCAP; + Uit
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
-1 -0.0013 
(-0.39)
-0.0193
(-2.73)*
0.1653
0 -0.0025 
(-0.70)
-0.0169 
(-2.14)#
0.1102
-1, 0 -0.0038
(-0.70)
-0.0363 
(-3.04)*
0.2003
N 39
DUMCAP = 1 for capital deficient banks
= 0 for capital sufficient banks
Table 6.3 (contd.)
e) MODEL: eit = a + b LAEXP; + uit
Cumulation All Exposed Banks R2
Period a b
0 0.0014 -0.0041 0.1072
(0.29) (-2.11)#
-1, 0 -0.0012 -0.0055 0.0777
(-0.16) (-1.77) §
N 39
f) MODEL: eit = a + b PCAP; + uit
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
-1 -0.0547 
(-2.12)#
0.0082 
(1.93)@
0.0918
0 -0.0475
(-1.68)0
0.0068 
(1.48)
0.0562
-If o -0.1023 
(-2.35)#
0.0150
(2.11)#
0.1071
N 39
t-statistics in parentheses; @ Significant at 10% level
# Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 1% level;
191
Table 6.4
Results of Regressions for Brazilian Moratorium Event
a) MODEL: eit = a + b DUMEXP; + Uit
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
-1 -0.0005
(-0.10)
-0.0030
(-0.48)
0.0050
0 -0.0080
(-1.32)
-0.0026
(-0.37)
0.0029
-1/ 0 -0.0085
(-1.04)
-0.0039
(-0.40)
0.0035
N 49
DUMEXP = 1 
= 0
for exposed banks 
for non-exposed banks
b) MODEL: 6 it = a  + b DUMEXP; + uit
Cumulation
Period
High Exposure Banks 
a b
R2
-1 -0.0005 
(-0.10)
-0.0127 
(-1.75)@
0.1001
0 -0.0080
(-1.31)
-0.0118
(-1.41)
0.0713
- i ,  o -0.0085
(-1.04)
-0.0203
(-1.81)0
0.1116
N 28
DUMEXP = 1 for high exposure banks
= 0 for non-exposed banks
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Table 6.4 (contd.)
c) MODEL: = a + k> DUMEXP; + U h
Cumulation
Period
Medium
a
Exposure Banks 
b
R2
-1 -0.0005
(-0.13)
0.0039
(0.73)
0.0165
0 -0.0080
(-1.44)
0.0039
(0.55)
0.0094
-1, 0 -0.0085
(-1.30)
0.0078
(0.93)
0.0265
N 34
DUMEXP = 1 
= 0
for
for
medium exposure banks 
non-exposed banks
d) MODEL: 6 u = a + b DUMEXP; + uit
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
-1 0.0034 
(0.81)
-0.0166
(-2.56)#
0.1617
0 -0.0041 
(-0.88)
-0.0157
(-2.18)#
0.1222
“ If o -0.0007 
(-0.11)
-0.0281 
(-2.88)*
0.1958
N 36
DUMEXP = 1 for high exposure banks
= 0 for medium exposure banks
Table 6.4 (contd.)
e) MODEL: eK = a + b LAEXP; + uit
Cumulation All Exposed Banks 
Period a b
R2
-1 0.0044
(0.95)
-0.0077
(-2.59)#
0.1684
0 -0.0012
(-0.26)
-0.0091 
(-2.89)*
0.2019
0 0.0008
(0.13)
-0.0131 
(-2.97)*
0.2113
N 35
f) MODEL: eit = a + b PCAP; + uit
Cumulation All Exposed Banks R2
Period a b
-1 -0.0509 0.0064 0.0404
(-1.28) (1.18)
0 0.0273 -0.0053 0.0234
(0.63) (-0.89)
-1, 0 -0.0356 0.0030 0.0039
(-0.58) (0.36)
N 35
t-statistics in parentheses; @ Significant at 10% level
# Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 1% level;
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Table 6.5
Results of Regressions for Falkland War Event
a) MODEL: eit = a + b DUMEXP; + uit
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
-1 0.0019
(0.51)
-0.0073 
(-1.69)0
0.0575
0 0.0051
(0.99)
-0.0104
(-1.72)0
0.0592
-1/ o 0.0070
(1.12)
-0.0178
(-2.41)#
0.1100
N 49
DUMEXP = 1 
= 0
for exposed banks 
for non-exposed banks
b) MODEL: eit = a + b DUMEXP; + U;t
Cumulation
Period
Capital Deficient 
a b
R2
-1 0.0019
(0.48)
-0.0110
(-1.91)0
0.1322
0 0.0051
(0.88)
-0.0169
(-2.00)0
0.1426
-1, 0 0.0069
(0.99)
-0.0280 
(-2.74)*
0.2340
N 26
DUMEXP = 1 
= 0
for capital deficient banks 
for non-exposed banks
Table 6.5 (contd.)
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c) MODEL: eit = a + b DUMEXP; + U;t
Cumulation
Period
Capital
a
Sufficient
b
R2
-1 0.0019 
(0.47)
-0.0054
(-1.07)
0.0318
0 0.0051
(0.91)
-0.0070
(-1.00)
0.0277
-I, o 0.0070
(1.05)
-0.0125
(-1.48)
0.0589
N 37
DUMEXP = 1 
= 0
for capital sufficient banks 
for non-exposed banks
d) MODEL: eit = a + b DUMCAP; + Uit
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
-1 -0.0035
(-1.50)
-0.0056
(-1.39)
0.0552
0 -0.0020
(-0.66)
-0.0099 
(-1.95)@
0.1029
-1, 0 -0.0055 
(-1.58)
-0.0155
(-2.61)#
0.1707
N 35
DUMCAP = 1 for capital deficient banks
= 0 for capital sufficient banks
Table 6.5 (contd.)
e) MODEL: eit = a + b LAEXP; + uit
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
-1 -0.0032 -0.0007 
(-1.07) (-0.96)
0.0271
0 0.0030 -0.0028 
(-0.88) (-3.17)*
0.2331
-1, 0 -0.0001 -0.0035 
(-0.04) (-3.33)*
0.2517
N 35
f) MODEL: eit = a + b PCAP; + uit
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
-1 -0.0337 
(-2.83)*
0.0052
(2.40)#
0.1482
0 -0.0383
(-2.44)#
0.0060 
(2.13)#
0.1205
-1, 0 -0.0720
(-4.18)*
0.0112 
(3.59)*
0.2811
N 35
t-statistics in parentheses; @ Significant at 10% level
# Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 1% level;
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Table 6.6
Results of Regressions for Oil Price Slump Event
a) MODEL: eit = a + b DUMEXP; + U;t
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
0 0.0105 -0.0282 0.1669
(1.36) (-3.17)*
-1, 0 0.0243 -0.0299 0.1007
(2.22)# (-2.37)#
N 52
DUMEXP = 1 for exposed banks
= 0 for non-exposed banks
b) MODEL: eit = a + b LAEXP; + U;t
Cumulation
Period
All Exposed Banks 
a b
R2
0 -0.0054
(-1.24)
-0.0042 
(-1.97)0
0.1256
-If o -0.0016
(-0.33)
-0.0059
(-2.54)#
0.1922
+ 1 -0.0072
(-2.07)#
-0.0031 
(-1.86)0
0.1141
N 29
Table 6.6 (contd.)
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C) MODEL: eit = a + b, MXVZEXP; + b2 ARBZEXP; + u it
Cumulation All Exposed Banks 
Period a bj
F-stat.
^2
R2
0 -0.0070
(-1.43)
-0.0022 
(-0.12) (
0.0065 1.02 
-0.41)
0.0729
-1, 0 -0.0028
(-0.51)
-0.0184
(-0.93)
0.0047 1.75 
(0.27)
0.1186
+1 -0.0051
(-1.48)
-0.0321
(-2.58)#
0.0211 4.28# 
(1.89)@
0.2476
N 29
MXVZEXP = sum of 
divided
loans outstanding to Mexico and 
by the market value of equity
Venezuela
ARBZEXP = sum of loans outstanding to Argentina 
divided by the market value of equity
and Brazil
d) MODEL : en = a + bj MXVZEXP; + b2 ARBZEXP; + uit
Cumulation High 
Period a
Exposure Banks 
bi
F-stat.
b2
R2
-1 0.0119
(2.48)#
-0.0371 
(-3.10)*
0.0249 
(2.68)#
4.85# 0.4684
0 -0.0305 
(-3.40)*
0.0298 
(1.33)
-0.0177 
(-1.02)
1.00 0.1540
1, 0 -0.0186 
(-2.40)#
-0.0073 
(-0.38)
0.0072
(0.49)
0. 13 0.0229
N 14
Table 6.6 (contd.)
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e) MODEL: eit = a + bj MXVZEXP; + b2 ARB Z EXP; + U;t
Cumulation
Period
Medium
a
Exposure Banks 
b; b2
F-stat. R2
0 0.0006
(0.12)
-0.0114
(-0.38)
-0.0013
(-0.04)
0.88 0.1274
1/ o 0.0038
(0.51)
0.0207
(0.44)
-0.0461
(-0.87)
1.15 0.1602
+1 -0.0017
(-0.63)
-0.0381 
(-2.23)#
0.0360 
(1.86)0
2.81@ 0.3195
N 15
f) MODEL: eit = a + b PCAP; + uit
Cumulation All Exposed Banks R2
Period a b
0 -0.0391 0.0040 0.0203
(-1.09) (0.78)
-1, 0 -0.0566 0.0068 0.0426
(-1.38) (1.14)
N 29
t-statistics in parentheses; @ Significant at 10% level;
# Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 1% level;
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Table 6.7
Risk Characteristics of Banks for Mexican Moratorium Event
Parameter High
exoosure
Medium
exoosure
All Exposed Zero
exoosure
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Beta .7905 .8815 
(0.80)
.4931 .5613 
(0.92)
.6183 .6894 
(0.99)
.3247 .3775 
(0.91)
Var(RJ
('000)
0.077 0.103 
(1.34)
Var (ep) 
('000)
0.318 0.356 
(1.12)
0.282 0.357 
(1.27)
0.297 0.356 
(1.20)
0.395 0.396 
(1.01)
Var (R„) 
('000)
0.366 0.436 
(1.19)
0.301 0.389 
(1.29)
0.326 0.405 
(1.24)
0.403 0.411 
(1.02)
Table 6.8
Risk Characteristics of Banks for Bolivian Moratorium Event
Parameter High
exoosure
Medium
exposure
All Exposed Zero
exposure
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Beta .8280 1.0596 
(1.79)@
.4931 .6184 
(1.80)§
.6305 .7972 
(2.09)#
.3652 .3060 
(-0.76)
Var (Rm) 
('000)
0.051 0.045 
(1.13)
Var (ep) 
('000)
0.232 0.221 
(1.05)
0.239 0.265 
(1.11)
0.236 0.248 
(1.05)
0.274 0.213 
(1.29)
Var (Rp) 
('000)
0.266 0.271 
(1.02)
0.251 0.282 
(1.12)
0.256 0.277 
(1.08)
0.281 0.217 
(1.29)
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Table 6.9
Risk Characteristics of Banks for Brazilian Moratorium Event
Parameter High
exoosure
Medium
exposure
All Exposed Zero
exoosure
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Beta .9571 .8435 
(-0.97)
.7517 .6906 
(-0.70)
.8397 .7601 
(-1.09)
.5756 .4428 
(-0.88)
Var(Rm)
('000)
0.073 0.078 
(1.06)
Var (ep) 
('000)
0.363 0.339 
(1.07)
0.311 0.352 
(1.13)
0.333 0.347 
(1.04)
0.331 0.293 
(1.13)
Var (Rp) 
('000)
0.430 0.394 
(1.09)
0.352 0.389 
(1.11)
0.384 0.392 
(1.02)
0.355 0.308 
(1.15)
Table 6.10
Risk Characteristics of Banks for Mexican 
Debt-Rescheduling Event
Parameter High
exoosure
Medium
exoosure
All Exposed Zero
exposure
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Beta 1.0778 0.7941 
(-2.20)#
.7938 .6581 
(-1.66)
.9155 .7141 
(-2.65)*
.5874 .4940 
(-0.73)
Var(RJ
('000)
0.066 0.076 
(1.15)
Var (ep) 
('000)
0.320 0.367 
(1.15)
0.300 0.467 
(1.56)
0.309 0.426 
(1.38)
0.315 0.309 
(1.02)
Var (Rp) 
('000)
0.397 0.415 
(1.05)
0.342 0.500 
(1.46)
0.364 0.465 
(1.28)
0.338 0.328 
(1.03)
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Table 6.11
Risk Characteristics of Banks for Falkland War Event
Parameter High
exoosure
Medium
exposure
All Exposed Zero
exposure
Pre- Post­
event event
Pre- Post­
event event
Pre- Post­
event event
Pre- Post-_ 
event event
Beta .7528 .8941 
(1.25)
.5178 .5832 
(0.83)
.6288 .7300 
(1.36)
.3506 .3429 
(-0.11)
Var (Rm) 
('000)
0.074 0.117 
(1.58)*
Var (ep) 
('000)
0.275 0.444 
(1.61)
0.232 0.391 
(1.69)
0.252 0.414 
(1.64)
0.402 0.383 
(1.05)
Var (Rp) 
('000)
0.317 0.538 
(1.70)
0.252 0.431 
(1.71)
0.281 0.476 
(1.69)
0.411 0.397 
(1.04)
Table 6.12
Risk Characteristics of Banks for Cartagena Declaration Event
Parameter High
exoosure
Medium
exposure
All Exposed Zero
exposure
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Beta 0.8599 1.0585 .5215 .6226 .6587 .8149 
(1.54) (1.43) (1.91)0
.3556 .3529 
(-0.04)
Var(RJ
('000)
0.051 0.044 
(1.16)
Var (ep) 
('000)
0.230 0.209 
(1.10)
0.246 0.271 
(1.10)
0.239 0.245 
(1.03)
0.270 0.222 
(1.22)
Var (Rp) 
('000)
0.268 0.258 
(1.04)
0.260 0.288 
(1.11)
0.261 0.274 
(1.05)
0.276 0.227 
(1.22)
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Table 6.13
Risk Characteristics of Banks for Baker Plan Event
Parameter High
exoosure
Medium
exposure
All Exposed Zero
exoosure
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Beta 1.0385 1.1545 
(1.00)
.7106 .8019 .8511 .9515 
(1.35) (1.35)
.4316 .5983 
(1.50)
Var(RJ
('000)
0.035 0.066 
(1.89)*
Var(ep)
('000)
0.327 0.287 
(1.14)
0.186 0.379 
(2.04)
0.246 0.341 
(1.39)
0.247 0.333 
(1.35)
Var (R„) 
('000)
0.365 0.375 
(1.03)
0.204 0.421 
(2.06)
0.271 0.400 
(1.48)
0.254 0.357 
(1.41)
Table 6.14
Risk Characteristics of Banks for Oil Price Slump Event
Parameter High
exoosure
Medium
exposure
All Exposed Zero
exposure
Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post Pre Post
Beta .9985 .9476 
(-0.40)
.7213 .7689 
(0.56)
.8554 .8500 
(-0.07)
.4644 .5521 
(0.71)
Var(RJ 
( '000)
0.034 0.074 
(2.18)*
Var (ep) 
('000)
0.218 0.361 
(1.66)
0.187 0.241 
(1.29)
0.200 0.294 
(1.47)
0.295 0.340 
(1.15)
Var (Rp) 
('000)
0.252 0.427 
(1.69)
0.205 0.285 
(1.39)
0.225 0.347 
(1.54)
0.302 0.363 
(1.20)
@ Significant at 10% level.
# Significant at 5% level.
CHAPTER 7
ANALYSIS OF BRITISH AND CANADIAN BANKS
The analysis of events related to the Latin American debt 
problem has been limited so far to the U.S banks. This 
chapter extends the analysis of events to the British and the 
Canadian banks to assess international differences in investor 
reaction to shocks to banking system. As noted in Chapter 3, 
the British and the Canadian banks, like the U.S. banks, are 
substantial lenders to Latin America. Their Latin American 
loan outstandings amount to more than 100% of their 
shareholder equity. The event study results of each event on 
these banks including a comparison with their U.S. 
counterparts are discussed in the next Section. The second 
stage of analysis involving regressions on excess returns is 
not undertaken here because of the very small sample sizes of 
the British and the Canadian banks. In Section B, some 
plausible explanations for the unique results with respect to 
the Canadian banks are examined. The last section summarizes 
the discussion.
A. Event Study Results on U.K. and Canadian Banks
1. Borrower-induced Events 
Mexican moratorium
The event study results of the Mexican moratorium are
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shown in Table 7.1. The results indicate that the U.K. banks 
experienced average excess returns of -1.52% (t = -2.15) on 
the event day . (The U.S. banks with Latin American loans have 
comparative excess returns of -1.77% on day 0). The average 
excess returns after day 0 are not significant. The 
cumulative excess returns (CARs) from day -1 to day 10 are all 
negative, but not significant.
In contrast, the average excess returns for the Canadian 
banks on the event day are not statistically different from 
zero. The excess returns become significantly negative only 
on day +4. As in the case of the U.S. and the U.K. banks, the 
Canadian banks also experienced significant positive returns 
on the two days (day -2 and day -1) prior to the event day. 
This may be due to the fact that the stock markets all over 
the world surged to record levels on those days. The CARs for 
Canadian banks are positive and significant till day 3 and 
again from day 8 to day 10. They do not change sign during 
the 10 days. These results suggest that the Mexican 
moratorium announcement has no impact on Canadian bank stock 
prices.
Tables 7.2 and 7.4 show the distributional properties of 
the market model residuals for the British and Canadian banks 
respectively. All the five U.K. banks exhibit non-normality 
as indicated by significant D-statistics. Both skewness and 
kurtosis are significant in all the cases. In contrast, only 
one Canadian stock out of the six exhibit non-normality.
206
Leptokurtois is observed in two stocks. Tables 7.3 and 7.5 
report the maximum likelihood estimates of GARCH(p,q) market 
model for the British and Canadian banks respectively. In 
general, for both the U.K. banks and the Canadian banks, 
Student t-distribution seem to fit in cases where the OLS 
model is not appropriate.
Table 7.6 shows the average excess returns and daily 
conditional variance for U.K. and Canadian banks with GARCH 
estimation method. The results are, in general, similar to 
those with the OLS method except for a few cases. Thus, for 
the U.K. banks, the average excess returns on day -1 and day 
+4 are significant (t = 2.35, and 2.13) with the GARCH model 
and insignificant with the OLS model. For the Canadian banks, 
the significance levels on day -2 are different. The 
conditional variance jumped up around the event period. The 
average beta with GARCH model is smaller than the OLS beta by 
about 11% for the British banks and by 10% for the Canadian 
banks. As in the case of the U.S. banks, the GARCH model does 
not make significant difference from the OLS model for the 
U.K. and Canadian banks also.
Argentinean Moratorium
Results from Table 7.1 (day +10 is the event day) 
indicate that the event has no impact on both the U.K. and 
the Canadian banks. One possible reason in the case of 
British banks may be that the market already discounted the 
Argentinean debt. England was involved in a war with
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Argentina over Falklands from April 1982 to June 1982. 
Immediately after the commencement of the war (on April 3, 
1982), the British government imposed economic sanctions and 
froze Argentine deposits in London banks. Thus, it is 
possible that the stock market has discounted the Argentinean 
debt during the Falkland war period.
Bolivian Moratorium
The results for the Bolivian moratorium event, shown in 
Table 7.7, indicate that the U.K. banks have average excess 
returns of -1.78% (t = -2.27) on day -1 and -1.17% (t = -1.79) 
on day 0, for a two-day return of -2.95% (t = -2.87). Thus, 
the announcement of Bolivian moratorium has considerable 
effect on the U.K. banks. The earlier premise that the market 
treated the Bolivian moratorium as an indication of deeper 
malaise with the entire Latin American loan portfolio seems to 
hold in the case of the British banks also.
The Canadian banks failed to follow the above pattern. 
Results indicate that these banks have positive excess returns 
on day -1, and negative excess returns on day 0, both being 
insignificant at the conventional 5% level. The two-day 
returns are positive, but not significantly different from 
zero. The CARs are insignificant throughout. Thus, the 
Bolivian moratorium, like the Mexican moratorium, has no 
information content for the Canadian bank stocks. The average 
residual variance and the beta of the portfolio at the time of 
the Bolivian moratorium decreased as compared to the Mexican
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moratorium (for the U.S. and U.K. banks there is an increase 
in these variables).
Brazilian Moratorium
The Brazilian moratorium announcement resulted in average 
excess returns of -1.46% (t = -2.10) on day -1 and -0.96% (t
= -1.51) on day 0 for the U.K. banks (Table 7.8). Thus, the
two-day excess returns add up to -2.42% (t = -2.58) and are 
similar in magnitude (-2.88%) for the high exposure group of 
U.S. banks. All the CARs are significant, indicating that the 
moratorium has a lasting effect on the stocks. The beta of 
the portfolio has almost doubled as compared to the Mexican 
event.
The Brazilian moratorium has the most severe effect on 
the Canadian bank stocks. The excess returns on day - 1 and
day 0 correspond to -4.05% (t = -8.39) and -3.58% (t = -7.49),
respectively. Thus, in two days the Canadian bank stocks lost 
7.62% of their market value. The CARs are highly negative and 
significant till day 3. They rise up to -11.70%. The beta of 
the portfolio increased by more than 50% from the Mexican 
moratorium event. The intensity of the reaction of Canadian 
bank stocks to the Brazilian announcement is in contrast to 
that observed for the U.S. and U.K. bank stocks. The effect 
on Canadian banks (in terms of excess returns and the t- 
statistics) for the Brazilian moratorium is the most severe of 
all the events analyzed in this study.
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2. Lender-induced Events 
Citicorp Loan-Loss-Provision Event
The Citicorp decision to enhance the loan-loss-provision 
on Third World debt seems to have a stronger effect on the 
British banks than on the U.S. banks. The event study 
results, reported in Table 7.9, show that the U.K. banks have 
average excess returns of 3.26% (t = 4.17) on the event day, 
and -4.12% (t = -5.73) and -2.46% (t = -3.40) on the next two 
days. This is in contrast to the experience of the Citicorp 
which has negative, but insignificant excess returns on day 0, 
and positive and significant excess returns of about 10% on 
day 1 and day 2.
Initially, the market reacted favorably to the Citicorp 
decision. The day after Citicorp's announcement, the Bank of 
England urged British banks to step up their reserves for 
Third World loans. The U.K. banks have loan-loss-reserves of 
about 5% - 10% of their Third World debt, insignificant
compared to 30%-40% of reserves provided by big German, Swiss 
and French banks. The additional provisions needed would wipe 
out almost the entire pre-tax earnings of the British banks.
Although the importance of loan-loss-provision is 
confined only to accounting adjustments, it has implications 
for tax deductibility in the case of the U.K. banks. British 
tax rules permit banks to deduct loan loss provisions against 
their income taxes. British tax officials informally set 
these levels on a case-by-case and country-by-country basis.
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The loan-loss-provision event has no effect on the 
Canadian bank stocks. The excess returns on day 0 and day 1 
are negative, but not significant. A possible explanation is 
that the market treated the announcement as a firm-specific 
event, as in the case of the U.S. banks.
3. Events Initiated by Borrower and Lender 
Mexican Debt-Rescheduling Agreement
The debt-rescheduling agreement between Mexico and the 
creditor banks resulted in excess returns of -2.03% (t = 
-2.39) on day -1, and insignificant negative excess returns on 
day 0 for the U.K. banks (Table 7.10). The two-day (day 
-1 and day 0) excess returns amount to -2.62% (t = -2.25). 
These results are similar to those observed for the U.S. banks 
with Latin American loans. Thus, the market treated the debt- 
rescheduling agreement as unfavorable to the banks.
But, the Canadian stock market treated the agreement as 
a non-event as shown by the insignificant excess returns for 
the Canadian banks. In fact, the excess returns are positive, 
though not significant, on day 0 and day 1. The CARs are also 
not statistically significant. Again, the Canadian banks show 
a pattern different from that of the U.S. and the U.K. banks.
4. External Events 
Falkland War
The results of the Falkland War event, shown in Table
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7.11, indicate insignificant excess returns on the event day 
and positive and significant excess returns of 1.92% (t = 
3.21) on the following day for the British banks. The CARs 
are positive, and significant till day +2. The impact of 
Falkland war event on British bank stocks is exactly opposite 
to that of the reaction of U.S. bank stocks. It should be 
noted that England is one of the parties in the Falkland war. 
A negative event like devaluation of peso by Argentina would 
be good news to London stock market resulting in positive 
excess returns for the U.K. bank stocks.
The excess returns and the CARs for the Canadian banks 
are negative, but insignificant. Thus, the Falkland war event 
did not impact the Canadian bank stocks, unlike for the U.S. 
bank stocks with Latin American loan portfolio.
Cartagena Declaration
The results of the Cartagena declaration event, shown in 
Table 7.12, indicate that the event has no impact on both the 
British and the Canadian banks. The U.S. banks experienced 
slight positive excess returns. Thus, the Cartagena 
declaration event was perceived as a political event by all 
the markets.
Peru's Declaration
As shown in Table 7.13, the U.K. banks have insignificant 
excess returns on the event day. The CARs are also 
insignificant. Thus, the U.K. market, like the U.S. market, 
treated the declaration by the President of Peru limiting his
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country's payments to 10% of export earnings as a political 
statement.
The Canadian market treated the event differently. The 
Canadian banks have average excess returns of -1.37% (t = 
-2.74) on the event day. The excess returns on day -1 and day 
+1 are not significant. The CARs are also negative, but 
insignificant.
Baker Plan
The results for the Baker Plan event, reported in Table 
7.14, indicate positive and insignificant excess returns for 
the U.K. banks around the event day. For the Canadian banks, 
the excess returns on the event day are negative and 
insignificant on day 0. However, on day +1, the banks have 
negative excess returns of -1.65% (t = -3.66). The CARs are 
negative and significant till day 3. In contrast, the U.S. 
banks have positive excess returns following the announcement 
of Baker plan. Thus, there are three different responses from 
three markets for the same event: positive from the U.S., 
negative from the Canadian, and indifferent from the U.K.
Oil Price Slump
The event study results of oil price slump event are 
shown in Table 7.15. There is no impact of the event on the 
British bank stocks. In contrast, the Canadian banks have 
average excess returns of -2.11% (t = -4.89) on day 0. This 
result is close to the excess returns (-1.94%) experienced by 
the high exposure group of the U.S. banks.
The event study results for the set of all exposed U.S. 
banks, U.K. banks, and Canadian banks are summarized in Table 
7.16. The results for the U.S. and the U.K. banks are, in 
general, similar whereas Canadian banks are somewhat 
different. The Mexican and the Bolivian moratoria have 
significant negative impact on U.S. and U.K. banks and no 
effect on the Canadian banks. Although the average excess 
returns in case of the Brazilian moratorium are significantly 
negative for all the three groups, the Canadian banks 
experienced predominantly higher excess returns: nearly six 
times that of the U.S. banks and three times that of the 
British banks. The only lender-induced event, Citicorp loan- 
loss-provision event, was treated as a firm-specific event by 
the U.S. and the Canadian banks and as an industry-wide event 
by the U.K. banks. The borrower-lender joint event, the debt- 
rescheduling agreement event, produced significant negative 
excess returns for the U.S. and the U.K. banks and positive, 
but insignificant excess returns for the Canadian banks. The 
Baker plan event was treated as favorable by the U.S. and the 
U.K. banks and unfavorable by the Canadian banks, although the 
excess returns are significant only in the case of the U.S. 
banks. Peru's declaration event has no information content 
for the U.S. and the U.K. banks, but it resulted in 
significant negative excess returns for the Canadian banks.
Thus, the results for the Canadian banks emerge as 
somewhat different from the other two sets of banks. However,
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these results should be interpreted with caution due to the 
small sample sizes of the British and the Canadian banks. 
Some possible explanations for the different pattern of 
results obtained for the Canadian banks are examined in the 
next section.
B. Excess Returns: The Case of Canadian Banks 
Three possible explanations are examined for the
dissimilar results obtained for the Canadian banks. The first 
explanation is that the Canadian stock markets are not
efficient. However, the Toronto and the Montreal stock
exchanges on which these banks are listed are well developed 
and there is no reason to suspect that these markets are 
inefficient. Moreover, the six banks in the sample are the 
largest banks in Canada and they account for more than 90% of 
total Canadian bank assets. Hence, these stocks are closely 
monitored by analysts.
The second explanation relates to capital regulation. 
Although the primary capital ratios (base capital ratios) for 
Canadian banks are not large (around 3% to 4% in 1982)
compared to those of the big U.S. banks, it should be noted 
that capital regulation in Canada is rather conservative (see 
Chapter 3) . Hence, the Canadian banks seem to be better 
capitalized than what the base capital ratios indicate.
The third explanation is that the investor reaction is 
reflected in the volume of shares traded. The volume of
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shares traded for the six banks around the Mexican moratorium 
and the Bolivian moratorium events are shown in Tables 7.17 
and 7.18, respectively. It can be seen from Table 7.17 that 
from day -2 to day -1 there is an abrupt increase in volume. 
From day -1 to day 0, the volume dropped steeply.1 Similar 
steep changes in volume around the event day are observed for 
other events also.
Volume reaction is related to change in expectations of 
individual investors around the events. Beaver (1968) argues 
that price reaction reflects changes in expectations of the 
market as a whole while volume reaction reflects changes in 
the expectations of individual investors. Beaver notes that 
volume reflects a lack of consensus regarding the price and 
the lack of consensus is induced by a piece of new 
information. If risk preferences differ, there could be a 
volume reaction, even after the equilibrium price had been 
reached. A piece of information may be neutral in the sense 
of not changing the expectations of the market as a whole but 
it may greatly alter the expectations of individuals. In that 
case, there would be no price reaction, but there could be 
shifts in portfolio positions as reflected in volume.
Thus, a piece of information can result in change of 
price or volume or both. In the case of the Canadian banks, 
there is change in volume for all the events, but the price
‘Significant changes in volume around the Mexican 
moratorium event are observed for the U.S. banks also.
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change is observed in only a few cases. This raises the 
question of the adequacy of the definition of an 'event'. 
Since an event conveys information to the market about the 
stocks, it may result in change of price or volume or both. 
Most of the event studies in finance literature concentrated 
on price change. In view of the evidence presented here, a 
much broader definition of an event is warranted, one which 
involves changes in price or volume or both.
c. chapter Summary
This chapter extends the analysis of events to the 
British and Canadian banks. The results for the U.S. and the 
U.K. banks are in general similar for major events like the 
moratoria. However, the results for the Canadian banks are 
somewhat different. The excess returns for most of the events 
are insignificant for the Canadian banks, but abrupt shifts in 
volume of shares traded around the event dates are observed. 
Hence, it may be concluded that Canadian stock market reaction 
to the events studied resulted mainly in shifts in trading 
volume.
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Table 7.1
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns for British
and Canadian Banks around Mexican Moratorium Event
(Event Date 820819)
Day U.K. Banks Canadian Banks
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
“3 -0.0367 0.0005
(-5.24)** (0.08)
-2 0.0209 0.0145
(3.01)** (2.04)*
-1 0.0130 0.0340
(1.91) (4.29)**
0 -0.0152 -0.0014
(-2.15)* (-0.56)
1 0.0000 0.0130
(-0.02) (1.80)
2 -0.0071 -0.0048
(-1.04) (-0.59)
3 -0.0030 0.0055
(-0.47) (0.10)
4 -0.0102 -0.0131
(-1.55) (-2.22)*
5 -0.0071 -0.0127
(-1.04) (-1.67)
6 -0.0024 0.0160
(-0.30) (2.77)**
7 -0.0005 0.0023
(-0.08) (0.32)
8 -0.0010 0.0289
(-0.25) (5.63)**
9 0.0199 0.0070
(2.96)** (0.89)
106 -0.0001 -0.0051
(-0.01) (-0.42)
Table 7.1 (contd.)
U.K. Banks Canadian Banks
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 -0.0022 0.0326
(-0.17) (2.64)**
-1 +1 -0.0022 0.0456
(-0.15) (3.19)**
-1 +2 -0.0093 0.0408
(-0.65) (2.47)*
-1 +3 -0.0123 0.0463
(-0.79) (2.25)*
-1 +4 -0.0225 0.0332
(-1.36) (1.15)
-1 +5 -0.0297 0.0206
(-1.65) (0.43)
-1 +6 -0.0320 0.0366
(-1.65) (1.39)
-1 +7 -0.0326 0.0389
(-1.58) (1.41)
-1 +8 -0.0335 0.0677
(-1.58) (3.12)**
-1 +9 -0.0137 0.0748
(-0.61) (3.24)**
-1 +10 -0.0138 0.0697
(-0.59) (2.98)**
N 5 6
Avg res var( '000) 0.2379 0.3136
Beta 0.5393 0.7677
t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level
Estimation Period (t = -260 to t = -11)
§ Day of rumor of Argentinean default of debt
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Table 7.2
Descriptive Statistics of Market Model Residuals for 
British Banks Using Ordinary Least Squares Method 
(250 Days before Mexican Moratorium)
Sym­
bol
D-Stat
(P)
Mean Vari­
ance
('000)
Skew­
ness
(P)
Kurt-
osis
(P)
D-W
Stat
Market Model 
Parameters 
(a) (b) 
(t) (t)
BAR 0.131
(0.01)
0.00 0.2624 -2.271
(0.00)
20.11 
(0.00)
2.269 0.0003 0.63 
(0.27) (8.31)
LLY 0.103 
(0.01)
0.00 0.2434 1.890
(0.00)
15.81
(0.00)
1.998 0.0004 0.54 
(0.45) (7.44)
MID 0.088 
(0.01)
0.00 0.2890 0.519 
(0.00)
5.76 
(0.00)
2.287 0.0006 0.63 
(0.58) (7.98)
NAT 0. 096 
(0.01)
0.00 0.1993 0.882 
(0.00)
6.95 
(0.00)
2.149 0.0008 0.56 
(0.92) (8.60)
STD 0.101
(0.01)
0.00 0.1881 0.907 
(0.00)
9.49 
(0.00)
1.861 0.0005 0.34 
(0.53) (5.35)
BAR = Barclays Bank
LLY = Lloyds Bank
MID = Midland Bank
NAT = National Westminster Bank
STD = Standard Chartered Bank
P = p-value 
t = t-statistics
D-Stat = Kolmogorov-Smirnov D-Statistics for normality 
D-W Stat = Durbin-Watson Statistics
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Table 7.3
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of GARCH Market Model for 
British Banks around Mexican Moratorium Event
Sym­
bol
Market Model 
Parameters 
a b
oo
3 
O «i Pi «i+Pi Model 1/v
1. BAR 0.0004
(0.6)
0.65
(14.1)
0.1700
(4.21)
0.1935
(1.19)
- 0.1935 ARCH(t ) -
2. LLY -0.0002
(-0.3)
0.61
(11.3)
0.2600
(2.96)
- - - OLS -
3. MID 0.0002
(0.3)
0.70
(11.6)
0.3100
(3.77)
- - - OLS -
4. NAT 0.0009
(1.3)
0.63
(12.8)
0.2200
(3.03)
- - - OLS -
5. STD -0.0003
(-0.5)
0.30
(6.4)
0.0100
(0.85)
0.0529
(1.63)
0.9293
(20.9)
0.9822 GARCH(t ) 0.1570
(2.77)
t-statistics in parentheses
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Table 7.4
Descriptive Statistics of Market Model Residuals for 
Canadian Banks Using Ordinary Least Squares Method 
(250 Days before Mexican Moratorium)
Sym­
bol
D-Stat
(P)
Mean Vari­
ance
('000)
Skew­
ness
(P)
Kurt-
osis
(P)
D-W
Stat
Market Model 
Parameters 
a b 
(t) (t)
BNS 0.04 
( .20)
0.00 0.0002 -0.166
( .28)
0.10
(.76)
2.016 0.0001
(0.04)
0.56
(5.7)
BOM 0. 04 
(.20)
0. 00 0.0002 0.183
(.23)
0.97
(.97)
2.308 -0.0009 
(-1.06)
0.79
(7.8)
CIC 0. 05 
(.15)
0. 00 0.0002 -0.179 
(.24)
0.37
(.23)
2.201 -0.0008
(-0.99)
0.76
(8.1)
NBC 0. 09 
(.01)
0.00 0.0009 -1.858
(.00)
18.2
(.00)
1.841 -0.0023
(-1.24)
0.76
(3.6)
RBC 0. 03 
(.20)
0. 00 0.0002 0. 074 
(.63)
-0.11
(.72)
2.000 -0.0001 
(-0.13)
0.98
(9.6)
TDB 0. 04 
(.20)
0. 00 0.0002 -0.282 
(.07)
0.95
(.00)
1.920 0.0001
(0.15)
0.76
(7.4)
BOM = Bank of Montreal
BNS = Bank of Nova Scotia
CIC = Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
NBC = National Bank of Canada
RBC = Royal Bank of Canada
TDB = Toronto Dominion Bank
P = p-value 
t = t-statistics
D-Stat = Kolmogorov-Smirnov D-statistics for normality 
D-W Stat = Durbin-Watson Statistics
Table 7.5
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of GARCH Market Model for 
Canadian Banks around Mexican Moratorium Event
Sym­
bol
Market Model 
Parameters 
a b
o
 
o
 
3 
o P> a,+P, Model 1/v
1. BNS 0.0001
(0.08)
0.5855
(6.27)
- - - - OLS -
2. BOM -0.0009
(-1.14)
0.7232
(7.79)
0.0001
(6.83)
0.2815
(1.81)
- 0.2815 ARCH(t) 0.14
(2.1)
3. CIC -0.0008
(-0.96)
0.7521
(9.13)
0.0001
(8.38)
0.1977
(2.11)
- 0.1977 ARCH(N) -
4. NBC -0.0010
(-0.78)
0.8129
(5.96)
0.0002
(1.82)
0.2542
(1.62)
0.5184
(2.58)
0.7726 GARCH(t ) 0.28
(13.5)
5. RBC -0.0002
(-0.20)
0.9566
(10.1)
- - - - OLS -
6. TDB 0.0001
(0.16)
0.7523
(8.84)
- - - - OLS -
t-statistics in parentheses
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Table 7.6
Average Excess Returns and Conditional Variance for British
and Canadian Banks around Mexican Moratorium Event
Using GARCH Model (Event Date 820819)
Day U.K. Banks Canadian Banks
AR (et) VAR (ht) AR (et) VAR (ht)
r'000) ('000)
-3 -0.0360 0.289 0.0012 0.359
(-5.01)** (0.02)
-2 0.0216 0. 312 0.0135 0. 376
(2.71)** (2.59)**
-1 0.0136 0.375 0.0323 0.431
(2.35)* (3.17)**
0 -0.0154 0.386 -0.0019 0.459
(-2.35)* (-0.79)
1 0.0002 0.395 0.0146 0.473
(-0.05) (2.35)*
2 -0.0061 0.399 -0.0044 0.485
(-1.27) (-0.51)
3 -0.0031 0.387 0.0048 0.498
(-0.39) (0.01)
4 -0.0109 0.379 -0.0124 0.476
(-2.13)* (-1.83)
5 -0.0076 0. 361 -0.0125 0.462
(-1.21) (-1.99)*
6 -0.0022 0.347 0.0154 0.449
(-0.36) (2.65)**
7 -0.0013 0.323 0.0016 0.419
(-0.28) (0.28)
8 -0.0017 0. 312 0.0267 0. 396
(-0.14) (4.39)**
9 0.0187 0. 301 0.0077 0.368
(2.76)** (0.78)
106 -0.0011 0.281 -0.0058 0.348
(-0.26) (-0.22)
N 5 6
Avg. beta 0.4782 0.6893
t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level
Estimation Period (t = -260 to t = -11)
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Table 7.7
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns for British
and Canadian Banks around Bolivian Moratorium Event
(Event Date 840531)
Day U.K. Banks Canadian Banks
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 0.0000 0.0230
(-0.01) (4.77)**
-2 0.0085 0.0440
(1.07) (9.03)**
-1 -0.0178 0.0087
(-2.27)* (1.94)
0 -0.0117 -0.0058
(-1.79) (-1.00)
1 0.0034 0.0037
(0.25) (0.54)
2 0.0165 0.0081
(2.20)* (1.48)
3 -0.0177 -0.0077
(-2.71)** (-1.46)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 -0.0295 0.0029
(-2.87)** (0.67)
-1 +1 -0.0261 0.0066
(-2.20)* (0.85)
-1 +2 -0.0097 0.0147
(-0.81) (1.48)
-1 +3 -0.0273 0.0070
(-1.93) (0.67)
N 5 6
Avg res var( '000) 0.2852 0.1443
Beta 0.5663 0.6689
t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level
Estimation Period (t = -260 to t = -11)
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Table 7.8
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns for British
and Canadian Banks around Brazilian Moratorium Event
(Event Date 870223)
Day U.K. Banks Canadian Banks
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 -0.0021 0.0163
(-0.17) (3.08)**
-2 -0.0117 -0.0027
(-1.39) (-0.61)
-1 -0.0146 -0.0405
(-2.10)* (-8.39)**
0 -0.0096 -0.0358
(-1.51) (-7.49)**
1 -0.0041 -0.0053
(-0.57) (-1.26)
2 -0.0355 -0.0356
(-4.59)** (-7.57)**
3 -0.0145 0.0224
(-2.09)* (4.66)**
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 -0.0242 -0.0762
(-2.58)** (-11.22)**
-1 +1 -0.0284 -0.0815
(-2.42)* (-9.89)**
-1 +2 -0.0639 -0.1170
(-4.39)** (-12.35)**
-1 +3 -0.0783 -0.0946
(-4.86)** (-8.96)**
N 5 6
Avg res var(/000) 0.3815 0.1413
Beta 0.9787 1.1982
t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level
Estimation Period (t = -260 to t = -11)
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Table 7.9
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns for British and
Canadian Banks around Citicorp Loan-Loss Provision Event
(Event Date 870519)
Day U.K. Banks Canadian Banks
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 -0.0014 -0.0017
(-0.33) (-0.28)
-2 0.0150 0.0004
(1.61) (-0.01)
-1 0.0120 -0.0115
(1.59) (-2.40)*
0 0.0326 -0.0089
(4.17)** (-1.93)
1 -0.0412 -0.0046
(-5.73)** (-0.83)
2 -0.0246 0.0046
(-3.40)** (0.93)
3 0.0032 -0.0053
(0.56) (-1.09)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 0.0446 -0.0205
(4.08)** (-3.06)**
-1 +1 0.0035 -0.0251
(0.02) (-2.98)**
-1 +2 -0.0211 -0.0204
(-1.68) (-2.12)*
-1 +3 -0.0180 -0.0258
(-1.26) (-2.38)*
N 5 6
Avg res var('000) 0.3315 0.1445
Beta 0.5015 0.9574
t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level
Estimation Period (t = -260 to t = -11)
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Table 7.10
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns for British and
Canadian Banks around Mexican Debt-Rescheduling Event
(Event Date 860930)
Day U.K. Banks Canadian Banks
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 0.0016 0.0029
(0.18) (0.63)
-2 -0.0016 0.0051
(-0.11) (0.97)
-1 -0.0203 -0.0061
(-2.39)* (-1.14)
0 -0.0059 0.0082
(-0.80) (1.67)
1 -0.0068 0.0053
(-0.85) (1.00)
2 -0.0054 -0.0094
(-0.76) (-1.83)
3 0.0033 -0.0022
(0.49) (-0.46)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 -0.0262 0.0021
(-2.25)* (0.37)
-1 +1 -0.0330 0.0073
(-2.33)* (0.89)
-1 +2 -0.0384 -0.0020
(-2.40)* (-0.15)
-1 +3 -0.0352 -0.0043
(-1.93) (-0.34)
N 5 6
Avg res var('OOO) 0.3935 0.1564
Beta 0.9630 1.1802
t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level
Estimation Period (t = -260 to t = -11)
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Table 7.11
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns for British
and Canadian Banks around Falkland War Event
(Event Date 820505)
Day U.K. Banks Canadian Banks
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 -0.0078 0.0145
(-1.16) (2.45)*
-2 -0.0010 0.0001
(-0.15) (0.07)
-1 0.0092 -0.0086
(1.46) (-1.42)
0 0.0018 -0.0046
(0.37) (-1.13)
1 0.0192 -0.0029
(3.21)** (-0.58)
2 -0.0036 0.0071
(-0.70) (1.31)
3 -0.0057 -0.0082
(-0.91) (-1.55)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 0.0111 -0.0132
(1.29) (-1.80)
-1 +1 0.0303 -0.0161
(2.91)** (-1.80)
-1 +2 0.0266 -0.0090
(2.17)* (-0.91)
-1 +3 0.0209 -0.0172
(1.54) (-1.50)
N 5 6
Avg res var( '000) 0.2136 0.2558
Beta 0.5560 0.6313
t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level
Estimation Period (t = -260 to t = -11)
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Table 7.12
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns for British
and Canadian Banks around Cartagena Declaration Event
(Event Date 840621)
Day U.K. Banks Canadian Banks
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 -0.0136 0.0050
(-1.99)* (0.85)
-2 0.0025 -0.0067
(0.16) (-1.37)
-1 0.0000 0.0011
(0.14) (0.28)
0 0.0040 0.0065
(0.48) (1.12)
1 -0.0016 -0.0053
(-0.02) (-0.89)
2 -0.0014 0.0014
(-0.24) (0.39)
3 0.0014 -0.0008
(0.35) (-0.14)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 0.0040 0.0076
(0.44) (0.99)
-1 +1 0.0023 0.0024
(0.35) (0.30)
-1 +2 0.0009 0.0037
(0.18) (0.45)
-1 +3 0.0023 0.0029
(0.32) (0.34)
N 5 6
Avg res var('000) 0.2956 0.1566
Beta 0.6269 0.7000
t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level
Estimation Period (t = -260 to t = -11)
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Table 7.13
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns for British
and Canadian Banks around Peru's Declaration Event
(Event Date 850729)
Day U.K. Banks Canadian Banks
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 -0.0033 -0.0028
(-0.56) (-0.64)
-2 0.0032 -0.0133
(0.11) (-2.58)**
-1 0.0182 0.0019
(2.08)* (0.43)
0 -0.0002 -0.0137
(0.19) (-2.74)**
1 -0.0256 -0.0077
(-2.63)** (-1.36)
2 -0.0057 -0.0003
(-0.61) (-0.12)
3 -0.0516 0.0135
(-4.68)** (2.62)**
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 0.0180 -0.0118
(1.60) (-1.64)
-1 +1 -0.0076 -0.0195
(-0.21) (-2.12)*
-1 +2 -0.0133 -0.0198
(-0.49) (-1.90)
-1 +3 -0.0649 -0.0064
(-2.53)* (-0.53)
N 5 6
Avg res var('000) 0.4577 0.1608
Beta 0.5238 0.2611
t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level
Estimation Period (t = -260 to t = -11)
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Table 7.14
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns for British
and Canadian Banks around Baker Plan Event
(Event Date 851007)
Day U.K. Banks Canadian Banks
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 -0.0054 -0.0056
(-0.85) (-1.04)
-2 0.0170 -0.0005
(2.47)* (-0.05)
-1 0.0158 0.0023
(1.57) (0.35)
0 0.0064 -0.0078
(1.05) (-1.44)
1 0.0039 -0.0165
(0.51) (-3.66)**
2 0.0120 -0.0048
(1.44) (-0.95)
3 -0.0028 -0.0064
(-0.38) (-1.36)
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 0.0222 -0.0054
(1.85) (-0.77)
-1 +1 0.0261 -0.0219
(1.81) (-2.74)**
-1 +2 0.0381 -0.0268
(2.28)* (-2.85)**
-1 +3 0.0353 -0.0332
(1.87) (-3.16)**
N 5 6
Avg res var('000) 0.5344 0.1279
Beta 0.4975 0.1646
t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level
Estimation Period (t = -260 to t = -11)
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Table 7.15
Excess Returns and Cumulative Excess Returns for British
and Canadian Banks around Oil Price Slump Event
(Event Date 860204)
Day U.K. Banks Canadian Banks
Panel A: Daily Average Excess Returns
-3 0.0043 -0.0039
(0.30) (-0.76)
-2 -0.0131 -0.0091
(-1.72) (-2.11)*
-1 -0.0113 0.0028
(-1.13) (0.56)
0 0.0063 -0.0211
(0.44) (-4.89)**
1 -0.0092 0.0063
(-0.99) (1.53)
2 0.0035 0.0111
(0.26) (2.46)*
3 0.0469 -0.0135
(6.97)** (-3.29)**
Panel B: Cumulative Average Excess Returns
-1 0 -0.0113 -0.0183
(-1.13) (-3.07)**
-1 +1 -0.0142 -0.0120
(-0.97) (-1.62)
-1 +2 -0.0107 -0.0009
(-0.71) (-0.17)
-1 +3 0.0362 -0.0144
(2.49)* (-1.63)
N 5 6
Avg res var(/000) 0.4901 0.1174
Beta 0.4934 0.8316
t-statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5% level 
** Significant at 1% level
Estimation Period (t = -260 to t = -11)
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Table 7.16
Summary of Event-Day Average Excess Returns 
for U.S., U.K., and Canadian Banks
Event 
(Event date)
U.S.
Banks
U.K. Canadian
Banks Banks
1. Mexican 
moratorium 
(08/19/82)
2. Argentinean 
moratorium 
(09/02/82)
3. Bolivian 
moratorium 
(05/31/84)
4. Brazilian 
moratorium 
(02/23/87)
5. Citicorp 
loan loss 
(05/19/87)
6. Debt-Resch. 
agreement 
(09/30/86)
7. Falkland War 
(05/05/82)
8. Cartagena meet 
(06/21/84)
9. Peru's 
declaration 
(07/29/85)
10.Baker Plan 
(10/07/85)
11.Oil Price 
slump 
(02/04/86)
-0.0177
(-7.70)**
-0.0024
(-1.32)
-0.0083 
(-3.01)**
-0.0108 
(-2.94)**
0.0068 
(3.08)**
-0.0039
(-1.24)
0.0119 
(3.50)**
-0.0104 
(-3.41)**
-0.0152 -0.0014
(-2.15)* (-0.56)
-0.0072 -0.0001 -0.0051
(-2.70)** (-0.01) (-0.42)
-0.0112 -0.0295 0.0029
(-3.53)** (-2.87)** (0.67)
-0.0135 -0.0242 -0.0762
(-4.08)** (-2.58)** (-11.22)**
0.0326 -0.0089
(4.17)** (-1.93)
-0.0262 0.0082
(-2.25)* (1.67)
0.0111 
(1.29)
0.0040
(0.48)
-0.0002
(0.19)
0.0064
(1.05)
0.0063 
(0.44)
-0.0132 
(-1.80)
0.0065 
(1.12)
-0.0137 
(-2.74)**
-0.0078
(-1.44)
- 0.0211 
(-4.89)**
t-statistics in parentheses
* Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% level
234
Table 7.17
Volume of Shares Traded for Canadian Banks 
around Mexican Moratorium Event
Volume of Shares ('000) 
Day _____________________________
BOM BNS CIC NBC RBC TDB
-2 54.3 51.9 16.8 17.2 51.1 155.5
-1 122.5 323.4 137.8 19.6 130.0 395.4
0 80.5 114.3 50.0 69.0 32.3 234.0
+1 8.8 226.2 37.2 15.0 31.5 156. 0
+2 45.8 108.9 41.4 4.4 152.6 422.4
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Table 7.18
Volume of Shares Traded for Canadian Banks 
around Bolivian Moratorium Event
Volume of Shares ('000) 
Day _____________________________
BOM BNS CIC NBC RBC TDB
-2 106.3 122.5 82.6 13.2 128.2 171.6
-1 90.8 89.7 92.8 9.0 67.6 91.8
0 32.4 83.4 23.0 5.8 48.8 17.8
+1 50.2 50.6 23.0 7.6 41.5 134.0
+2 42.3 123.2 32.2 79.2 79.9 133.6
CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This dissertation analyzed the impact of twelve events 
related to Latin American debt crisis on the market value of 
the U.S, U.K, and Canadian bank stocks. The literature was 
extended in several directions. First, different types of 
events and several events of the same type were examined to 
enhance the generality of the conclusions. Second, a general 
theoretical framework involving two testable hypotheses was 
utilized to interpret the economic significance of the events. 
Third, the capital regulation hypothesis was tested 
extensively and it helped to clarify some of the ambiguities 
presented by earlier literature on the Mexican moratorium 
event. Fourth, the GARCH model was used to address some of 
the problems associated with the OLS market model. These 
include nonnormalities, nonlinearities, and 
heteroscedasticity, and Cornell and Shapiro's criticism 
against use of event study methods for studying the impact of 
the debt crisis. Finally, the international dimension of the 
Latin American problem is recognized by extending the analysis 
to the British and the Canadian banks.
The topic was introduced in Chapter 1 while Chapter 2 
contained a review of literature on Latin American debt 
problem. In Chapter 3, twelve events were identified for
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detailed study. The events were selected in such a way that 
they encompass the unique features of the Latin debt problem. 
A brief description of each event and its hypothesized impact 
on stock prices were provided. The chapter also contained 
description of the sample of the U.S., U.K. and Canadian 
banks.
In Chapter 4, two hypotheses, the new information 
hypothesis and the capital regulation hypothesis, were 
proposed as a general framework to explain the significance of 
the excess returns around each event. The deficiencies in the 
OLS market model, namely, nonnormalities, nonlinearities, and 
heteroscedasticity, and the criticism of Cornell and Shapiro 
against use of standard event study method in the case of 
Latin American debt crisis were discussed. The GARCH model 
was proposed to address the inadequacies of the OLS model.
In Chapter 5, the event study results using the OLS and 
the GARCH models were presented. The events for which the 
event-day excess returns were found to be significant were 
analyzed further in Chapter 6 to test the hypotheses. In 
Chapter 7, the analysis was extended to the U.K. and the 
Canadian banks to exploit the international dimension of the 
problem.
Before discussing the results, some limitations of this 
study may be noted. First, the event dates are perfectly 
clustered, which, in effect, means that the sample size for 
any event is only one. However, this drawback is overcome, to
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some extent, by analyzing a number of events of the same type 
(e.g., the four moratoria) . Second, the beta of the stocks is 
assumed to be constant in the GARCH model, whereas the beta is 
found to change when the risk characteristics of the sample 
are analyzed. Hence, as noted later in this chapter, both 
beta and variance should be allowed to vary. Finally, the 
results of the U.K. and the Canadian bank stocks should be 
interpreted with caution because of the very small sample 
sizes.
The results of this study indicate that most of the
events produced significant event-day excess returns for the 
group of U.S. banks with Latin American loans. The market
distinguished banks broadly as high-, medium-, and zero-
exposure groups. The four moratoria as a class, produced 
strong and consistent results. However, tests suggest that 
the underlying dynamics of the moratoria differ, although the 
event period excess returns are similar. The results also 
clarify some of the ambiguities presented by earlier 
literature on the Mexican moratorium event. This study
provides perspective on the economic impact of capital
regulation and clarifies the link between external exogenous 
events and bank value.
The results of the GARCH model indicate that the variance 
correction does not make a significant difference in tests of 
hypotheses. However, it is useful to test the GARCH model in 
other types of studies and different data sets. In this study
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the dynamic patterns of the conditional variances and the 
betas have not been modeled simultaneously. This study can be 
extended by employing multivariate GARCH model which exploits 
the link between time-variation in beta and the time-varying 
conditional variance. Bollerslev et al. (1990) suggest that 
this model is more appropriate than an ARCH variance with a 
constant beta or beta process independent of the error 
variances.
The results for the British banks are, in general, 
similar to those for the U.S. banks for major events like the 
moratoria. However, the results for the Canadian banks differ 
somewhat from those for the U.S. banks. It is suggested in 
this study that the Canadian stock market reaction to the 
events resulted mainly in sharp changes in trading volume 
around the event dates. However, further research may be 
necessary for a more satisfactory explanation of the results 
for the Canadian bank stocks. Most of the money center banks 
of the U.S. are listed on the Montreal or Toronto stock 
exchanges. A useful extension of this study would involve 
analyzing the market reaction for the U.S. bank stocks listed 
in Canada. This may clarify whether the differences for the 
Canadian banks are caused by the market structure or the 
regulatory environment.
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